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ABSTRACT 
 
This project is a comparative exploration of the connection between descriptive 
representation and the substantive and symbolic representation of ethnic minorities: do 
Afro and indigenous representatives effectively “stand for” group members by 
introducing identity and empowering descriptive constituents? Featuring reserved seats 
for both minority groups, Colombia is an ideal case. In combination, the institutional 
design of reserved seats and the tradition of mestizaje and racial democracy add 
complexity to analyzing these populations. Consequently, in order to assess minority 
representation this work adds to extant representational theory by taking into account the 
crystallization of minority constituencies across elections. 
I use quantitative and qualitative data to comparatively assess the use of reserved 
seats for integrating minority identity to the deliberative process and measuring 
empowerment impacts for minority-majority municipalities. This data includes an 
original dataset of electoral outcomes across seven cycles (1990-2010) and transcripts of 
congressional plenaries spanning three legislative periods (2002-2014). I take into 
account constituency dynamics identifying the concentration and geographical sources of 
votes in minority districts. These outcomes translate to expectations of representative 
behavior, hinging on the theoretical belief that constituency dynamics act as signals of 
legislator accountability to minority constituents.  
This dissertation is located at the intersection of the comparative politics literature 
on minority quotas and representation, on one hand, and ethno-racial minority politics in 
Latin America, on the other. I find that ongoing electoral reforms have impacted 
constituency outcomes in post-reform cycles. More importantly, I observe that reserved 
 ii 
 
representatives from both groups have integrated identity into deliberative processes 
often, but that only in the case of indigenous representation has the use of identity in 
plenaries been responsive to constituency variables. In addition, empowerment effects are 
identified in indigenous-majority communities that have strong linkages to minority 
districts, while the same empowerment cannot be conclusively identified in Afro-
majority communities. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
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Ignoro aún si es negra o blanca, 
Si ha de cantar en ella 
el índio adormecido que llora en mis entrañas 
o el pendenciero ancestro del abuelo que me dejó su ardiente 
y sensual sangre mulata. / Si ha de llevar sabor de agua salada 
o tambores al fondo 
o claridades de sol de la mañana 
o nebulosos fríos de montaña 
 
[I still do not know if it is black or white, 
whether singing in it will be 
the dormant Indian who weeps in my heart 
or the passionate ancestor of the grandfather who left me his fiery 
and sensual mulatto blood. / Whether it will have the taste of saltwater 
or drums in the back ground / or brilliances of sun in the morning 
or misty mountain chills.] 
 
-Jorge Artel (text and translation from Prescott 1999) 
 
 
 
In 1989, the International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted Convention 169, a 
document which sought to address the rights of ethnic minorities. A broad revision of 
ILO Convention 107, the text of Convention 169 recognized indigenous land and 
property rights, autonomy, and political equality (ILO 1989, my emphasis).
1
 In particular, 
it called for special measures to ensure the protection of the persons, institutions, 
property, cultures, and environment of indigenous peoples (Article 4) and to their 
guaranteed consultation in matters of importance (Article 6, my emphasis). Convention 
169 signaled the importance of ethnic minority issues in various parts of the globe. More 
importantly, states who have taken the additional step of ratifying the measure are 
professing a concern—whether genuine or feigned—for the problems that continue to 
                                                       
1
 ILO Convention 107 was previously adopted in 1957 and called primarily for the protection and 
integration of tribal and semi-tribal people into their respective societies (ILO 1957). 
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affect their minority populations. Included among these is their exclusion from 
institutional politics and low rates of participation (Cabrero et al 2013).  
Rectification for the ills of marginalization—or the attempt thereto—has come in 
various forms. Perhaps most common are pursuits of social justice by institutional means, 
which seek to alter the nature of republicanism’s selective exclusion by introducing 
selective inclusion to democratic institutions. Electoral quotas, in their various forms, 
have taken center stage in this chapter of democracy’s ongoing global saga. At the heart 
of these measures is the desire to create space for constituents whose voices are markedly 
absent from the deliberative process, primarily as a cause of institutions which are ill-
fitted to provide valuable representation. In some instances, these constituencies escape 
the geographical norm, eschewing the common understanding of local interests for a 
broader set of group interests, all driven by a shared identity. The focus of this 
dissertation project is an analysis of two such constituencies—Afro and indigenous 
Colombians—as well as the inclusive measures that endeavor to provide them a voice in 
governmental processes. How successful have such measures been in bringing Afro and 
indigenous identity to the policy arena? How has the inchoate nature of non-geographic 
ethno-racial constituencies crystallized over time? Most importantly, what symbolic and 
substantive representational outcomes can we comparatively observe for these minority 
groups? These are the foundational questions that guide this work. 
I investigate the impact of reserved seat policies to build responses to these 
questions. Afro and indigenous Colombians were the first ethno-racial minorities in Latin 
America to receive preferential treatment during electoral processes, thereby ensuring 
their representation in the national congress. This is achieved through nationally scoped 
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(non-geographical) “virtual districts” that are connected to reserved seats. Capturing the 
crystallization of Black and indigenous constituencies in Colombia and measuring for 
representational impacts does not only address claims about the effects of inclusive 
measures; it also considers how group representatives advocate for constituents once in 
office, how this is conditioned by electoral support patterns, and whether the target 
groups feel more represented post-implementation. An analysis of this ilk is particularly 
urgent in a democratically complex region such as Latin America, where a recent wave of 
constitutional reform movements sprouted in response to flailing democratic institutions 
(Van Cott 2000). Such movements created political opportunities for minority groups 
across the region, allowing both women and ethnic minorities to wedge themselves into 
the political arena, often through affirmative action measures. Thus the continued 
analysis of these measures is part and parcel of a thorough understanding of democracy in 
Ibero-America. 
The Colombian case, along with the two minority groups considered here, 
provides fertile ground for exploring the intricacies of minority representation and the 
impact of minority constituencies manufactured through electoral engineering. The broad 
constitutional reforms passed in 1990 by the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (National 
Constituent Assembly; ANC) include either a constitutional requirement for 
representation, in the indigenous case, or an article demanding that inclusion be 
implemented in the future, as was the case for Afro-Colombians. Consequently, both 
social groups have secured reserved seats, first implemented in 1991 and 1994, 
respectively. In addition, both are elected from non-discriminatory minority districts that 
invite the participation of all voters in Colombia, should they feel connected with 
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minority representation as an alternative to traditional parties. In effect, these reserved 
seats establish a minimal quota for minority representation, while also leaving wide 
interpretation as to what is—and what might be—an ethnic minority constituency. This 
presents an ideal testing ground for the impacts of electoral support and constituency 
dynamics on representational outcomes and minority empowerment, all with potential to 
reveal how responsive minority district representation has been for the target groups. 
Sharp exclusion in Latin America, and the ethno-racial resistance it has prompted, 
may explain the region’s exemplary performance in regard to the ratification of 
Convention 169.
2
 More importantly, these actions were a clear break from the historical 
metanarratives of mestizaje and racial democracy. States not only awoke from the 
sophistic reverie that ethnic minorities did not exist, but also accepted that they must 
actively integrate them while respecting rights to cultural difference. Also implicit in the 
ratification of 169 is the recognition of group rights to previous consultation on matters of 
importance and that achieving this requires better representation in institutions.
3
 
Contemporarily, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela feature some type of ethnic 
quota, with the national congress being the most common level of implementation (see 
                                                       
2
 Per the ILO, at the time of this writing 20 states had ratified the Convention. Fourteen of these are Latin 
American governments. Indigenous representation statistics speak to the depth of this problem. México’s 
indigenous population comprises roughly 10% of the national total, yet currently only 14 of 500 diputados 
are indigenous; indigenous people are almost half of Guatemala’s population and descriptively represented 
by 19 out of 158 national representatives; almost half of Peru’s population is descriptively represented by 
nine out of 130; Bolivia’s indigenous majority of roughly 60% has 41 out of 130 in the lower house, 
despite the success of Evo Morales’s Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) (Ibid). 
3
 Attempts to strengthen Latin American democracy have motivated a wave of broad political reforms, 
many of which have included some type of representational quota (Van Cott 2000). Beneficiaries of such 
arrangements have primarily been women, with over 12 Latin American countries implementing a gender 
quota either through party initiative or broader electoral reform (Krook and O’Brien 2010). 
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Table 1).
4
 Notably, regional figures are reflective of global trends. Over 100 countries 
currently implement some type of gender measure and almost 40 have an ethnic quota 
(Krook and O’Brien 2010). The impact of quotas on minority representation has received 
a great deal of academic attention. Gender scholars have exposed the fact that gender 
quotas can heighten perceptions of institutional access (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 
2001), alter attitudes towards government (Mansbridge 1999), can result in positive 
“empowerment” reactions (Nanivadekar 2006), and impact female political engagement 
(Krook 2006). This literature buttresses normative arguments that assert the importance 
of descriptive representation beyond the policy arena (Pitkin 1967). A weakness,  
Table 1.1. Reservations and Quotas for Ethnic Minorities in Latin America 
Country 
Year 
Adopted 
National  
Sub-
national  
Details 
Bolivia 2009 Yes No 
7 lower house seats reserved for 
indigenous populations 
 
Colombia 
 
1991/2002 Yes No 
2 senate seats and 1 lower chamber 
seat reserved for indigenous 
populations; 2 lower house seats for 
Black communities 
Peru 2002 No Yes 
15% of electoral lists must be 
indigenous candidates in 11 of 25 
regions 
Venezuela 1999 Yes No 
3 congressional seats reserved for 
indigenous populations 
    Source: Ethnic quota information adopted from Htun (2012). 
 
however, lies in the fact that the bulk of the quota literature has focused on gender, a 
minority group that Htun (2004) refers to as “crosscutting” due to their non-exclusivity to 
a single social class, thus crossing partisan divisions. Ethnic minorities, on the other 
                                                       
4
 For an exhaustive list of minority quotas across the globe see Krook and O’Brien (2010), pp. 256-258. 
Peru is the only case listed here that implements a sub-national ethnic quota in which 15% of candidates on 
electoral lists (in 11 of 25 regions) must be from native communities. 
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hand, tend to coincide with partisan and class divisions and therefore merit different 
modes of inclusion, most likely producing distinct representational dynamics. 
This doctoral dissertation seeks to contribute to the growing literature on minority 
quotas by examining the impact of reserved seats on the representation of indigenous and 
Afro-Colombians. Consequently, representation is the central concept at work. I build 
upon the seminal text of Hannah Pitkin (1967), in which she theorizes the importance of 
three sub-concepts; descriptive representation, substantive representation, and symbolic 
representation. To adjust to the Colombian reserved seat context, I modify Pitkin’s 
representative-centric foundation by also taking into consideration the concept of 
constituency. This modification is particularly important due to two traits of the cases 
studied here: first, the fluid nature of ethno-racial identity in Latin America, which 
produces considerable ambiguity regarding a potential minority constituency; second, the 
fact that minority representation is elected from nationally-scoped, non-exclusive 
minority districts, in which any participating citizen can cast votes for minority 
candidates. As such, the nature of a minority voter base—and which voters will identify 
with minority candidates—is unclear. I expect that the crystallization of these 
constituencies will be impacted by the electoral format and will exert influence on the 
behavior of elected representatives. 
To contextualize the study, this introduction touches on the dynamics of ethnicity 
and race in Latin America (including the history of ethnic and racial exclusion particular 
to the region), conducts a review of the academic literature on quotas and minority 
representation, and situates minority politics in Colombia within the broader context of 
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constitutional/electoral reform. Prior to concluding, I also make some key methodological 
notes regarding the data presented here and any limitations that this presents. 
 
NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON MINORITY QUOTAS 
Claims of underrepresentation extend from the presupposition that citizens are best 
represented by a social peer—someone who shares their gender, ethnicity, class, or other 
marker. According to this logic, minority presence in institutions is congruent with 
democratic values and that deficits below the level of social diversity are undesirable 
(see, e.g., Pitkin 1967; Kymlicka 1995). Despite empirical studies that demonstrate a 
trade-off between descriptive and substantive representation (Cameron, Epstein, and 
O’Halloran 1996; Overby and Cosgrove 1996), the idea that personal characteristics of 
representatives are important continues to acquire greater force in contemporary 
democracy (Bullock 1995). Some have noted that descriptive representation carries 
greater importance in cases of historical and systemic marginalization. Mansbridge 
(1999) suggests that there are particular contexts in which marginalized groups might 
seek descriptive representatives in order to perform key functions. Young (1989) makes 
the case that “oppressed” groups should be ensured descriptive representation as they 
suffer from systemic disadvantages in governmental processes. Therefore, instances of 
historical domination lead to contexts in which descriptive representation is normatively 
desirable and pragmatically necessary, as effective participation is hindered without it. 
This focus on historical and systemic inequalities is linked with calls for affirmative 
action measures that ensure minority inclusion. Multiple theories of group representation 
have pointed out that procedural democracy has had difficulty coping with issues of 
 9 
 
group representation, particularly majoritarian systems (Williams 1998; Kymlicka 1995). 
These assertions are also linked to the importance of minority empowerment, a non-
material outcome that is a by-product of descriptive representation (Bobo and Gilliam 
1990). In sum, affirmative action policies are perceived as a starting point for overcoming 
historical disadvantage and exclusion, two conditions that characterize the Afro and 
indigenous experience in Latin America.  
In recent years, the list of countries that have established quotas to increase 
minority representation has grown significantly. These policies are created in response to 
the demands of minority social movements and the pressures brought by minority 
legislators, non-minority allies, political parties with vested interests, or executives who 
are often under international pressure.
5
 More importantly, the normative arguments made 
in favor of political quotas stress the importance of minority inclusion for remedying 
historical asymmetries of power and the putative illegitimacy of representatives who do 
not reflect minority interests and experiences (Mansbridge 1999; Htun 2004; Krook 
2009). These arguments shed light upon the key theoretical linkages between inclusion 
and quality governance, particularly in multi-cultural states. Empirical observers have 
taken up the task of measuring the extent to which these measures have translated into the 
desired institutional results (e.g. changes to institutional discourse or the passage of 
minority-friendly policy). 
Empirical studies have primarily assessed the impact of quotas on minority 
presence in institutions, policy responsiveness, and the distribution of public goods. Some 
have focused on the effectiveness of different types of quotas on rates of minority 
                                                       
5
 For a more detailed review of electoral reform determinants see Celis, Krook, and Meier (2011). 
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inclusion (Htun and Jones 2002; Schwindt-Bayer 2009). Others have remarked that 
female-friendly policy is more likely to be passed in legislatures where women hold a 
higher proportion of seats (Childs and Withey 2004; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; 
Kittilson 2008). Pande (2003) noted that ethnic reservations in India led to an increase in 
state spending devoted to target group welfare programs, while Besley et al. (2004) 
identified a linkage between ethnic reservations and increases in basic necessities for 
minorities (water, electricity, etc.). Finally, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) 
demonstrated that localities situated in an ethnic minority reserved district received a 
greater share of public funds designated for repair or construction of public goods. As 
Duflo notes, this demonstrates that any tradeoffs that might be made for reserved 
representation (i.e. narrowing candidate choices, less experienced representatives, etc.) 
appear to be offset by the gains made on behalf of marginalized populations.  
It is rarely questioned that descriptive lawmakers serve as role models for their 
constituents (Phillips 1995), but the extent of symbolic effects on mass political attitudes 
remains contentious. Some suggest that descriptive female representatives result in 
positive “empowerment” reactions (Nanivadekar 2006) and female political engagement 
(Krook 2006). Others have pointed out a greater confidence in more inclusive legislatures 
(Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Race and ethnicity scholars have also shown that 
descriptive representation increases minority participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990) as 
well as trust in government and group pride (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Tate 
and Harsh 2005). These observations buttress the normative arguments that descriptive 
representation has democratic value. But other examples have downplayed such positive 
effects. Zetterberg’s (2009) 17 country Latin America study showed little to no 
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correlation between the implementation of gender quotas and female political attitudes 
and beliefs. This study calls into question the idea that descriptive representation greatly 
affects elite-mass interactions, at least in terms of the putative “role model” effects that 
representatives have for descriptive constituents.  
 
ETHNICITY, RACE, AND EXCLUSION IN LATIN AMERICA 
Perceptions of European racial superiority during the colonial era received convenient 
support from biological ideologies. The natural inferiority of darker races, it was asserted, 
justified the social stratification scheme of the time (Graham 1990). Beliefs of Anglo 
superiority were so sharp that many Europeans became convinced that race mixture 
resulted in the “mongrelisation of whiteness” (Wade 1993). It was these pseudo-scientific 
racial underpinnings that justified the continuation of Black slavery and the selective 
assimilation, marginalization, and destruction of the Indigenous inhabitants of the new 
world. It also established a long-standing racial order that placed white Europeans at the 
apex of a top-down hierarchy. The ultimate result was a colonial system in which an 
individual’s ethnic identity determined her legal status and social position (Morner 1965), 
a system which thrived into the restless era of independence. 
Independence in the Americas arrived with an intellectual dilemma. On one hand, 
most Latin American societies were typified by ethnic and racial heterogeneity. On the 
other, they sought continued integration and commerce with Europe and a continuation of 
colonial social structures (Graham 1990). Latin American elites were in a difficult 
position, seeking to balance nation-building enterprises in pluri-ethnic societies with the 
continuation of criollo hegemony. This post-colonial reality was complex and, not 
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surprisingly, exhibited signs of both continuity and change; post-regal society was 
notably different, but European models of social stratification were not abandoned 
(Graham 1999). This led to a particularly curious response to the slave and Indian 
questions as minority populations were saddled to models of modernization through the 
ideologies of mestizaje (race mixture) and blanqueamiento (whitening of all races) (Wade 
1993), both of which feed the more contemporary “racial democracy” metanarrative. The 
result was a distinctly Latin American response to the aforementioned dilemma, one in 
which seemingly contradictory forces find a place to coexist; discrimination alongside 
integration and racial exclusion with racial inclusion. As Wade (1993) aptly suggests, 
“Blacks and especially Indians were romanticized as part of a more or less glorious past, 
but the future held for them paternalistic guidance towards integration, which also ideally 
meant more race mixture and perhaps the eventual erasure of blackness and indigeneity 
from the nation” (p. 11, emphasis added).  
While notions of racial egalitarianism are not exclusively Luso-tropical, the racial 
democracy thesis has its origins in Brazil. Gilberto Freyre, much like José Vasconcelos of 
Mexico and José Marti of Cuba, used racial democracy as an ideological weapon against 
biologically rooted racial hierarchies. Vulgarly simplified, his argument responded to 
Anglo-Saxon claims of superiority “by emphasizing the culturally—rather than 
biologically—based origins of ‘racial’ differences and celebrating those differences as a 
positive feature of national development” (Hanchard 1999, p. 4). Freyre observed the 
“benign” nature of the Portuguese slaveholder and thought that this led to closer 
relationships with slaves, both spatially and emotionally. This proximity resulted in a 
greater tendency for miscegenation and the assimilation of African and Indian culture 
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into the mainstream. Freyre also insisted, again echoing Vasconcelos’s Raza Cosmica, 
that the fusion of European, indigenous, and African people culminated in a tan-skinned 
race of people that was superior to the mono-racial Anglos. So strong were theories of 
racial democracy that they took root throughout and beyond Brazil. 
The historical impact of racial democracy for the ethnic and racial minorities of 
Latin America is difficult to capture briefly. While expounding on race in Brazil, leading 
race scholar Michael Hanchard noted that 
In both popular and scholarly works inside and outside of Brazil, Freyrean Luso-
tropicalism became the ideological cornerstone for a common belief in Brazilian racial 
exceptionalism: the idea that Brazil, unlike other multiracial polities, was not a land of 
racial inequalities. The scholarly and political consequences of Freyre’s exceptionalist 
beliefs are encapsulated in the following questions: Why bother to study or presume 
racial inequality in a place where it is nonexistent? Why should nonwhites struggle for 
civil rights in a society based in miscegenation and racial egalitarianism? (Hanchard 
1999, p. 5) 
 
What Hanchard unequivocally points out is that Latin American society, in a 
stroke of self-serving amnesia, failed to recall its racist history to the point of perceiving 
an egalitarian present. The result was a common misunderstanding of past and ongoing 
systems of social stratification. The societal coup de gras was the firmly held belief that 
one’s phenotype was rarely, if ever, the source of social discrimination and never to 
blame for a lack of upward mobility. It is this (mis)perception of a civically egalitarian 
melting pot that has defined race and ethnic relations in Brazil and throughout Latin 
America.
6
 
Peter Wade’s (1993) seminal work on racial dynamics in Colombia clearly 
demonstrates that the Brazilian racial democracy trope, while perhaps slightly adapted, 
indeed diffused to Colombia. Writing in 1993, Wade commented that “[t]he idea of a 
                                                       
6
 For a thorough review of racial democracy and negritude in Brazil see Hanchard (1994), particularly the 
introductory chapter and chapter 1. 
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‘racial democracy’ in Colombia is still pervasive, and despite refutation of this myth from 
academic and popular circles alike, some people of all colors and classes can still be 
heard to avow the insignificance of race as an issue…” (p. 3). Thus, the interplay of 
mestizaje, blanqueamiento, exclusion, and selective inclusion reflect the Brazilian case. 
It is remarked by Wade that ethno-racial minorities in Colombia have participated 
in two overall processes; on one hand, they have culturally and physically intermingled 
with the white/mestizo world while on the other they have congregated away from the 
white/mestizo world to create their own cultural forms. Degrees of mestizaje 
(mixture/integration) are often a function of the geographic context. A Black Colombian 
in Medellin was more likely to be assimilated into a predominantly lighter world than one 
in the mostly Afro-descendent Choco department, for example. But what is common 
across contexts is that assimilation of black people was only legitimately accomplished 
through blanqueamiento. In other words, it was the adoption of white and mestizo 
cultural behaviors and lighter skin that allowed one to “move up” the stratification ladder. 
Harking back to the language of Florestan Fernandes, Wade explains that the nature of 
minority “accomodation” into the mainstream is only possible on an individual level. 
Stated plainly, while the individual was assimilable, negritud and indegenismo remained 
inferior—despite any perceptions of egalitarianism that ran counter. The result is a 
“double dynamic of…adaptation and autonomy [that] works in tandem with a double 
dynamic of…conditional acceptance and racism” (Wade 1993, p. 7). 
This humanistic overview of Latin American ethno-raciality establishes the 
setting within which the guiding theory of representation must be situated. That is to say, 
this history is, in part, the justification for non-geographic districts that seek to capture 
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minority groups with diasporic qualities and unclear attachments to identity. It is not 
always precisely clear who is Indian or Afro-descendant in Colombia. As such, extant 
theories of political representation do not comfortably capture these complexities. Thus, 
there is a need to adjust to the curious history of ethno-racial exclusion/inclusion and the 
still prevalent notion of racial democracy, which led numerous anthropologists to label 
some minority populations, particularly Afro-descendants, as historically and legally 
“invisible” (Friedemann 1984; Wade 1993; Whitten 1998).7  
However, the tag of “invisibility” pointed out by the likes of Nina de Friedemann 
(1984), as she herself would suggest, is not applicable beyond the realm of legality. The 
aforementioned historical revisionism strongly debunked the idea that ethnic and racial 
identity is non-existent. Political scientists also started picking up on this fact in the 
1970s. Michael Mitchell’s (1977) seminal work on racial consciousness and political 
behavior in Brazil demonstrated that racial identity—even within the context of “racial 
democracy”—is a key tool that Latin American minorities can use to galvanize resistance 
to push group concerns. While exposing the weaknesses inherent in both primordial and 
structural explanations of the politicization of race, Mitchell emphasizes that 
consciousness must be attached to political activity. Studies of this ilk are precursors to 
the social scientific awakening in regard to ethno-racial politics in the region. By the 
1980s, political scientists were noting the increase in ethno-racial mobilization and 
politicization.
8
 While heavily influenced by structural and international accounts (see, 
                                                       
7
 Nina de Friedemann (1984) ascribes a quality of “invisibility” to black populations in Colombia. She 
asserts that a lack of discoverability has historically typified the black experience due to both the juridical 
and social exclusion that was the product of a racial monologue that largely ignored their existence. 
8
 Despite the importance of the recent surge in ethnic mobilization, historical revisionists have noted that 
marginalized populations have long been actors on the political landscape rather than mere subjects who 
are devoid of agency. See, for example, George Reid Andrews (2004). 
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e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998), the explanations for this period of galvanization are varied. 
It has also been attributed to a variety of institutional and cultural phenomena. Most 
notably among these are broad constitutional reforms and the stress and decomposition of 
traditional party structures. These changes created a political opportunity structure 
amenable to the successful politicization of ethnicity for various purposes; cultural 
preservation, resource control, communal rights to land, and territorial autonomy, to 
name a few (Asher 2009; Van Cott 2000, 2005).  Equally important was the strategic 
reinvention of identity by minority groups, who challenged the mental image of the 
mestizo nation. Colombian scholars have argued that these movements have turned 
national politics from a purely class-based struggle to an ethnic and cultural battleground, 
with ethnic rights and demands taking center stage (Castillo and Carou 2003). In short, 
what was once viewed as an issue of structure or primordial identity attachments is now 
vastly more complex.  
The reimagining of ethnicity and race has made ethnic demands palatable in the 
political arena, and thus amenable to institutionalization.  Coming on the heels of this 
shift was a new set of political scientific research in the region focusing on ethnicity in 
institutions and elections.
9
 Included among these are cross-national studies on the 
formation of ethnic parties and their mixed performance (Madrid 2012; Rice and Van 
Cott 2006; Van Cott 2005), ethnic party consolidation (Rice 2011), and the positive and 
negative effects of ethnic parties on party systems (Madrid 2005a). Others have 
confirmed that strong identity linkages tie indigenous people to indigenous organizations 
                                                       
9
 The precursors to these studies focused largely on ethnic social movements, struggles for inclusion, and 
the acquisition of collective rights. For this brand of scholarship see Asher 2009; Escobar and Alvarez 
1992; Jackson and Warren 2002; Ng’weno 2007; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Van Cott 2000; Yashar 2005. 
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and parties (Laurent 2002), electoral successes for indigenous populations (Madrid 
2005b; Laurent 2010), and the waning electoral performance for Black representation in 
Colombia (Agudelo 2002; Agudelo, Hoffmann and Rivas 1999).  
These studies are indicative of the great progress in Latin American ethno-racial 
studies, an area of knowledge that prior to the 1970s was almost exclusively the domain 
of humanistic inquiry. But even as the political scientific literature matures, key voids 
remain. First, despite the coexistence of both Indian and Afro-Latin politicization, 
scholars have not energetically pursued broad comparisons between Indian and Black 
politics in the region.
10
 In fact, most research is focused on indigenous politics with Afro-
descendants receiving far less attention. Second, and of greater importance here, it 
remains foggy at best what the ongoing linkages are between elected ethno-racial 
minorities and their constituents. That is to say, it is unclear precisely why minorities in 
the region should express support for descriptive representatives and seek social benefits 
through institutional representation. What do Afro and Indian Latinos stand to gain, both 
materially and non-materially, out of political quotas? Does one minority group exhibit 
observably greater benefits than another? These are critical questions that receive scant 
attention in institutional studies. 
 
                                                       
10
 There are a few notable exceptions. Taking a regional approach, Hooker’s (2005) piece that highlights 
the disparity in a collective rights gained by indigenous groups versus Afro-Latinos in multi-cultural 
reforms. Chapter 3 of Van Cott’s (2000) earlier book also sheds light on some of the comparative 
development of Afro-Colombian social movements versus Indian Colombians while highlighting each 
group’s involvement in the National Constituent Assembly. Finally, Sanchez et al. (1993) perform another 
single-state comparison of the involvement and outcomes for each group coming of the constitutional 
reform period in Colombia. 
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INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN REFORMATORY COLOMBIA 
The Colombian state has a long and sinuous history in regard to suffrage and electoral 
laws.
11
 In recent decades, electoral processes and referendums have been strong catalysts 
for socio-political change. The vaunted constitutional reform of 1991 itself was not 
politically feasible until the septima papeleta (seventh ballot)—an “unofficial” 
referendum regarding the formation of a constitutional assembly—received broad support 
in the March 1990 congressional elections.
12
 Although legally inconsequential, this 
popular expression led to an official referendum on reform when the Colombian 
Congress passed Decree 927, which submitted the issue to the public during the 
presidential elections that year in May. On this occasion, public demand for reform was 
expressed with yet greater clarity, with the referendum garnering an overwhelming 
eighty-six percent support rate (National Electoral Council). By June, a call for elections 
was put in motion, this time to select members of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente 
(National Constituent Assembly; ANC). Elections for the ANC took place on December 
                                                       
11
 Since 1821, each new Colombian constitution has introduced electoral rules and suffrage. Universal 
suffrage was intermittent, depending on the traditional party in power. Conservative actors, often aligned 
with the clergy, held a skeptical view of mass opinion and federalism while their Liberal counterparts 
strived for more dispersed power and broader participation (Jaramillo and Franco Cuervo 2005). The liberal 
constitution of 1853 introduced universal, direct, and secret suffrage for all posts, including former slaves 
(now free men). Limited suffrage returned in during the conservative Regeneración (Regeneration). Fully 
centralist and mostly authoritarian, the constitution of the Regeneración reestablished the indirect election 
of both presidents and senators. Chamber deputies were directly elected, but with restrictions on suffrage. 
This arrangement extended into the 20
th
 century until the Republica Liberal (Liberal Republic; 1932-1946) 
which introduced lasting measures that universalized suffrage for all men 21 years of age or older without 
regard to literacy. This measure was first applied to the election of presidents and deputies in 1936, with 
direct election to the senate being introduced in 1945.  Suffrage for women was granted by executive 
mandate in 1954 during the government of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, a right which they first exercised during 
a plebiscite in 1957. 
12
 The “seventh ballot” was labeled as such because this referendum became the seventh mandate that 
Colombian voters were considering during the elections that took place on March 11, 1990. The other six 
were for municipal councils, mayors, departmental assemblies, internal nomination of the Liberal Party 
presidential candidate, and national congress (senate and chamber). Over two million votes were cast in 
favor of the seventh ballot referendum, a tally that was interpreted as strong support for reform, particularly 
given the measures “unofficial” status and hasty inclusion (Santos Perez and Ibeas Miguel 1995). 
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9, 1990, producing atypical outcomes that reaffirmed voters’ desire for aperture in the 
political and party systems. Among these was the formidable showing by parties of the 
left, who emerged with almost one third of the available seats (21 out of 70), a 
particularly extraordinary result in a nation without an effective left-leaning party.
13
 Most 
importantly here, ANC voting was the first election in which an ethnic minority voice 
projected strongly at the national level. Indigenous movements separately fielded two 
candidates, together attracting 54,226 votes (1.5%) and the right to two seats on the 
Assembly. Those seats would be occupied by Francisco Rojas Birry of the National 
Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) and Lorenzo Muelas from the Indigenous 
Authorities of Colombia (AICO). Leaders from the Afro-Colombian movement also 
placed their names in the ANC hat, ultimately falling short due the short appeal of the 
Afro message, the lack of a unifying Black candidate or organization, and scant funds for 
their campaigns (Wade 1993, pp. 5-6; Agudelo, Hoffman, and Rivas 1999).
14
 It was for 
this reason that an Indigenous-Afro alliance played a crucial role in the reform process, 
with Rojas Birry—himself from Chocó and quite familiar with the activities of the Black 
organizations of the region—positioning himself as a voice for both the indigenous and 
Afro communities, particularly those of the Pacific. In fact, a big part of his support base 
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 According to the National Electoral Council, the Democratic Alliance M-19 (AD M-19) received 26.7% 
of the votes, resulting in 19 ANC seats. The Patriotic Union (UP) received 2.5% of the vote, delivering two 
seats to what was at that point a decimated party. 
14
 The various candidates running for the ANC for Afro organizations reflected some of the rifts in that 
movement. Otilia Dueñas had her roots in the Cauca department and worked in the Colombian Institute of 
Family Welfare. She also aligned with traditional Liberal party leaders of the region and took a universalist 
position on difference, appealing to a universalist view of difference and marginalized populations. 
Justiniano Quiñones, doctor from Nariño, and Jorge Tadeo Lozano, a senator from Chocó, both also ran on 
a Liberal party platform. Carlos Rosero, a leading member of the Proceso de Comunidades Negras (Black 
Communities Process; PCN), insisted on a purely ethnic platform which emphasized the cultural 
differences of Black Colombians and the African roots of negritude. Juan de Dios Mosquera was the 
president of the Cimarrón organization at the time and, although he did not run his own campaign, backed 
the candidates of the left. He insisted in the importance of aligning the Black movement with leftist 
organizations, a sign that the ethnic message was not of paramount importance (Wade 1993). 
 20 
 
for the ANC elections came from the Afro-Colombian community (Wade 1993). The 
lack of proper delegates was also assuaged by the presence of Afro-Colombian actors 
involved as assistants to elected delegates, in a sense forming an Afro-Colombian lobby 
for the ANC.
15
 
The two seats acquired by ONIC and AICO, along with the Birry connection to 
Black communities and the Afro-Colombian lobby, gave an ethnic tinge to the 
constitutional reform process. In effect, their involvement in the ANC stood as the most 
prominent instance of national-level ethnic representation in the nation’s history. With 
this representation—and in response to centuries of cultural, social, and political 
discrimination—a key premise of reform developed during the ANC. Pushed largely by 
minority actors, the argument suggested that exclusive electoral districts and reserved 
seats were a promising avenue for electing responsive national-level representation and 
ensuring ethnic minority access to government. Such a proposition is consistent with 
theoretical arguments that extol the efficacy of minority representation quotas. Perhaps 
more importantly, it sought to conform to international legal frameworks that called for 
“agreement and consent” in regard to native peoples, including their consultation in 
matters that affect their governance and integrity (ILO Convention 169). In practice, 
however, Latin America had yet to see the implementation of an ethnic or racial quota. 
Indeed, in the early 1990s the region had yet to articulate a broad conversation regarding 
the value of ethnic minority representation, a fact that lends quite a nod to the region’s 
collective ability to deny its cultural and racial plurality (Wade 1997). The Colombian 
                                                       
15
 Mercedes Moya of the Cimarrón organization was an adviser for Rojas Birry, while Otelia Dueñas was 
present with the Jaime Benítez camp. In addition, Lorenzo Muelas kept close contact with Luis Guillermo 
Ramos, an Afro-Colombian leader from Cauca who later became an adviser for Floro Tunabalá, one of the 
first two senators to hold a reserved seat for Indigenous communities (Wade 1993). 
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case would become surprisingly exemplary on this matter, being the first to implement 
some type of ethnic quota despite having a smaller Indigenous population than regional 
peers.  
Minority leaders capitalized on the reform process by successfully including two 
key minority demands; first, two reserved Senate seats for Indigenous communities; 
second, the inclusion of Transitory Article 55 (AT55), which effectively became a 
promise for future legislation regarding the collective territories and institutional 
representation of Afro-Colombians. AT55 resulted in Law 70, commonly known as the 
Ley de Comunidades Negras (Law of Black Communities), which dictated that two seats 
would be reserved for these communities in the Chamber of Deputies. The creation of 
these districts occurred alongside broader electoral reforms, particularly those of the 
Colombian Senate. The reform of the Senate entailed eschewing geographical 
(departmental) constituencies in the Colombian upper house in favor of a high-
magnitude, national-level scheme. Simply put, a multitude of lists would compete 
nationally for the 100 seats available.  
By the 1994 election cycle, Law 70 was put into motion and the now-labeled 
comunidades negras (Black communities) saw the implementation of their electoral 
district. The (at the time) 161-member Chamber of Deputies was otherwise mostly 
untouched by the ANC, retaining its geographical constituencies with varying district 
magnitudes. Like the renovated senate, however, both sets of minority candidates were to 
be listed in a national candidate list, without regard to geography or demographics.
16
 On 
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In 1994, the electoral format for representatives of Black Communities did not have geographical 
stipulations of any kind, thus truly being elected by plurality in a simple count of national votes. This 
format was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 1996, with the decision citing that 
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the surface, it would appear that this national scope of representation was intended to 
give voice to as many minority citizens as possible, although this is an admittedly 
sanguine perspective. What remained unclear was how this format would mold the 
strategies of the diverse segments of the Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations, 
which both exhibited regional and fragmented tendencies. 
These sweeping electoral reforms were intended to make good on the vague 
promises of the new social contract, which vowed to usher in system that was more 
“democratic, participatory, and pluralist” than its predecessor (Constitution of Colombia, 
Article 1). Less ambiguously, Botero (1998) suggests that reformers had three paramount 
ends in mind. First, they sought to construct a legislative body highly motivated to deliver 
national-level policy solutions, particularly those critical to the survival of the system. 
Second, they hoped to extract the clientelistic tendencies permeating Colombian 
institutions. Finally, they endeavored to increase the political representation of regional, 
political, and ethnic minorities. In essence, the goal was to induce a permanent shift in the 
nature of national-level representation and administer a jolt to the quasi-oligarchical two-
party system, one that had been excessively exclusionary, corrupt, and parochial (Archer 
and Shugart 1997).  
Continuing the path of reform, the Colombian legislature passed Legislative Act 
01 in 2003, commonly known as the Political Reform of 2003. First implemented in 
2006, this legislation introduced the most significant changes to the electoral system 
since the original constitutional reforms. Among the additions were a minimum threshold 
                                                                                                                                                 
representation in the Chamber, whether territorial or otherwise, had to have some type of geographical 
limitation (Constitutional Court of Colombia Sentence C-484 of 1996). For this reason, the 2001 reform 
that included the reinstatement of the Black Communities district dictated that a candidate must the two  
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of 3% of the district total and single party lists. This round of electoral engineering was 
intended to address fragmentation in the party system and induce more cohesive parties. 
It was also designed to alter the stubborn tradition of personal style politics and 
undermine local patron-client networks (Rodriguez Raga and Botero 2008). These 
innovations altered the nature of competition in legislative elections, making it 
increasingly difficult for smaller parties to win seats and forcing some to form electoral 
alliances for survival. While the Political Reform of 2003 did little to alter the nature of 
competition in minority districts, these systemic changes are expected to impact minority 
district electoral dynamics. Introducing single party lists and a minimum threshold 
reduced the number of competing parties in larger districts and heightened electoral 
challenges for smaller organizations (Shugart and Pachon 2010), leaving them to seek 
alternative options for competition. In doing so, subsequent rounds of electoral 
engineering had “ethnicized” effects. This is not to be confused with the gendered effects 
of women’s quotas, which are argued to affect gender gaps in political knowledge, 
political interests, and political involvement (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012). Rather 
than attitudes, the implementation of Legislative Act 01 has ethnicized effects without 
directly impacting the representation of the minority groups. It indirectly does so by 
changing the competitive environment surrounding minority districts.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTES AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The data used in the empirical analyses of this project come from two main sources, one 
used for quantitative analyses and the other for a qualitative analysis of congressional 
behavior. Electoral data was acquired during fieldwork from the Concejo Nacional 
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Electoral in Bogotá. For most years, this data was available at the municipal level.
17
 The 
qualitative data consists of congressional plenary transcripts acquired from the Gaceta 
del Congreso de Colombia.  
Where prudent and useful, the majority of methodological details are included in 
the chapters that follow. However, there are some key points that merit elaboration here. 
One of the conceptual complications present throughout this project extends from the 
unique and specific dynamics of Black and indigenous populations in Latin America. 
Some observers will quickly note the contrasting histories and treatments of afrolatinos 
and indigenas.
18
 This contrast holds true in the Colombian case. Afro-Colombians and 
indigenous Colombians have different patterns of economic and geographic location 
within the country. Further aggravating this comparison are incongruent forms of 
historical exclusion and discrimination (Wade 1993, Introduction). In terms of putting the 
current model to work, this creates various obstacles. Stemming from the different forms 
of exclusion and discrimination, some ethnic demands may be legitimate in the eyes of 
the mainstream public, elites, and the state while the “racialization” or “ethnicization” of 
others may be viewed as illegitimate (read: non-ethnic or non-racial). This circumstance 
might produce a natural advantage for some ethno-racial representatives to substantively 
represent their constituents by invoking minority identity in congress. This may also be 
an extension of another basic issue, the matter of divergent political opportunities and 
constraints across groups. Otherwise stated, there may be both micro and macro-level 
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 Electoral data for the 1998 cycle was only available at the level of the department. 
18
 For a thorough review of race and ethnicity in Latin America see Graham (1990) or Wade (1997). For a 
review of racial dynamics in Colombia see Wade (1993). 
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opportunities and constraints that affect minority groups and representatives differently, 
and for which there are no clear controls.  
The history of racial democracy has been accompanied by a lack of racial 
classification in governmental statistics.
19
 The lack of reliable data sets across the last 
twenty years makes tracking ethnic concentrations at the departmental and municipal 
level over long spans of time extremely difficult at best, if not impossible. The result will 
be some generalizations about what the ethno-racial make-up of municipalities and 
departments might be in earlier years based upon data from a later census. Historical 
stigmas against indigeneity and negritude also continue to effect self-identification of 
ethnic and racial minorities. This further exacerbates existing problems with assessing 
counts of minority people in Colombia, a circumstance that has culminated in a range of 
disparate population figures. During fieldwork in Cali, Colombia, I interviewed leading 
race scholar Claudia Mosquera Rosero-Labbé of the Universidad del Valle, who spoke 
directly to the censual exclusion of racial categories: 
It was not until recent censuses that race was a category offered for response. This 
is why many of us use the term “statistical invisibility” or “statistical genocide” to 
describe the collection of racial information. And our work on self-identification 
has been truly complicated. In large part, the problem is the categories….Black 
people in the Caribbean do not self-identity as much, they might say they are 
costeños, but not Black. But this does not signify that they really are not Black! 
We are almost trying to convince people of what they are so that they can be 
counted. But this has not been easy. 
 
Mosquera’s position on the matter clearly illustrates the problematique of racial 
identity in the Colombian census. In essence, self-identification according to a defined set 
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On the topic of statistics, ethnicity and race were not included as census categories until 1993 and some 
have argued that this was done problematically and was thus unreliable (Barbary and Urrea 2004). The next 
census was performed in 2005. 
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of categories is what drives the amassing of ethnicity and race data. For Afro-Colombians 
these categories include negro (Black), afrocolombiano, afrodescendiente (Afro-
descendant), and mulato and for indigenous populations it includes an indígena category 
with an array of tribal affiliations (Interior Ministry of Colombia 2014). However, on top 
of cultural differences across regions that produce tendencies to self-identify with these 
categories, there is also the issue of stigma avoidance that makes many ethnic and racial 
minorities—particularly Afro-descendants—reluctant to identify as such. This is also, in 
part, a function of the desire to be included in mestizo society (Wade 1993). 
Moving beyond broad population figures, this circumstance would also prove 
problematic for identifying descriptive representatives in institutions, as some may not 
self-identify as ethno-racial minorities. A focus on reserved seats and representatives 
provides a way out of this methodological impediment. Unfortunately, a strict focus on 
reserved seats as only source of descriptive representation means that there is little 
variation in the number of minority representatives present in congress. Thus I cannot 
measure whether an increase in self-identifying Black or indigenous congresspersons is 
an explanatory factor for substantive or symbolic representation. This point 
notwithstanding, the data acquired surrounding reserved seats and the electoral patterns 
that authorize minority representation are ideal for testing the key relationships examined 
here: 1) the impact of institutional rules on electoral outcomes in minority districts; 2) the 
extent to which constituency formation in nationally-scoped minority districts impacts 
representative behavior; 3) whether or not minorities are empowered by the presence of 
minority district candidates in elections.   
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The five chapters that follow attempt to work through the challenges identified 
above while producing plausible conclusions to the questions at hand. First, I attempt to 
build a theoretical framework that is applicable to Latin American ethno-racial minorities 
and the dynamics of the Colombian case. To this end, Chapter 2 builds upon the seminal 
work of Hannah Pitkin (1967) on the concept of representation. I note that Pitkin’s 
framework is crucial for its disaggregation of the concept into the sub-concepts of 
descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation. However, I make the case that her 
framework must be adjusted prior to being applied to non-exclusive, nationally-scoped 
minority districts and the Latin American context of racial democracy. This is due to her 
theory’s assumption on the static nature of constituency, which leaves little space for the 
fluidity of Latin American ethnic identity. In brief, Pitkin’s theory is excessively 
representative-centric, which, per my argument, leaves the theory wanting for the 
dynamics of the case. Consequently, I adjust to this by building a framework can capture 
the intricacies of minority constituencies in Colombia. These constituency variables are 
mobilized later to test their impact on representational outcomes. 
Chapter 3 assesses the crystallization of ethnic minority constituencies as a 
function of electoral results, in effect creating an empirical extension of the framework 
created in Chapter 2. An empirical analysis of longitudinal electoral data is driven toward 
making the argument that electoral and constituency outcomes are conditioned by both 
internal rules and broader systemic changes, the latter factor brought to life by the 
implementation of Legislative Act 01 in 2006. Backed by a broad overview of district-
year level data, I expose the fact that internal and external rules have influenced minority 
constituency formation by altering the nature of electoral competition. In short, I make 
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sense of the electoral patterns of support for minority district candidates while testing for 
the influence of institutional factors, all culminating in the identification of constituency 
outcomes that I theorize should have an impact on congressional representation. 
Chapters 4 and 5 each address representational outcomes for Afro and indigenous 
Colombians. In applying the theoretical framework constructed in Chapter 2 and building 
upon the empirical foundations of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 takes up the issue of substantive 
representation in congress, here understood as the invoking of ethno-racial identity by 
minority representatives and linking it with issues and geography. Described succinctly, 
this chapter utilizes qualitative congressional data (plenary transcripts) to assess the 
tendency of minority representatives to “stand for” minority constituents during the 
deliberative process. Accordingly, the primary goal is to determine whether constituency 
outcomes exert influence on the behavior of representatives, as my theory dictates they 
should. Chapter 5 shifts to the topic of symbolic (non-material) representational outcomes 
by examining the linkage between minority districts and minority empowerment. 
American identity scholars have noted that the presence of visible descriptive leaders has 
an empowerment effect on the minority citizens with whom they share an identity (see, 
e.g., Bobo and Gilliam 1990). Using the measures of minority district support and turnout 
in minority-majority municipalities, I test to see if linkages to minority district candidates 
induce heightened rates of minority participation, the latter here understood as a marker 
of empowerment. Both Chapters 4 and 5 are comparative in nature, juxtaposing the 
outcomes for Afro versus Indian communities to see if ethno-racial identity has held 
greater traction for one group versus the other. Where helpful, outcomes are also 
aggregated—or disaggregated, depending on the analysis—at the regional level. This is 
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done to determine how much, if at all, geographic context influences the salience of 
ethnic minority politics. 
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CHAPTER 2: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF MINORITY 
REPRESENTATION 
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Latin American economic and legitimacy crises came to a crescendo in the 1980s, 
widening political opportunities for minorities to force government concessions and 
broad constitutional reforms (Van Cott 2005). States began openly recognizing the 
heterogeneity of their citizenries, while academic authors began to note the importance of 
race and ethnicity to social status and divisions of labor (Fernandes 1969; Hanchard 
1994; Wade 1993; Wade 1997). Thus it was under dire circumstances that the racial 
democracy thesis was recanted by Latin American elites. State response to domestic and 
international pressures has been swift and visible, including measures to ensure cultural 
preservation and the institutional integration of excluded populations. The most 
observable institutional response at the national level is the creation of reserved seats and 
party quota mandates for minorities. This prescription for greater institutional 
representation recognizes both the theoretical and practical value of quality representation 
in modern democratic settings (Dahl 1967; Tilly 2007).  
Reserved seats and other quotas are undoubtedly a positive step forward, even if 
interpreted solely as a sign of good faith from traditional power structures to minority 
groups and the international community. Discovering the representational impacts of 
quotas, however, is far more complex, particularly for ethnic groups traditionally 
dismissed as “invisible” (de Friedemann 1984). That is to say, it remains foggy how Latin 
American ethno-racial minorities—groups with little historical and political visibility—
have benefited from descriptive representation via quotas. This situation is distinct from 
women and many other ethnic minorities, whose rights and legitimacy were historically 
denied but whose existence was always assumed, if not apparent.  
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Adding to the framework of Hannah Pitkin (1967), which has a predominant 
focus on the characteristics and behaviors of representatives, this chapter builds a 
theoretical framework of minority representation that is appropriate for the ethnic 
minorities of Latin America—and that might also be applied to other global populations 
struggling for external—and even internal—recognition.1 My approach keeps two 
particular case dynamics in mind: 1) the crystallization of newly forming minority 
constituencies and identities; 2) the connections between these constituents and reserved 
representatives elected out of non-geographical, nation-level districts. The theory 
developed in this chapter will be tested in the chapters that follow, using the measures 
described here. 
 
REPRESENTING NEWLY RECOGNIZED MINORITY GROUPS 
Pitkin’s framework seeks to fill gaps in the extant theories of representation at the time of 
authorship (1967), adding a procedural dimension to more static conceptions of 
representation. It does not, however, deliver a theory that fully captures the complexities 
of ethnic representation in Latin America. Specifically, her approach largely concentrates 
on the actions and nature of the representative. While logically consistent, this focus is ill 
suited for an analysis that must give attention to the process of minority constituency 
formation in “post-racially democratic” societies. Or, more broadly, it is limited to 
analyzing legislators whose constituencies are fixed and whose interests are apparent. In 
                                                       
1
 By “internal recognition” I mean that one of the issues vexing the Afro movement lies in the lack of group 
members to self-identify as such. The work of Mosquera Rosero-Labbe, Lao-Montes, and Rodriguez 
Garavito (2010) on census processes has shed light on this issue. There is a general resistance to the 
embracing of black identity which has, per the authors, been exacerbated by the identity categories made 
available to census respondents.  
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other words, the representative is dynamic while the constituency is static. In Colombia, 
it is unclear who (actors/citizens) and what (issues/demands) are legitimately ethnic. In 
addition, and particularly the case for black Colombians, there is an observed reluctance 
of minorities to self-identify as such (Mosquera Rosero-Labbe, Lao-Montes, and 
Rodriguez Garavito 2010). Thus the process of creating an ethnic constituency and 
locating minority constituents who self-identify as such are all critical to a complete 
analysis. This context, along with the implementation of reserved seats via non-
geographical, non-exclusive constituencies, necessitates a key empirical undertaking; an 
assessment of electoral outcomes for understanding the crystallization of ethnic 
constituencies. This procedure must be conducted in order to determine, to some degree, 
the geographical and social makeup of the constituency to which the representative is to 
be held accountable.  
In theory, minority representatives elected via quotas acquire their authority like 
other elected officials; outperformance of rivals in elections. However, prior to elections 
they benefit from affirmative action measures that ensure the authorization of minority 
group representation. Furthermore, as representatives whose authority is partially 
acquired by a quota, minority representatives are also largely accountable to those 
populations, although the extent to which this “mandate effect” has an impact may hinge 
on the political forces pushing the quotas passage (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). In the 
Colombian case the open nature of participation in minority rolls, which allows all voters 
the freedom to cast votes in whichever district they choose (indigenous, Afro-descendent, 
or non-minority), means that electoral accountability is not exclusive to the target groups. 
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Consequently, ethnic constituencies are both ambiguous and subject to external influence, 
and thus cannot be left assumed or static. 
Theories of institutional representation to larger minorities (e.g. women) also fall 
short due to the small proportion of seats reserved for minority groups, a proportion that 
is invariably fixed across legislative cycles. Indigenous communities have acquired 2 
seats in a 102 member senate and 1 in a 166 member chamber of representatives. Black 
communities, somewhat less fortuitously, have attained 2 reserved seats in the 166 
member lower chamber alone. These figures plainly show that neither set of seats provide 
either group with anything greater than a skewed minority status (Kanter 1977; Dahlerup 
1988). Consequently, it is hardly reasonable to expect the presence of reserved seats to 
drastically alter the agenda or policy outcomes, as has been observed for groups who 
acquire higher rates of institutional inclusion (Thomas 1991; Grey 2002). 
Notwithstanding these limitations, an expansion of the concept of substantive 
representation allows for considering critical acts as a valid form of communicating 
group concerns (Dahlerup 1988).
2
 Even the most skewed minority groups can introduce 
minority identity to the deliberative processes by invoking group identity in connection 
with issues. This is best observed through the inclusion of ethnic identity by minority 
representatives in plenary speeches. Representative behavior, of course, is presumably 
impacted by the belief that utilizing this discourse will be politically advantageous. Or, 
                                                       
2
 Arguing that politics cannot be reduced to physics, Dahlerup utilizes the “critical act” as a supplementary 
concept to critical mass. She defines a critical act as “one which will change the position of the minority 
considerably and lead to further changes.” She suggests three main examples; 1) recruitment of other 
minorities into politics; 2) the introduction of minority quotas; and 3) the introduction of minority-friendly 
legislation and institutions. 
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conversely, it is influenced by the belief that they will be held accountable for not doing 
so.  
        Figure 2.1. Adjusted Model of Minority Representation 
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or weakness of ethnic support. These are 1) high rates of support from minority 
communities versus low rates of support from minority communities; second, highly 
concentrated support patterns versus lower concentrated support patterns. Both factors 
identify patterns of constituency formation through electoral outcomes and must be 
assessed across electoral cycles. Highly concentrated/strong ethnic support versus low 
concentrated/weak ethnic support are expected to impact elite behavior by signaling 
minority representatives the extent to which they are accountable to minority 
constituents. This model captures the importance of constituency variables and situates 
their explanatory value for representational outcomes.  
In Colombian legislative elections, all voters are free to forego supporting 
mainstream candidates to vote for minority candidates, making it impossible to discern 
who is voting for indigenous and Afro district candidates. In simple terms, neither self-
identification as a minority nor alternate registration is necessary. This being the case, it 
is not prudent to directly interpret district voting patterns as a purely ethnic expression, as 
an unknown portion of that support is presumably from non-ethnic voters. We can, 
however, maximize assumptions about the strength or weakness of ethnic mandates by 
focusing on the share of votes that are cast in minority-influenced departments (MIDs) 
and the geographic concentration of support.
3
 These two measures can be calculated at 
the district, district-year, and individual (candidate/representative) levels and construct 
the blueprint for categorizing minority constituency formation. Spotlighting support from 
                                                       
3
 By the phrase “strength or weakness of ethnic mandates” I mean the extent to which minority votes 
dominate the authorization of group representation. That is to say, a “strong” minority mandate would 
feature a large proportion of votes from geographic locales with a high percentage of minority residents. A 
“weak” ethnic mandate would include a larger percentage of votes from areas with a smaller segment of 
minority residents. 
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MIDs allows for an approximation of minority voter support, as we can be confident that 
most minority district votes cast in MIDs come from minority voters. Thus high rates of 
MID support and a strong concentration in those districts is the best possible outcome, as 
it signals representatives that they are highly accountable to minority populations.  
A two-dimensional visual of constituency outcomes from MID support and 
Hirschman-Hirfandahl Index (HHI) concentration is given in Figure 2.2. When placed on 
this axis, four constituency types are produced by the measures, each corresponding to 
the combination of low to high concentration and weak to strong MID support. In order 
of weakest to strongest ethnic mandates, they are 1) low-weak, 2) high-weak, 3) low-
strong, and 4) high-strong. It is important to note that these measures are temporally 
dynamic. In other words, they are capable of capturing both the crystallization and re-
crystallization of minority constituencies across election cycles. Constituency outcomes 
may be strongly ethnic and highly concentrated in one cycle and low and dispersed (not 
concentrated) in the subsequent cycle, thus shifting from a high-strong (Type 4) to a low-
weak (Type 1) constituency across elections. For the purposes of assessing individual 
candidates/representatives, participation and concentration are also used at the candidate 
and representative level. This means that we may see one candidate elected out of the 
formation of one type of constituency and another representative concomitantly elected 
out of another type. The result is a typology that is mobilized primarily at the minority 
district level in order to assess the broad linkages between minority voters and seat 
reservations and also at the candidate/representative level to capture patterns that are 
electorally successful. Both figures are important for gauging expectations of individual 
representatives, the former for acquiring an idea of who the representative might be 
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accountable to in the future and the latter for understanding to whom she is currently 
accountable. In the following section, I provide a detailed explanation of the 
representational consequences for minority constituents that we can expect from each 
constituency type.  
 
    Figure 2.2. Four Category Typology of Minority Constituency Formation 
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4
 Moreover, these strong minority support rates are 
                                                       
4
 I use the word “suggests” in this instance as well as all of the category descriptions. This is due to the fact 
that in most cases it will be impossible to be certain what proportion of minority district votes actually 
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concentrated in a smaller number of districts, a circumstance that, theoretically, facilitates 
the linkage of identity to regional and local interests. Stated otherwise, it avoids the 
representational complications that arise from a more dispersed support base, such as the 
need to balance between rural and urban interests. A representative elected from a high-
strong constituency from Pacific region districts can focus her attention on issues such as 
collective mining rights and rural poverty alleviation, as these are clear regional issues.  
Officials elected out of strong-high constituencies are likely to possess certain 
characteristics. First, it is likely that they will have political experience in at least one of 
the MIDs that exhibit high concentration scores (e.g. visible social movement leaders, 
mayors in prominent cities, or departmental governors). Thus it is likely that they will be 
highly visible, a profile validated by their high and concentrated appeal. This should 
translate to a familiarity with the key issues and local patronage networks. The presence 
of a public figure of this ilk might ease any doubts that the representative is legitimately 
linked to ethnic citizens and has a shared understanding with minority constituents 
(Williams 1998; Young 2000).  
The rich ethnic support that produces a high-strong constituency acts as a signal 
to elected officials and future aspirants that accountability to ethnic populations is high. 
Due to high expectations of accountability, this constituency type is most likely to 
produce high rates of substantive representation and observable empowerment outcomes. 
In substantive terms, we can expect representatives to introduce minority identity in 
                                                                                                                                                 
came from minority voters. This is a function of the open ability of all voters to vote for minority district 
candidates should they choose to forego selecting a mainstream candidate or list. In cases of particularly 
high minority population figures we can safely assume that the vast majority of minority district votes came 
from ethno-racial minority citizens. It merits mentioning, however, that as minority population figures 
decline this assumption will become more precarious.  
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plenary speeches at higher rates (invocations of ethnicity or race). Empowerment 
outcomes, here measured as higher rates of turnout in minority-majority municipalities, 
can also be expected.
5
  
 
Low-Strong Constituencies (Type 3) 
A low-strong constituency is formed when MID support rates are high while the overall 
district vote is not concentrated in a small number of departments. The most likely 
scenario involves a split in the minority vote, most likely divided along regional lines. 
This brings a complication; a lack of geographical focus which may pit one set of 
regional issues versus others. The second scenario is particularly problematic due to the 
contrasting interests of rural versus urban minority voters, a reality which undermines the 
likelihood of these sectors to come together on electoral issues. It is most likely that this 
context would be the result of sharp fragmentation in minority electoral organizations, 
with some championing urban minority issues and others stressing rural demands. 
Whatever the case, the lack of concentration at best vexes the linkage of identity to issues 
and geography in plenaries and, at worse, makes the introduction of identity more 
difficult. This may slightly curb the ability of representatives to effectively “stand for” 
their constituents.  
Officials elected out of low-strong formations are likely to be figures that have 
broad appeal or are minority citizens with a non-political source of fame.
6
 In the 
                                                       
5
 I follow others in interpreting higher rates of minority turnout as a sign of minority empowerment (Bobo 
and Gilliam 1990). 
 41 
 
indigenous case where we see the presence of institutionalized parties, the former 
situation is more likely. In fact, it is conceivable that such a diverse voter base may be a 
function of party appeal rather than a reflection of the candidate’s history. Thus the 
diverse appeal would be due to a lasting party apparatus with a loyal voter base. Afro-
Colombian parties have much less longevity, usually only lasting for one cycle.  
Consequently, they are more likely to fit the description of fragmented organizations, 
splintered support bases, or figures with non-political fame. This being the case, we can 
expect low-strong constituencies to bring contrasting representational expectations across 
groups. 
High participation in MIDs makes it likely that low-strong constituencies will be 
positively correlated with minority empowerment (turnout). Substantive outcomes are 
more complicated, however. The strong minority support intermingled with lacking 
concentration in MIDs acts as a cue to elected officials, effectively communicating that 
minority interests in MIDs are salient but not necessarily paramount for successful 
performance. Afro-Colombian representatives who arise out of a fragmented movement 
are at an apparent disadvantage, needing to stand and act for non-harmonious sets of 
interests. Indigenous representatives might feel the same pressure, but the backing of an 
institutionalized party provides them a greater margin of ethnic error, so to speak, and an 
entirely different set of motivations (i.e. coalitions, party politics, etc.). Black 
representatives are therefore likely to be more circumspect about their use of ethno-racial 
                                                                                                                                                 
6
 A possible example of a public figure with a non-political source of fame is Maria Isabel Urrutia, who 
held one of the seats reserved for Afro-Colombian communities from 2002 to 2006. She is widely known in 
Colombia as one of the country’s few Olympic gold medalists, a factor that made her election possible via 
name recognition. The fame-by-athletics path to power is also applicable to Willington Ortiz, a former 
player for the Colombian national soccer team. 
 42 
 
language, as the different factions within the movement will disagree on how negritude 
should be politically mobilized (cite Arocha 1998 re: disagreements on this). This might 
inhibit their ability to engage in discursive representation. In contrast, indigenous 
representatives from parties that already have a long-standing indigenous platform will 
find it easier to invoke indigeneity as its content is not as much in question. This contrast 
should also impact substantive outcomes. Black representatives will find it more difficult 
to navigate the complications of presenting policy that serves their splintered 
constituency. Indigenous representatives will find it easier to introduce legislation. They 
benefit from a party affiliation that would facilitate the representative’s capacity to build 
useful alliances and navigate institutions. But the fact that a great deal of party support 
might be from non-minority voters presents a bit of a quandary. The party, and by 
extension the representative, is highly accountable to a non-ethnic (likely left-leaning) 
population of voters. This segment is unlikely to see value in ethnically (read culturally) 
focused legislation, but rather broader structural issues. Thus the complication of diverse 
interests plays a key role in processes of substantive representation for both minority 
populations, albeit for different reasons. It is perhaps ironic that these instances of high 
minority district participation, which signal the salience of minority issues, might be 
representationally counter-productive.  
 
High-Weak Constituencies (Type 2) 
The formation of a high-weak constituency is characterized by a low percentage of 
overall support from MIDs that is highly concentrated. Low minority district participation 
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in MIDs suggests that elected representatives were authorized with weak ethnic support, 
seeing the integration of non-MID votes at a higher rate. This support base is considered 
weak due to the infiltration of votes from departments that have low minority population 
figures. Thus, accountability to minority populations is diminished. The low rate of MID 
support suggests one of two outcomes: 1) minority support for reserved representation is 
waning; 2) non-minority support is increasing. Like strong-high constituencies, high-
weak patterns will also be geographically identifiable due to a high vote concentration. 
However, in these instances that concentration may be due to a high amount of votes 
from non-minority urban centers (e.g. Bogotá). Highly concentrated support patterns 
make it possible that localized ethnic issues of importance will still be apparent to the 
representative. The low rate of participation, on the other hand, indicates that issues of 
minority importance may not take precedence, as they are not salient to a large swatch of 
the minority district electorate. That is to say, the linkages between minority populations 
and minority district candidates are most likely weak, thereby complicating exclusive 
attention to minority demands. It may also signal weak performance by sitting 
representatives and, consequently, a loss of minority voter trust.  
Officials elected out of high-weak patterns, like those from high-strong 
constituencies, will likely have political experience in at least one of the departments of 
highly concentrated support or will be nationally-recognizable figures. In contrast, they 
will most likely be perceived by minority voters to have weak ties to the group, 
affiliations with non-minority parties, or may be incumbents who have failed to perform 
effectively. A representative producing a high-weak constituency will have knowledge of 
key local issues only in situations where they also have legitimate ties to the target group. 
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In other words, nationally-recognizable figures that have ties to non-minority 
organizations (e.g. linkages to paramilitaries and the right) will have either little 
knowledge of group demands or short motivation to represent those demands. In addition, 
they will likely have less influence in regional patronage networks. If the opposite were 
true in terms of influence, their support numbers in MIDs would likely be more robust.  
The weak minority support that produces a high-weak constituency is a signal to 
elected representatives and future aspirants that accountability to ethnic populations is 
low. Moreover, lower MID support is indicative of larger ethno-representational 
problems, including the inability of minority organizations and parties to overcome 
traditional party strongholds (e.g. the Liberal Party in the Pacific region) or the rise of 
nefarious sectors of Colombian politics in minority-influenced areas. This instantly 
places their institutional efficacy in question in regard to strong minority representation. 
However, due to the concentrated nature of support, this constituency type is still likely to 
be produce substantive outcomes by linking minority identity with issues and geography. 
In other words, they are likely to invoke ethnicity and race due to a geographically 
identifiable minority constituency. The question becomes, how will they balance this 
with the influx of votes from non-minority areas? My theory suggests that they will do 
this at a lesser rate than those with constituency outcomes that have high MID support, 
but more than the low-weak constituencies that reflect both weak MID support and low 
concentration scores.  
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Low-Weak Constituencies (Type 1) 
A low-weak constituency is formed when both MID support and HHI concentration is 
low. This combination suggests two main characteristics; first, that elected 
representatives were authorized with a questionable (hence illegitimate) amount of ethnic 
support (many votes are from districts with low minority population figures); second, that 
this mostly non-MID support was dispersed across the national territory. Both issues 
signal to elected representatives that accountability to geographically-specific minority 
communities is very low. Unlike the previous two constituency types, low-weak 
formations are unlikely to have an identifiable geographical pattern, or at least not one 
that has a geographic focal point. Consequently, issues that are salient for ethnic 
populations in MIDs are not likely to be apparent (or important) to the representative. 
The low rate of participation also indicates, as in the high-weak type, that ethnic issues 
are not salient to the “minority” electorate. In addition, the linkages between minority 
populations and reserved representatives are weak.  
The formation of a low-weak constituency is likely to be a function of a sharp 
disconnect between reserved representatives and the populations who should benefit from 
reserved seat policies. Even if these representatives have political experience in minority-
majority areas, their electoral support tips us off to the fact that their presence on the 
minority roll was motivated by political opportunism rather than a true connection with 
minority struggles. In fact, it is probable that these outcomes are signs of the complete 
usurpation of reserved seats by other electoral vehicles. In these cases the candidates put 
forth on the minority roll are most likely allies of non-minority parties and organizations. 
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It is, however, possible that the candidacies are genuine and that the low MID voting 
rates and concentrations are due to a lack of appeal to minorities—for various possible 
reasons—combined with the desire of mainstream Colombians to seek electoral 
alternatives to traditional parties. In instances where reserved seats are hijacked, the 
representative would be indifferent to minority issues, even if rhetorically cognizant. In 
situations of poor minority appeal, the representative would struggle to represent the 
minority communities from which there is a clear disconnect.  
Because of the weak minority mandate, reserved representative elected out of 
low-weak constituencies are accountable to other sectors of the electorate. Their alliances 
with non-minority organizations shed serious doubt on their desire to be responsive to 
Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities. As mentioned previously, lower rates of 
MID support at the district-year level are a sign of broader mistrust between minority 
voters and reserved seat candidates. Accountability to non-minorities means little to no 
invocations of minority identity and linkages between identity and issues.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has introduced a method for studying the impact of constituency formation 
on representational outcomes in a Latin American context. The nature of race and 
ethnicity in Colombia—delivered by a history of racial democracy, mestizaje, and 
exclusionary-inclusion—produces various complexities. First, we must view both Afro-
Latin and indigenous populations as ethnic groups with significant intra-group diversity 
whose issues, demands, and platforms are still nascent. This is particularly the case for 
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Afro-Colombians, whose status as an identifiable ethnic group is most often questioned 
while also being internally conflicted (Arocha 1998). Second, the historical lack of ethnic 
visibility—particularly in the political sense—is a potential impediment for responsive 
representation. Issues brought forth by minority representatives may be viewed as 
illegitimate by mainstream elites, not to mention society at large. Moreover, and because 
of the pervasiveness of racial democracy, the putative linkages between minority citizens 
and mandated representation are obscure. Hazy minority population statistics are 
consequences of both historical census procedures (lack of racial/ethnic categorization) 
and minority aversions to self-identification (Mosquera Rosero-Labbe, Lao-Montes, and 
Rodriguez Garavito 2010). These intricacies require an approach that goes beyond 
representative-centered approaches to representation, while still preserving their utility. 
The response here has been the creation of a framework that captures constituency 
formation so that we can harness the ongoing crystallization of developing constituencies. 
This being the case, I have argued here that representational outcomes are destined for 
misinterpretation if we do not first consider the continuously altering constituency 
formation patterns arise from non-geographic reserved seat districts. 
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CHAPTER 3: MINORITY ELECTORAL DISTRICTS IN PRACTICE (1991-2010) 
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One of the guiding premises of this project is that the Pitkinian conception of 
representation has an excessive focus on representatives versus constituents. Pitkin’s 
traditional framework emphasizes the identity and actions of representatives and the 
impact that these factors have on symbolic and substantive representation (Pitkin 1967). 
While this framework may be an appropriate starting place for developed identity groups, 
I argue in Chapter 2 that newly politicized identities require a more balanced approach 
between representative and constituency variables. Particular to the Afro and Indigenous 
Colombian cases, I see a critical role played by the crystallization of indigeneity and 
negritude as political markers. In the electoral sense, this translates to constituencies that 
are in flux, particularly in the context of open, non-geographic minority districts. I have 
argued that the jelling of identity and constituency should have a considerable impact on 
minority representative behavior and, by extension, symbolic and substantive outcomes. 
In short, this theoretical shift presents a dynamic, multi-directional framework. 
 Through an analysis of electoral dynamics in minority districts, this 
chapter assesses the crystallization of ethno-racial constituencies. My central claim is that 
electoral outcomes in minority districts—and the subsequent constituencies that are 
produced—are doubly conditioned by internal rules and broader systemic factors.1 I 
demonstrate that the electoral reforms included in Acto Legislativo 01 de 2003 
(Legislative Act 01 of 2003; henceforth LA01) have influenced the nature of constituency 
formation by altering the state of electoral competition both in and outside of minority 
                                                       
1
 The juxtaposition between “internal” and “systemic” is intended to draw a distinction between rules that 
are specific to minority districts versus those that are applied in all Colombian elections (Chamber, Senate, 
and local). Rules that oversee minority electoral districts are understood here to be internal, while all others 
are considered systemic. Most prominently, minority districts have alternative guidelines for registering 
candidate lists. These alternate rules are not constant across minority districts, however, as is discussed in 
greater detail below. 
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districts. This impact is most discernible at the district level, but impacts at the party-list 
level are also observed. Thus, the main goal is to identify geographic patterns of support 
for minority candidates while taking institutional factors into account. Most importantly, 
this exercise will concretize Afro and Indigenous constituencies that are otherwise 
“virtual” in nature.2  
 In an attempt to weaken the influence of local patronage networks, 
constitutional reform (1991) brought changes to the electoral format for the Senate. This 
entailed foregoing geographic representation in favor of a single (nation-level) electoral 
district (Crisp and Ingall 2002). Politicians from both traditional parties, along with 
newcomers, increasingly used new party labels—commonly referred to as movimientos—
to gain election in this nation-wide district with a magnitude of 100 (Pizarro Leongómez 
2006).
3
 The number of effective parties in Colombia burgeoned as a result, an 
overcorrection which in effect brought the end of the institutionalized two-party system. 
LA01 sought to “rationalize” party competition (i.e. curb fragmentation and minimize 
personally-driven movimientos). It has been noted elsewhere that the reforms—which 
implemented single-party lists, a minimum threshold, and D’Hondt formula—
successfully altered party competition enough in order to achieve the main intent 
(Rodriguez Raga and Botero 2006). I suggest here that party adaptations to new rules also 
impacted the nature of competition in minority districts. That is to say, more cohesive 
                                                       
2
 By “virtual”, I mean that minority districts—and, consequently, constituencies—do not have a 
subnational geographic boundary or pertain to a department or region. Thus, despite a focus on target 
minority groups, the electoral constituencies of minority districts are determined ex post facto by electoral 
outcomes rather than the reverse.  
3
 Movimientos are basically candidate-oriented “mini-parties”, which were small electoral organizations 
whose sole purpose was to elect a single candidate for public office. Colombians also use the terms “micro-
empresas” (micro-enterprises) and, more informally, “partidos taxis” (taxi parties) to describe these 
organizations (Pizarro 2006).  
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parties altered voter preferences to a great enough extent as to affect outcomes in the 
BCD, ICD, and ISD, thereby also influencing the crystallization of minority 
constituencies and, by extension, minority representation. 
To frame the analysis, I begin by discussing the design of minority districts 
(internal structures) and nature of introduced reforms (external structures). I then observe 
two key district dynamics—list formation and fragmentation—across six cycles, making 
the case that variation across districts is directly impacted by internal rules and—like 
constituency outcomes—conditioned by systemic reform. I then move forward by 
analyzing electoral support and constituency outcomes. The task of classifying virtual 
constituencies involves measuring the geographic concentration of votes cast in minority 
districts, as well as the proportion of this concentration (the percent share of overall 
votes) that comes from minority-influenced areas. In effect, this procedure captures a 
spatial snapshot of electoral outcomes in minority districts, which allow the classification 
of support patterns into constituency types. Ergo, the data tendered here represents the 
implementation of the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2 and will mobilize the 
constituency variables that are to be used in subsequent chapters. 
 
DISTRICT DESIGN AND SYSTEMIC REFORM 
The implementation of reserved seats was, in theory, a focal point for ameliorating 
minority exclusion, putatively strengthening a delicate Colombian democracy.  In 
practice, institutional inclusion has been a complex process, mostly due to the mode of 
implementation. First, minority districts are marked by the absence of participatory 
restrictions. Thus, all voters are free to cast votes in the minority roll if they so choose, 
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without any additional registration requirement or documented affiliation with the target 
group. This design introduces the potential for the dilution of the minority vote, even 
within the districts created specifically for selecting responsive minority representation. 
Such interference may potentially lead to the election of representatives that do not have 
strong mutual relationships with the dispossessed subgroup, a criteria that Dovi (2002) 
suggests is crucial for selecting preferable descriptive representatives. Put simply, non-
minority influence in minority elections may dilute minority representation, although this 
is not a foregone conclusion.
4
 
Indigenous and Afro seats saw first implementation in 1991 and 1994, 
respectively. Senate representation was secured by Indigenous communities during the 
Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (National Constituent Assembly; ANC) and was 
included in the text of the National Constitution.
5
 Specifically, Article 171 of the 
Colombian Constitution states that 
 
The special district for the election of senators for Indigenous communities will be 
determined by the electoral quotient system, defined in Article 263 of the Political 
Constitution. Representatives of Indigenous communities who aspire to integrate into the 
Senate of the Republic must have held a traditional position of authority in their 
respective community, or have been the leader of an Indigenous organization, a quality 
accredited by certificate from the respective organization and endorsed by the Interior 
Ministry.
6
 
 
                                                       
4
 I do not assume that broad support from non-minority sectors will produce representation that is entirely 
indifferent to minority issues, be they local, regional, or national in scope. Pitkin suggests that the 
representation of national interests does not have to come at the cost of provincial needs and that 
representatives of a geographic constituency should strike a balance (Pitkin 1967, pp. 215-217). It follows 
that representatives elected via quota do not have to be excessively narrow in their activities, regardless of 
the nature of their mandate. However, any factor that alters the nature of targeted representation (i.e. non-
minority electoral influence) must be given close consideration, as impacts on minority constituents are 
potentially vast. 
5
 For a thorough review of constitutionally protected Indigenous rights and an analysis of the history of 
adjudication by the Constitutional Court see Semper (2006). 
6
 All translations of constitutional articles in this chapter are my own. 
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The subsequent system applied a quotient (Hare) to determine which candidates 
were elected.
7
 More importantly, it stipulated that tribal councils and Indigenous 
organizations would exercise a great deal of oversight in regard to ballot access. Such a 
design is consistent with the spirit of quotas, giving a great deal of ownership over 
candidate selection to the target group. Much of the organizational power over candidate 
qualifications is given to extant organizations, which in the early years meant the 
Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia (ONIC), Alianza Social Indígena (ASI), 
and the Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia (AICO). If an aspirant was not linked to one 
of these organizations, the only avenue through which they could become a candidate 
was with the support of a tribal council, in which they had to have held a position of 
leadership. The latter option is less likely, given that Indigenous organizations gain legal 
recognition only when formed from of a group of tribal councils (Decree 1088 of 1993, 
Article 12). Thus, a candidate sanctioned by a council is likely to be sanctioned by an 
organization as a matter of consequence. Moreover, the support of these organizations 
was crucial to building a successful campaign and voter base.  Finally, the inability to 
circumnavigate tribal influence was completed when ballot access for citizens groups via 
signatures was excluded. In fact, signature requirements were entirely dismissed for 
minority districts. All of this is a testament to Indigenous stakeholders’ desire to control 
the process. It was tribal power that took up the gatekeeper role, in a sense and—
somewhat ironically—making inclusion quite exclusive. As I discuss in greater detail 
below, there are certainly positive outcomes that extend from tribal/council control; it 
ensures that candidates who aspire to Indigenous seats must be vetted by traditional 
                                                       
7
 The electoral quotient (Hare) is computed by dividing the total number of valid votes by the district 
magnitude (two). 
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institutions of Indigenous authority. This does not, however, produce an inherently 
harmonious candidate selection procedure. Organizations have regional and local 
differences that produce a contentious environment and the presence of myriad councils 
means that candidates can be vetted through a variety of avenues (Laurent 2005, pp. 361-
366). In fact, the growth in the number of candidacies in the ISD in later elections is 
indicative of the heightened competition as more regional organizations have mobilized 
candidates. 
The Colombian Constitution also included an article assuring a district for Black 
Colombians. To this end, Article 176 of the Constitution prescribed additional minority 
districts to be created in the Chamber of Representatives. This statute stated that “[t]he 
law may establish a special district to assure the participation of ethnic groups and 
political minorities and Colombians living abroad in the Chamber of Representatives. Up 
to five representatives may be elected through this district.” Throughout the two years 
following reform and ratification, the Afro-Colombian movement engaged with the 
Gaviria administration regarding the development of Artículo Transitorio 55 (Transitory 
Article 55; AT55), part of which entailed the creation of the electoral district for Black 
communities for electing two Afro representatives. Slated to be developed into permanent 
law since 1991, AT55 finally sealed a number of collective rights for Afro-Colombians in 
1993. The resulting legal code was Law 70 of 1993, a watershed structure that included, 
among other entitlements, the rights of Black communities to institutional representation. 
In regard to spaces of representation, Law 70 dictated that “In accordance with Article 
176 of the National Constitution, the special district to elect two members of the Black 
communities is hereby established, thereby assuring their representation in the Chamber 
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of Representatives. The National Electoral Council shall regulate all that is related to this 
election.” As the 1994 congressional elections approached, the CNE developed the 
following stipulations: 
 
1) Those who aspire to be candidates of the Afro community for this special 
district must be members of the respective community and endorsed by 
organization registered with the Interior Ministry. 
2) Representatives of the Chamber for the special district will be elected by the 
selection system currently in place for congresspersons. 
 
 
In some sense, these guidelines parallel the text of Article 171 (Indigenous district 
guidelines). First, the Afro district also employed the Hare quotient. More noteworthy, 
though, are the requisites for the personal traits of candidates, who should be a member 
of the quota target group and affiliated with an Afro organization registered with the 
Interior Ministry.  
Beneath the surface of candidate identity and organization affiliations, though, 
were stark contrasts between Indigenous and Afro-Colombian organizational oversight. 
First, and quite unsurprisingly, there was no standard of previous council leadership for 
aspirants to the seats for Black communities in 1994. Initially, this was simply an issue of 
chronology, as Afro-Colombian community councils did not become a legally defined 
entity until 1995 (Decree 1745 of 1995, Chapter 2). But even after their creation, the 
sanction of an Afro community council was never included as a requisite for candidacy.
8
 
Compounding the issue of organizational attachments is the ease with which a group of 
citizens can register as an Afro-Colombian organization. The procedure is as simple as 
                                                       
8
 This is most likely a function of being comparatively far less powerful than Indigenous councils, which 
have longer histories, a certain amount of autonomy, and greater organizational capacity, not to mention 
larger swaths of physical territory under their domain.  
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creating an organizational mission statement and internal structure, filling out a form, 
physically presenting this form to the Dirección de Asuntos para Comunidades Negras 
(Directorate of Affairs for Black Communities) in the Interior Ministry, and paying a 
filing fee. Frankly put, it entails labeling oneself Black, taking the time to fill out a 
government form, and the capacity to acquire a moderate sum of funds. The process is far 
more complex for Indigenous organizations. In these cases one must also present: 
 
1. One copy of the minutes of formation of the organization, signed by the 
Councils or Traditional Indigenous Authorities which compose the entity. 
2. One copy of the minutes of possession of the Councils or Traditional 
Indigenous Authorities who are part of the association. 
3. One original copy of the statutes and their respective approval. 
4. Minutes of the meetings of the respective Indigenous community, 
demonstrating the approval of the Council or Traditional Indigenous 
Authority to enter the association. 
5. Petitioners must also acquire a certificate issued by the General Directorate of 
Indigenous Affairs that certifies their status as a Traditional Indigenous 
Authority and the territory within which they exercise jurisdiction. 
 
 
These guidelines are unequivocal in their intent, which is to make the approval 
and verification of tribal authority paramount. In short, there simply is not a way to 
entirely—perhaps even remotely—circumnavigate an aspiring candidate’s need for tribal 
council approval. Prospects for Black communities, on the other hand, have far less red 
tape to manage and no true need to negotiate with local Afro-Colombian power 
structures—although many candidates surely have the desire to do so and virtually all run 
under the pretense of helping Black communities (Agudelo 2002). This lack of effective 
group control over candidates is particularly problematic for Afro-Colombians, who—
like Indigenous Colombians—are a minority group whose boundaries coincide with, 
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rather than cut across, socio-political cleavages and who share a history of 
marginalization (Htun 2004; Mansbridge 1999). 
In 2003, the Colombian legislature passed Legislative Act 01 (LA01), commonly 
known as the Political Reform of 2003. First implemented in 2006, this legislation 
introduced the most significant changes to the electoral system since constitutional 
reform in 1991. These included a minimum threshold, single party lists within districts, 
an option for open lists, and a switch to a D’Hondt system from the traditional Hare. This 
round of electoral engineering was intended to reduce the number of electoral 
organizations, which had expanded since 1991, and induce more cohesive parties. It was 
also designed to alter the intransigent tradition of personal politics and undermine local 
patron-client networks (Pachón and Shugart 2010; Pizarro Leongómez 2006). Naturally, 
this substantially altered the nature of competition in legislative elections, making it 
increasingly difficult for smaller parties to win seats and forcing some to form electoral 
alliances for survival.  
Other analyses have examined reformatory impacts on the Colombian party 
system and elections.
9
 Shugart and Pachón (2010) present strong evidence showing that 
inter and intra-party competition is conditioned by the introduction of open single-party 
lists, a minimum threshold, and the switch to a D’Hondt allocation sytem. In assessing 
the first post-reform election (2006) they suggest that these tweaks have contrasting 
effects on high and low magnitude districts, reducing the number of competing parties in 
high magnitude districts while increasing them in low magnitude districts. Keeping with 
                                                       
9
 Rodriguez Raga and Botero (2008) confirm that electoral reforms have contributed to a reduction in party 
system fragmentation in the Colombian Senate as measured by the effective number of parties (see also 
Pachón and Hoskin 2011).  
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the scope of this project, my intent here is to examine constituency formation in minority 
districts while assessing the repercussions of the 2003 reforms on these electoral 
outcomes. The changing nature of national competition noted elsewhere can be expected 
to alter the dynamics of minority districts—and, by extension, voter behavior— despite 
their detachment from the surrounding system.  
Internal and external rules are expected to produce a particular set of pre and post-
reform outcomes. The evidence and logic presented by Rodriguez Raga and Botero 
(2008) regarding the post-reform party system is a key heuristic. They make the case that 
the shift from multiple party lists and a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) to a single-
party list PR system with the option for open or closed lists has the effect of consolidating 
parties. This makes it more difficult for smaller parties or movimientos to thrive. I reason 
that this shift from what Pachón and Shugart (2010) call “personalization” to “listization” 
will increase incentives for candidate-driven movimientos to seek election in smaller 
magnitude districts. This is due to the amenability of smaller districts to personalized 
politics (Ibid). That is to say, intra-partisan competition is heightened in smaller 
magnitude districts because there is no advantage to the pooling of votes on single party 
lists. While their magnitude is small, the ISD and ICD districts do not fit this mold, being 
typified by non-personal party competition (strong control from central party 
organizations), as well as considerable group control over candidate selection by 
traditional authorities. The BCD, however, is strongly marked by personal vehicles and a 
lack of group control, largely due to the shorter history of organizations and the rules that 
guide organizational and candidate registration. In addition, the post-reform option for 
open lists leads to a decrease in the number of competing parties in party-driven districts. 
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As a result, these changes should produce a reduction in the number of competing parties 
in the ICD and ISD. These factors converge to produce two hypotheses regarding 
minority district fragmentation: 
H1: The 2003 electoral reforms will lead to an increase in the number of lists 
competing for seats in the BCD. 
H2: The 2003 electoral reforms will lead to a decrease in the number of lists 
competing for seats in the ICD and ISD. 
 
The consolidation of parties and inducement of a more cohesive party system in 
the post-reform years has, to some extent, forced smaller parties to come together 
(Rodriguez Raga and Botero 2006). The political left is a prime example, which saw the 
convergence of multiple parties to form the Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA).
10
 This 
consolidation is highlighted by the PDA’s strong performance in the 2006 legislative and 
presidential elections.
11
 Due to left-leaning tendencies of ethno-racial parties, 
organizations, and citizens, I expect the gains made by the left to reduce the percentage of 
minority district votes arriving from non-minority areas and urban centers. In essence, the 
emergence of electable candidates on the left can be expected to reduce the role of the 
“protest vote” in national elections.12 Consequently, at the district-year level (e.g. the 
                                                       
10
 The PDA resulted primarily from the convergence of the Polo Democrático Independiente (PDI), the 
Alternativa Democrática (AD), and some sectors of Marcha Patriótica (MP).  
11
 The PDA’s presidential candidate, Carlos Gaviria, acquired 22.04% of the first-round presidential vote. 
Although a distant second to Alvaro Uribe—who did not require a second round to claim victory—the 
PDA’s second place finish was the strongest of the left-leaning party in Colombia. They also acquired 11 
seats in the 100-member Senate, thereby supplanting the Liberal Party as the main opposition to the Uribe 
government. 
12
 The “protest vote” term describes the tendency of Colombian voters to cast votes for parties without ties 
to those that were hegemonic during the two-party era; the Colombian Liberal and Conservative Parties. 
The role of the protest vote is highlighted by the electoral outcomes for the National Constituent Assembly 
(ANC), in which the AM-19 movement and other non-traditional organizations acquired surprisingly high 
vote totals. Many voters found themselves seeking to express their discontent with the nebulous 
programmatic ideologies of the ruling parties, a circumstance that catapulted two Indigenous leaders into 
the ANC and a host of representatives from a political left that was theretofore institutionally unrepresented 
(in the national sense). 
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entire ICD in 2002 or the entire BCD in 2006) I expect to see a higher proportion of 
minority district votes to come from minority-influenced departments (MIDs) in post-
reform elections. This is simply due to the decrease of votes from non-MIDs and major 
urban centers. Additionally, I expect this reduction of non-MID support to lead to a 
greater concentration of district votes in MIDs. In other words, there will be more votes 
coming from a smaller number of departments, particularly those more closely associated 
with minority populations. Therefore, post-reform district-year data should also see 
increases in HHI scores. Finally, and following the same logic, I also expect these 
dynamics to play out at the party-list level for winning lists. 
H3: Electoral reform will lead to an increased rate of MID support in minority 
districts. 
H4: Electoral reform will lead to increases in HHI concentration scores in 
minority districts. 
H5: Electoral reform will lead to an increased rate of MID support for winning 
lists in minority districts 
H6: Electoral reform will lead to increases in HHI concentration scores for 
winning lists in minority districts.  
 
Due to the fact that constituency outcomes extend from MID support and HHI 
scores, the expected post-reform increases in these measures should also produce certain 
constituency formation trends. Higher MID support will increase the likelihood of 
winning lists sitting in the top half of the X axis (from “weak” to “strong”), while higher 
HHI is expected to more commonly move winning lists to the right side of the Y axis 
(from “low” to “high”). Thus, elections prior to reform (1991, 1994, 1998, and 2002) are 
expected to produce more Type 1 and 2 constituencies, while post-reform cycles (2006 
and 2010) are expected to more commonly produce Type 3 and 4 constituencies. 
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H7: Electoral reform will lead to the stronger and more concentrated 
constituencies, with the tendency of outcomes moving closer to or into the 
Type 3 and 4 categories. 
 
I present a two-part discussion that analyzes key factors impacting minority 
constituency formation out of minority districts. The first focuses on the internal 
dynamics (i.e. candidate selection and ballot access) and the second on the effects of 
electoral reform implemented in 2006. To carry this out, I begin with an overview of the 
data, followed by a discussion of some general observations from minority districts, 
including the volume of votes cast, number of lists registered, and the role of the non-
minority vote (votes from non-MIDs and urban centers). This is capped by an analysis of 
constituency formation at the district and party-list level. Frequent attempts are made to 
link empirical patterns with reform implementation so that conclusions can be derived 
regarding the impacts of systemic electoral reform on support for minority districts and 
constituency outcomes. 
 
DATA AND PROCEDURES 
Reserved seats for Colombian political minorities were first implemented in 1991 when 
the Senate set aside two seats for Indigenous communities. Since then, the Chamber of 
Representatives has added two seats for Afro-Colombian communities in 1994 and an 
additional seat for Indigenous populations in 2002. This representation is elected from 
separate minority districts that have a national scope. I include here all electoral data 
pertinent to these minority districts from 1991 to 2010, a span that includes a total of 16 
elections for minority representation. Among these, six pertain to the election of 
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Indigenous delegates to the Senate (1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010), three for 
electing Indigenous delegates to the Chamber (2002, 2006, and 2010), and four for 
choosing representatives of Black communities to the Chamber (1994, 2002, 2006, 
2010).
13
 Consequently, the information shown here has resulted in the election of 23 
minority representatives.
14
  
In minority districts with a national scope, geographic voting patterns are crucial 
for making sense of the district’s constituency tendencies, which are otherwise marked by 
ambiguity. In order to measure the geographic concentration of candidate/district support, 
I employed the Hirschman-Hirfindahl Index (HHI). This statistical measure accounts for 
the relative size and distribution of departmental support for each candidate.  In other 
words, it describes the geographic concentration (or dispersal) of a candidate’s base (or 
overall district outcomes). For my purposes, HHI is tabulated by squaring the proportion 
of a candidate’s vote total from each of the 33 departments (including Bogotá) and 
adding these figures together.
15
 These figures are then added together to give the “sum of 
squared proportions” statistic, which is then multiplied by 100 in order to produce an 
integer. HHI scores can range anywhere between 3.03 (perfectly dispersed across all 
departments) to 100 (full concentration within a single department).
16
 This measure is 
                                                       
13
 At the time of writing, municipal-level data for the 2014 election was not yet available. For this reason, 
these latest electoral outcomes are not included in this analysis 
14
 It should be noted that there was a gap in implementation for the BCD, which was declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 1996 on the grounds that the law was developed and passed 
without the proper procedural requirements (Sentence C-484 of 1996). A new statute that included the 
provisioning of seats for Black communities was passed in 2001, when it was included as part of the doling 
of reserved Chamber seats for other political minorities (Law 649 of 2001). 
15
 For a similar use of this index see Crisp and Ingall (2002). In this paper, elections prior to 2002 included 
vote proportions from 33 departments. The addition of votes from Colombians living abroad raises the 
number of squared proportions to 34. 
16
 The maximum HHI score of 100 would be produced when all votes are received from just one 
department. The minimum score of 3.03 is a function of the number of departments (33) and would be 
produced when each department contributes the same number of votes to a candidate. For example, 33 
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computed at the candidate, district-year, and district (all years) levels. On the party-list 
level, I reason that by capturing the concentration or dispersal of a candidate’s electoral 
base, HHI scores reveal three dynamics. First, they describe the breadth of a candidate’s 
programmatic appeal. Second, and in accordance with appeal, they indicate a set of 
constituents whose interests the legislator will be inclined to represent. Third, the support 
patterns for successful candidates will signal future aspirants of the requisites for success. 
On the district level, I understand HHI scores to point to the general trends of support 
exhibited by the ISD, ICD, and BCD, respectively. 
In addition to electoral data, census data from 2005 is used to classify departments 
according to their ethnic makeup.
17
 This was done in order to approximate the strength of 
the minority vote across districts and elections. Departments with a minority population 
equaling at least 15% of the district total are labeled as “minority-influenced 
departments” (MIDs). To be clear, the classification of departments as “minority-
influenced” does not firmly establish that votes coming from those departments are being 
cast by Afro or Indigenous voters. Indeed, the secret nature of suffrage in Colombian 
elections, much like elsewhere, greatly  reduces the chance of knowing specifically which 
votes are cast by whom. Knowing that a department has a bare minimum percentage of 
minority residents allows for a safer assumption that votes from certain locales are being 
cast by ethno-racial minorities. Or, inversely, the MID vote share provides an 
approximation of the strength of the minority vote by omitting votes that are most likely 
                                                                                                                                                 
departments contributing exactly one vote would each be contributing 3.03% of the total vote (.0303). Each 
of these values squared and then summed together would once again equal .0303, which when multiplied 
by 100 produces an integer of 3.03. 
17
 The 2005 Colombian census is the latest data available for analysis. Information on ethnic makeup is 
available at the municipal level and provides five ethno-racial categorizations; Afro-Colombian/Black, 
Indigenous, Raizal (from the islands of San Andres and Providencia), Romani, or “None of the Preceding 
Categories.” 
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from non-minorities (votes from departments whose minority population does not reach 
the 15% threshold). The 15% minimum standard means that departments classified as 
MIDs have minority populations that Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) would classify as a 
“tilted” minority group (rather than a “uniform” or “skewed” minority). In social 
situations, Kanter equated skewed status with an increased ability to impact overall group 
dynamics and surroundings. 
 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the geographic locations of MIDs, revealing the regional 
tendencies of Afro and Indigenous populations.
18
 Figure 3.1 shows that high 
concentrations of Afro-Colombians reside in the lowland areas of the Pacific and 
                                                       
18
 The maps presented here are taken directly from the DANE, which used inconsistent percentage schemes 
to identify high-minority areas. As such, the maps do not reflect a direct comparison of minority 
demographics. Rather, they have the function of giving a geographic visual of the areas in which minorities 
tend to comprise a large segment of the population. 
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Caribbean regions. They comprise a particularly high percentage of the Pacific 
departments of Choco, Valle del Cauca, and Cauca, as well as the Caribbean department 
of Bolivar (shaded in red). Falling  
 
 
 
just under the 20% population threshold are the Pacific department of Nariño and the 
Caribbean department of Sucre (shaded in orange). Indigenous populations tend to be 
more scattered than their Afro-Colombian compatriots (Figure 3.2). Departments 
featuring the highest proportion of Indigenous inhabitants are found mostly in eastern 
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Colombia, situated in the Amazonia region (shaded in red). The departments of La 
Guajira—located at the north tip of the country—and Cauca add to this list. Two 
additional departments (Nariño and Putumayo) in the Pacific fall between 15 and 20 
percent. Collectively, the two maps identify the Pacific region as having the most 
prominent ethnic population in terms of percentage of departmental totals. They also 
clearly display the scattered nature of minority demographics, which are typified by 
regional pockets of concentration. This begins to provide a visual of the form that a 
minority geographical district might take if it were based solely on the importance that 
the minority vote plays in each department. Consequently, they indicate the geographic 
locations in which ethno-racial issues are most salient, both contemporarily and 
historically.  
 
  
 
Figure 3.3. Four-Category Constituency Typology 
 67 
 
HHI and MID support statistics are used in conjunction to contextualize electoral 
outcomes as constituency types. Constituency types are determined by situating the 
elected representatives’ scores along a two-dimensional axis, with HHI (vote 
concentration) along the X-axis and percent of MID support on the Y-axis. The result is a 
four-category typology of constituencies (see Figure 3). The four types are labeled as 
“low-weak”, “high-weak”, “low-strong”, and “high-strong”, with the “low” and “high” 
tags denoting placement along the HHI axis (low concentration versus high 
concentration) and the “strong” and “weak” designations signifying placement on the 
MID support axis. In addition, the types are given number labels. These labels are 
intended to rank—from lowest (1) to highest (4)—the potential of each type to result in 
responsive representation. The constituency types identified here will inform my 
expectations regarding representational outcomes, particularly the invoking of group 
identity in plenary speeches and the linkage of identity to issues.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Candidate Lists and Fragmentation 
Figure 3.4 shows the number of lists in each district since 1991. Through the 2010 
electoral cycle, there have been a total of 169 candidate lists registered in minority 
districts. The comparative totals are noteworthy. The BCD has produced 128 of 169 total 
minority district lists, representing a proportion of just over three quarters of the total 
(75.7%). Since its introduction in 1994—and keeping in mind the non-inclusion of the 
Afro district in 1998—the number of lists registered for Black communities has 
consistently eclipsed those of the indigenous district(s). In most cases the number of BCD 
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lists is more than triple the number of indigenous candidacies, with a particularly 
conspicuous octupling of Indigenous lists in 2010 (67 to 8). This gap is consistent even 
after the introduction of the ICD in 2002. Furthermore, the number of lists vying for Afro 
seats has steadily increased over time, beginning with 12 lists in 1994 and expanding to a 
whopping 67 lists in 2010 (not visible in Figure 4). This has produced a rate of 32 lists 
per available seat in the BCD. The Indigenous districts, in stark contrast, have produced a 
total of 41 candidate lists combined, culminating in an average of 2.7 lists per available 
seat. When the ISD and ICD are disaggregated, we find that the former has produced a 
list per seat average of 2, while the latter has presented 5.7 candidacies per seat. 
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The BCD has been typified by ongoing spikes in fragmentation, an affliction 
previously attributed to observable rifts in the Afro movement (Agudelo 2002).
19
 I do not 
contest that contrasting framing strategies and sharp divisions are markers of the Afro-
Colombian movement. I insist, however, that attributing the growth of BCD lists solely to 
these factors ignores the critical role of institutional design. The hurdles for registering 
lists in the BCD are remarkably low. This flaw appears to have been exacerbated when 
the nature of party competition was altered by the reforms of 2003. The introduction of a 
minimum threshold and single party lists would both have the effect of putting small 
parties at a disadvantage, and the BCD became a destination for those clinging to 
institutional access.  
Conversely, indigenous districts produce far less candidacies due to the great 
amount of control exercised by tribal authorities and organizations.
20
 Latin American 
scholars have noted the relative cohesiveness of the Colombian indigenous movement 
throughout the 1990s, despite the great amount of ethnic and regional diversity and 
ruptures within ONIC—the largest Indigenous organization—which catalyzed the 
                                                       
19
 This line of thought leans on observations of the Afro-Colombian movement, broadly conceived. It holds 
that the most basic fissures within the movement—largely traced to the competing framing strategies across 
Black organizations—inhibit the ability of organizations to unite for electoral purposes. Much of this, the 
story goes, has to do with particularized (local) demands. A prime example would be the Asociación 
Campesina Integral del Atrato (Undivided Rural Association of the Atrato; ACIA), which formed in the 
early 1980s, its primary purpose being the defense of land and riparian rights along the Atrato river. ACIA 
saw the need to link territorial rights in the Pacific to cultural identity and traditional methods of resource 
extraction. This framing strategy has been termed the “indigenization” of Black demands due to the attempt 
to link territory and culture (Agudelo, Hoffman, and Rivas 1999). This is also why organizations like this 
sought to align with Indigenous actors such as Rojas Birry during the ANC—they saw the cultural 
connection to land as a common thread. In contrast, other Afro-Colombian leaders— often linked either to 
traditional parties or the political left—came from an urban viewpoint that stressed rights via racial 
inclusion rather than ethnic difference (Ibid). 
20
 Augmenting this institutional reality was the organizational landscape present during the 1990’s. There 
were just three Indigenous parties that had the capacity to mobilize candidates under these constraints; the 
National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC); the Colombian Indigenous Authorities Movement 
(AICO); and the Indigenous Social Alliance (ASI). 
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entrance of ASI into electoral politics (Laurent 2005; Peñaranda 2009). This confluence 
of factors resulted in just three Indigenous senate candidates in the district’s inaugural 
year. This number decreased to two in 1994 when ASI made the strategic decision to vie 
for Senate seats within the national district rather than the Indigenous, only to find 
themselves unsuccessful in this attempt and pushed back into the Indigenous district in 
1998, returning the number of lists in the Indigenous district to three. In sum, throughout 
the first three cycles, the creation of candidacies from the Indigenous movement was 
funneled through the three most overarching Indigenous organizations, which had highly 
centralized internal structures (Peñaranda 2009, Chapter 3). The result has been an 
electoral landscape with far greater order and clarity than that observed in the BCD.  
 
District-Level HHI Scores and MID Support 
The tables in the previous section clearly demonstrate the complexity of minority district 
elections in Colombia. The selection of minority representatives does not occur in a 
manner that gives complete ownership to the target groups. A large proportion of the 
votes that are cast in the minority roll are most likely from non-minority citizens, a 
circumstance that gives us theoretical reasons to be skeptical of the quality of minority 
group representation that will arise from such an arrangement. Percentages of the vote 
from non-minority areas, however, are insufficient to arrive at full conclusions about the 
crystallization of constituencies in these districts. As Figures 1 and 2 have indicated, Afro 
and Indigenous Colombian populations are geographically dispersed. Moreover, the 
territorial entities that have come to represent minority politics (e.g. resguardos, cabildos, 
titulos colectivos) can be found in opposite corners of the nation. Thus, even in a scenario 
 71 
 
where non-minority influence in elections is extracted entirely, the issue of constituency 
formation and issue representation is still quite complex, as minorities inhabiting 
different parts of the nation bring diverging group interests—Indigenous residents of the 
Cauca department might have riparian demands while those in La Guajira are pushing for 
mining legislation, for example. Taking all of this into account, I measured electoral 
outcomes along the lines of geographic vote concentration and the rate of minority 
support in order to make better sense of ethnic constituencies, it is necessary to classify 
electoral outcomes. This entails situating electoral outcomes into a four-category 
typology that combines geographic vote concentration scores (HHI) with rates of support 
from minority-influenced departments (MIDs) which have a minimum minority 
population of 15% of the department total. The integration of HHI and MID support rates 
is first presented at the district level, followed by candidate-level scores that will 
significantly impact the predictions of representational outcomes in later chapters. 
 
Table 3.1. HHI Scores and Rates of Support from Minority-Influenced Departments (By 
District and Year, 1991-2010) 
 
Y
Year 
ISD ICD BCD 
HHI 
% 
MID 
HHI 
% 
MID 
HHI 
% 
MID 
1
1991 
8.10 35.9 -- -- -- -- 
1
1994 
12.51 33.2 -- -- 10.98 55.6 
1
1998 
8.96 47.3 -- -- -- -- 
2
2002 
8.21 37.2 8.05 29.0 11.48 53.7 
2
2006 
13.26 46.3 8.32 19.5 8.92 65.1 
2
2010 
14.44 55.6 7.04 34.4 7.58 80.7 
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Table 3.1 shows the observed outcomes for HHI and MID support at the level of 
the district-year. This data reveals contrasting outcomes across minority districts. The 
ISD has generally seen an increase in vote concentration from 1991 to 2010, going from a 
score of 8.10 to 14.44. The percent of the vote from MIDs in this district has also seen an 
overall increase, although there are dips and spikes along the way. Despite the ebbs and 
flows in MID support rates, the ISD appears to have produced a pattern of increasing vote 
concentration and higher proportions of MID support overall. This culminates with the 
first and only Indigenous district election featuring a majority of votes from MIDs 
(2014). This indicates that the district has seen greater ethnic ownership over time and 
particularly so in the cycles that came on the heels of the 2003 electoral reforms. The 
ICD offers less clarity in regard to change over time, as well as the direction thereof. The 
HHI scores in the ICD have seen a relatively marginal shift from the first cycle to the last 
(8.05 to 7.04), as well as a notably inconsistent share of votes from MIDs. The ICD also 
features the district-year instance with the lowest share of MID votes across all districts 
(19.5% in 2006) and by these measures is the district with the least amount of minority 
control over elected representation. In addition, there is no identifiable impact that might 
be attributed to systemic reforms. Consequently, an intra-group comparison of the 
Indigenous districts shows that the electoral dynamics of the lower house are quite 
distinct from the upper house. These contrasting electoral support patterns arise despite 
the fact that the same ethnic parties are often in competition for both districts. Thus, the 
chamber of congress in which the seat is allocated seems to have a significant impact on 
HHI and MID vote shares. 
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The share of BCD votes from MIDs was flat across the two pre-reform cycles, 
followed by a pronounced post-reform spike in 2006 (65.1%) and again in 2010 (80.7%). 
HHI scores, on the other hand, indicate that vote concentrations have decreased over 
time, going from 10.98 in 1994 to 7.58 in 2010. This is an intriguing combination of 
results, as it leaves the impression that a higher vote share is coming from a shrinking 
number of departments (N=6 for Afro-Colombian MIDs) while also being less 
concentrated. This suggests that voting patterns in early BCD cycles—particularly 1994 
and 2002—were defined by high vote shares from a single non-minority department or 
urban center. A glance at BCD support from Bogotá lends support for this remark, which 
declined sharply from 1994 (24.5%) to 2010 (11.6%). The broad message is that BCD 
votes became less concentrated over time, largely due to the combination of a drop in the 
Bogota vote and the lack of a dominant electoral hub in Afro-Colombian MIDs.  Whether 
this will translate to similar outcomes at the party level remains to be seen. Regardless, 
this data points to an interesting story in the BCD that mixes two potentially 
counterintuitive processes; on one hand, the increase of group control over minority 
representation and, on the other, the increasing dispersal of electoral support within the 
district. While the former may facilitate the crystallization and representation of minority 
demands, the same process may be confounded by the latter. Also, the increasingly 
scattered nature of district-year votes lends some support to Agudelo’s (2002) claim that 
the Black movement has become increasingly fragmented with time, a matter that I 
foresee complicating group representation in national institutions. 
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Party-List Level HHI Scores, MID Support, and Constituency Outcomes 
Support patterns at the party-list level add much needed detail to district-level 
observations and may provide the best indicator of future representational outcomes. 
Table 3.2 provides an overview of HHI scores and MID support for candidates elected to 
the ISD. HHI scores for ISD representatives range from a low of 7.89 (Francisco Rojas  
Birry in 2002) to a high of 39.88 (German Lopez in 2010; Range = 31.99). MID support 
Table 3.2. HHI Scores, MID Support Rates, and Constituency Types in the Indigenous 
Senate District (1991-2010) 
Candidate 
Party/ 
Org 
Year HHI MID% Type 
ANATOLIO QUIRA ASI 1991 11.82 31.61 1 
GABRIEL MUYUY ONIC 1991 8.44 39.62 1 
GABRIEL MUYUY MIC 1994 10.40 45.12 1 
LORENZO MUELAS AICO 1994 16.19 27.33 1 
FRANCISCO ROJAS BIRRY AICO 1998 10.61 42.64 1 
MARTIN TENGANA ASI 1998 31.47 58.04 4 
EFREN FELIX TARAPUES AICO 2002 22.21 52.34 4 
FRANCISCO ROJAS BIRRY Coalition 2002 7.89 32.11 1 
ERNESTO ESTACIO* AICO 2006 21.00 59.12 4 
JESUS PIÑACUE ACHICUE* ASI 2006 16.15 40.13 1 
GERMAN CARLOSAMA* AICO 2010 39.88 84.51 4 
MARCO ANIBAL AVIRAMA* ASI 2010 15.97 41.90 1 
MEAN (ALL LISTS) -- 
1991-
2010 
17.67 46.21 2.00 
PRE-REFORM MEAN -- 
1991-
2002 
14.88 41.10 1.75 
POST-REFORM MEAN -- 
2006-
2010 
23.25 56.43 2.50 
*Open lists in which scores and types are tabulated from all open-list votes, rather than 
just the head of list candidate. 
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rates extend from a low of 27.33% (Lorenzo Muelas in 1994) to a high of 84.51% 
(German Lopez in 2010; range = 57.2). Outcomes in the ISD led to eight “low-weak” 
constituencies (Type 1) and four “high-strong” (Type 4) constituencies, the latter shown 
in bold italics. Six out of eight “low-weak” constituencies are produced in the pre-reform 
period (1991-2002, above the while two of the four “high-strong” outcomes are produced 
in the post-reform period. This is consistent with the observations in Table 1 that note a 
decrease in the share of votes from non-minority urban centers (Bogotá and Medellín) in 
later cycles. 
There is a general trend toward stronger minority constituencies in later electoral 
cycles, although there also continue to be instances in which elected representatives have 
a relatively small share of votes from MIDs. Francisco Rojas Birry (2002), Jesus Piñacue 
(2006), and Marco Anibal Avirama (2010) all fit this electoral profile, with each 
receiving less than half of their support from MIDs. A scatterplot of these outcomes is 
provided in Figure 3.5, placing each elected candidate on the four-category typology grid. 
Pre-reform outcomes are mostly clustered in the lower-left quadrant, while the four post-
reform scores are slightly more scattered. According to the theoretical framework 
detailed in Chapter 2, the representative most likely to bring minority issues to the agenda 
and pen minority-friendly legislation would be German Carlosama, whose mandate was 
sanctioned by the most concentrated base and highest MID support rate. We would 
expect Rojas Birry’s 2002 results to provide the least motivation for representing group 
issues.  
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Figure 3.5. Plot of Constituency Outcomes for ISD Representatives  
 
As is shown in Table 3.3, the range of HHI scores in the BCD is broad (Range = 
68.87) relative to those of the ISD (Range = 31.99). This is due entirely to the highly 
concentrated support that Yahir Acuña garnered in 2010, which amounted to an HHI 
score of 79.58. It is worth noting that Acuña’s voter base is found predominantly in the 
department of Sucre (89.13% of total votes), a place that has a large Afro-Colombian 
population (15.68% of the department total), yet is physically and culturally disconnected 
from the Pacific region departments more commonly associated with Afro-Colombian 
grass roots organizations and collective land titles. It will be interesting to see how this 
brand of minority representation will differ from others that have a greater vote share 
from Pacific region departments, potentially providing an indicator of the chasms in the 
Black movement. Also as a cause of  
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his Sucreño electoral base, Acuña acquired the highest proportion of MID support. 
Notably, the HHI and MID% combinations in the BCD yield just one “low-weak” and 
one “high-weak” constituency. This small number of weak outcomes sharply contrasts 
those of the ISD, which was typified by patterns of weak minority support, particularly in 
early cycles. The remaining seven BCD types are three each of the “low-strong” and 
“high-strong” types.  
 
Table 3.3: HHI Scores, MID Support Rates, and Constituency Types in the  
Black Communities District (1994-2010) 
Candidate (*Open List Total) Party/Org. Year HHI MID% Type 
AGUSTIN VALENCIA Com. Negras^ 1994 10.71 61.01 3 
ZULIA MENA Com. Negras^ 1994 16.63 43.39 1 
WILLINGTON ORTIZ AEAFUAC 2002 28.87 25.58 2 
MARIA URRUTIA MPU 2002 17.17 58.58 3 
SILFREDO MORALES* Afrouninca 2006 22.68 83.45 4 
MARIA URRUTIA ASA 2006 17.99 71.10 3 
HERIBERTO ARRECHEA* MPU 2010 24.78 90.68 4 
YAHIR ACUÑA Afrovides 2010 79.58 96.31 4 
MEAN (ALL) -- 
1994-
2010 
27.30 66.27 3.00 
PRE-REFORM MEAN -- 
1994-
2002 
18.35 47.14 2.25 
POST-REFORM MEAN -- 
2006-
2010 
36.26 85.39 3.75 
^Specific organizational information for various BCD candidates in 1994 was not available through 
the Registraduria Nacional.  
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        Figure 3.6: Plot of Constituency Outcomes for BCD Representatives (1994-2010) 
 
 
My framework suggests that Acuña will be the elected representative most likely 
to bring minority identity to the deliberative process, while Mena and Ortiz are least 
likely to do so. Notably, post-reform constituency types are all situated in the top two 
quadrants, confirming that post-reform BCD representation is consistently elected by a 
stronger MID electorate (less influence from non-minority areas). This outcome is 
surprising, given the observed decrease from 1994 to 2010 in district-level HHI noted in 
Table 3.1 (from 10.98 in 1994 to 7.58 in 2010). Normally, we would expect this 
longitudinal decline to translate to party-level HHI and produce constituency outcomes 
closer to the Type 1 and 3 categories. This, however, was not the case. Three of the four 
post-reform winners sat in the Type 4 (high-strong) segment, with the fourth falling just 
short of the HHI score needed to join them. This indicates that the increased 
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fragmentation of the BCD has broadly produced scattered district support, but that its 
personalist—rather than party-driven—tendencies lead to more localized and thus 
concentrated support for winning candidates. This lends support to the expectation that 
post-reform elections would produce stronger (Type 3 and 4) minority constituencies. 
Comparatively, the post-reform tendency is more pronounced in the BCD than in the 
ISD. Given their cross-institutional nature (house versus senate), a direct comparison 
between their electoral tendencies is problematic. Nonetheless, the outcomes forecast 
heightened representation of minority identity by Afro representatives.  
 
The shorter history of the ICD means that there are only three electoral instances 
upon which data can be collected. In conjunction with consistently low HHI scores 
(Table 3.4), the scarcity of cases produces zero variation in constituency outcomes. All 
three elected representatives are clustered in the lower-left quadrant of Figure 3.7, 
making them all “low-weak” constituencies (Type 1). This data suggests that the ICD is 
Table 3.4. HHI Scores, MID Support Rates, and Constituency Types in the  
Indigenous Chamber District (2002-2010) 
Candidate (*Open List Total) Party/Org. Year HHI MID% Type 
LORENZO VELASCO AICO 2002 11.79 28.19 1 
ORSINIA POLANCO Polo Dem. 2006 8.87 20.04 1 
HERNANDO TAPASCO* Polo Dem. 2010 6.51 26.73 1 
MEAN (ALL) -- 
2002-
2010 
9.06 24.99 1.00 
PRE-REFORM MEAN -- 2002 11.79 28.19 1.00 
POST-REFORM MEAN -- 
2006-
2010 
7.69 23.39 1.00 
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seeing weaker minority support than the ISD and BCD. It follows that, per my theory, 
this district is least likely to result in responsive group representation. Touching on 
specifics, HHI scores are quite low, ranging from Velasco’s high of 11.79 to Tapasco’s 
low of 6.51 (Range = 5.28). Also, and in opposition of the previous trends noted for the 
ISD and BCD, HHI vote concentrations decrease in post-reform cycles. This indicates 
that support for ICD candidates became more dispersed, a curious outcome for a chamber 
that is designed to represent more localized (read  
geographically concentrated) interests. MID support rates are also markedly low, ranging 
from Velasco’s high of 28.19% in 2002 to Polanco’s low of 20.04% in 2006. In sum, 
              Figure 3.7. Plot of Constituency Outcomes for ICD Representatives (2002-2010)  
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viewed in terms of an identifiable minority support base, ICD representatives have 
received the weakest minority mandates. Ergo, these representatives will to have less to 
gain from standing for minority constituents. Furthermore, representatives elected after 
the 2003 electoral reforms appear to nudge further away from concentrated, strong 
minority support bases. It remains to be seen how this will correlate with representational 
outcomes, but these observations do not inspire great expectations out of that district. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is clear that the internal rules guiding ballot access have a significant impact on the 
number of lists registered across elections (Figure 3.4). On the surface, the low number of 
candidates vying for indigenous seats seems surprising, particularly due to the lack of 
signature requirements for ballot access (Constitutional Act No. 2 of 1991) and diversity 
of indigenous groups in the national territory. I have made the case that the number of 
lists in indigenous districts is kept at bay due to institutional rules, which grant a 
gatekeeper role to tribal institutions and organizations. Indigenous district candidates 
must have the official support of an indigenous organization or have held a traditional 
position of authority in their tribal council. It follows that the tribal councils and the 
organizations that they spawned have a large hand in managing the nature of ISD and 
ICD competition, particularly during the early electoral cycles of the ISD. In the absence 
of organizational sentineling, registering a candidacy in the BCD has been far easier—
and hence more common. The proliferation of candidacies in the district has led to higher 
district-year HHI scores (Table 3.1) and the guiding rules have made the district 
hospitable to candidate-driven movimientos, commonly marked by localized interests. In 
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sum, group control over ballot access centralizes candidate selection processes. This 
bears a distant relation to Hinojosa’s (2012) counterintuitive finding that less democratic 
candidate selection processes facilitated increases in women’s representation. But rather 
than increasing rates of minority representation, in this case a fixed variable, group 
control over candidacies may improve representation by increasing accountability to the 
group. Moreover, this all prompts a new question: how will the candidate-centric 
mandates (rather than party-centric) of the BCD translate to group representation in 
institutions? 
LA01 introduced systemic changes that were external to minority districts, but 
which also impacted electoral outcomes. The “rationalization” of the Colombian party 
system—motivated by single-party lists, open-list options, and D’Hondt formula—altered 
the nature of inter-partisan competition throughout the political system. This forced more 
cohesive parties and made it increasingly difficult for smaller, candidate-centric parties to 
flourish. This factor, in combination with the aforementioned lack of group oversight, 
helped produce an excess of candidacies in the BCD. More importantly, it produced 
decreases in rates of support from non-MIDs. Stated inversely, it increased the percentage 
of BCD, ICD, and ISD votes that came from MIDs, thus making post-reform minority 
mandates stronger in nature. Put simply, less interference from non-MIDs pushed 
minority constituencies to the top of the typology (Types 3 and 4). These outcomes 
should produce stronger minority representation, as representatives will be speaking for a 
more clearly identifiable minority constituency. 
This discussion highlights the role of institutional factors on electoral outcomes 
and constituency formation. For all of their importance, a focus on institutions may also 
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unintentionally mask other underlying issues. My treatment of minority organizations, for 
example, treats them as objects reacting to the guiding rules of minority districts, rather 
than being complicit in their elaboration. But we can be certain that the strength of 
indigenous organizations and cabildos is largely responsible for the manner in which the 
ISD was originally implemented. The way that the BCD was drawn up is also surely a 
function of the state of the Afro movement at the time Ley 70 was drafted. I stand firm in 
ascribing a higher role to institutions, but I mention these convenient omissions as a way 
of introducing the potential undoing of the institutional argument. Should it turn out in 
subsequent chapters—particularly Chapter 4 on congressional representation—that 
elections have little impact upon representational outcomes, then the insistence upon the 
conditioning nature of institutions is weakened. In short, it may be necessary to step back 
and seek out alternative explanations—whether this means bigger picture or micro—to 
discover what is truly happening on the ground.  
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CHAPTER 4: MINORITY PRESENCE, CONGRESSIONAL DISCOURSE, AND 
IDENTITY REPRESENTATION 
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Evaluations of democratic institutions often take into account their inclusiveness, in 
effect conducting a litmus test of institutional diversity and minority access. Embedded in 
these assessments is the normative assumption that increases in minority representation 
are desirable and that underrepresentation—where disproportionate with demographics— 
requires redress. Per this argument, non-inclusive institutions are emblematic of social 
inequities and thus a democratic liability.  More specifically, minority representation is 
deemed particularly important for historically marginalized groups, who particularly 
stand to benefit from “descriptive” representation due to the shared life experiences that 
produce a minority perspective, even if group demands are not uniform (Mansbridge 
1999). In essence, descriptive representation is valuable insofar as it impacts a 
representative’s tendency to “act for” their descriptive constituents. This line of thought 
converges with theories of deliberative democracy that see the inclusiveness of 
democratic processes as a means for achieving social justice. Diverse societies, it is 
reasoned, require input from all segments in the articulation/distribution of public goods 
in order to maximize democratic legitimacy. As John Dryzek aptly wrote, “No concerned 
individuals should be excluded, and if necessary, some educative mechanism should 
promote the competent participation of persons with a material interest in the issues at 
hand who might otherwise be left out” (Dryzek 1990: 43).  
Calls for inclusion via descriptive representation have insisted upon the influence 
of a representative’s background on their behavior in office. Some empirical observers, 
however, have raised questions regarding the value of gerrymandered minority districts in 
the United States, with some insisting that minority constituencies are unwarranted 
(Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996), have the effect of bolstering non-minority 
 86 
 
conservatism (Lublin 1997) or are ineffective for achieving true minority empowerment 
(Guinier 1994). Finally, there are those who insist that minority influence is conditional 
upon membership in dominant coalitions (Browning, Marshall, and Tab 1984), hinting 
that partisan affiliation is of greater importance than identity.  
However, many scholars have confirmed the linkage between descriptive and 
substantive representation. Scholars have repeatedly shown that descriptive 
representatives are more likely than non-descriptive representatives to introduce 
minority-friendly policy and new priorities to the agenda (Bratton 2005; Bratton and 
Leonard 2002; Carroll 2001; Jones 1997; Htun and Jones 2002; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; 
Swers 2005; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003; Thomas 1994) and that more gender-
inclusive institutions adopt policy identified as “women’s issues” (Kittilson 2008; 
O’Regan 2000; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Students of ethnicity and race have 
authored studies agreeing to the latter, showing that descriptive minority presence has a 
positive relationship with the adoption of “racial and ethnic issues” (Preuhs 2006). Not to 
be forgotten are studies with a focus on structural outcomes, which have demonstrated 
that minority constituents in reserved seat districts receive a greater share of public goods 
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). As Duflo (2004) notes, this indicates that any costs of 
reserved representation (i.e. narrowing candidate choices, less experienced 
representatives, etc.) appear to be offset by the representational benefits for marginalized 
populations. 
Contributing to the conversation on descriptive-substantive linkages, this chapter 
assesses the integration of minority identity in plenary speeches by minority 
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representatives in Colombia. The effect of Indigenous and Afro seat reservations is 
examined through a qualitative analysis of the language used by minority representatives 
in congress.  More specifically, I analyze the relationship between constituency variables 
and representational outcomes, in effect testing the theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter 2 and building on the empirical foundations of Chapter 3. Thus the primary goal 
is to determine whether constituency dynamics—as products of elections—have an 
observable impact on representative behavior. This includes an evaluation of the 
measures visited in Chapter 3, namely Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) scores and 
rates of support from minority-influenced departments (MIDs).
1
 It is from these two 
measures—which collectively establish the geographic focus and strength of their 
minority support base—that expectations of representative behavior are derived and 
outcomes assessed. The analysis is performed while empirically measuring the use of 
Indigenous and Afro identity by minority representatives in the deliberative process. 
Plenary speeches are inspected in order to determine the tendency of minority 
representatives to “stand for” minority constituents by introducing ethno-racial identity 
and linking identity to geographic locales and issues. Thus, I introduce evidence that is 
markedly different than most studies on the descriptive-substantive relationship, which 
commonly focus on the introduction and passage of policy (see, e.g., Bratton and 
Leonard 2002; Childs 2004). As Piscopo (2011) finely demonstrated, a focus on policy 
reflects a narrow interpretation of Pitkin’s concept of descriptive representation. “When 
Pitkin wrote that descriptive representatives ‘stand for’ constituents, she was referring to 
                                                       
1
 These measures are articulated in greater detail in Chapter 3. HHI concentrations are determined by 
tabulating each department’s share of a candidates support, squaring those proportions, and summing the 
squared proportions. The “Rates of support from MIDs” figure represents the percentage of a candidate’s 
total vote that came from departments with a minority population of at least 15% of the departmental total.  
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their portrayals of constituents’ circumstances” (Ibid, p. 449). A focus on language 
allows us to capture these portrayals, thereby grasping the ways in which a legislator’s 
language reflects group values and standing in society.  
The Colombian case is an ideal setting for assessing the impact of electoral 
constituencies on representational outcomes, particularly as it pertains to the use of the 
“talking function” in a legislature. In July 2002, a new congress convened in Bogotá that 
included a full gambit of seats reserved for political minorities. The lower house now 
featured one seat for Indigenous communities and two seats for Black communities, the 
latter being reinstated after a one-session hiatus.
2
  These freshly implemented quotas 
were added to the extant seats awarded to Indigenous communities in 1991, producing 
the broadest set of affirmative action measures in the region. As a result, we can assess 
the impact of electoral patterns and constituency dynamics over the course of three 
legislative cycles (2002-2006, 2006-2010, 2010-2014). Further, it allows for a systematic 
comparison across the two largest ethno-racial minority groups in Latin America 
(Indigenous and Afro-Latinos), as well as a cross-institutional comparison specific to 
Indigenous Colombians (lower house vs. senate).  
Capitalizing on this context, this chapter is an exercise in understanding the 
impact of reserved seats on the substantive representation of indigenous and Afro-
Colombians. When a minority representative introduces identity and makes identity-issue 
linkages, she engages in a particular type of substantive representation. Not only does she 
                                                       
2
 The passed legislation that called for the implementation of seats reserved for Black communities was 
deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in 1996 on the grounds that the law was 
developed and passed without the proper procedural requirements (Sentence C-484 of 1996). A new statute 
that included the provisioning of seats for Black communities was passed in 2001, along with the other two 
Chamber seats reserved for Indigenous communities and Colombians living abroad (Law 649 of 2001). 
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“stand for” descriptive constituents, but also “acts for” them by invoking identity as a 
deliberative tool (Pitkin 1967, p. 83). Ergo, using identity as a deliberative tool is 
understood here to be a form of substantive representation, wherein minority 
representatives are “acting for” their constituents. I reason that minorities in a 
legislature—particularly those who comprise such a small proportion thereof—will 
attempt to represent group interests in a deliberative fashion by invoking group identity, 
communicating desires, and articulating interests. Although the discursive/deliberative 
role is not the only way that substantive representation can be measured, this “process 
oriented” variable is preferable in contexts where the minority has such little chance of 
achieving policy outcomes.
3
 Simply put, discourse is most readily available tool for 
minorities who fail to reach a point of critical mass (Bratton 2005). I should also note that 
all plenary sessions are recorded and televised, although rates of viewership are a 
mystery. However, representatives commonly mention viewers and the publics to whom 
they speak in their utterances, proving that the ears of the electorate are a consideration 
when they choose their language. It follows that voters and constituents should be an 
important determinant of this behavior. To assess this importance, the analysis tests for 
the effects of constituency while evaluating both the frequency with which Afro and 
Indigenous Colombian representatives invoke identity and how they substantively link 
identity to other ideas.  
                                                       
3
 In their analysis of the Argentine gender quota, Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) make an important 
distinction between “process oriented” and “outcome oriented” facets of substantive representation. 
Representation as process occurs when legislators undertake activity on behalf of descriptive constituents. 
This can occur without resulting in policy outcomes (pp. 397-399). 
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To measure the use of identity by minority representatives, I created three 
measures; 1) an ethnic invocation score (EIS), which identifies the introduction of 
identity in floor speeches; 2) a geography-identity linkage score, which notes the 
frequency with which representatives substantively link minority identity to geographic 
locations; 3) an issue-identity linkage score, which tabulates the frequency with which 
representatives substantively link identity to issues on the agenda. Prior to adding 
procedural details, some expectations of these measures vis-à-vis constituency variables 
should be noted. As the independent variables, HHI and MID support are expected to 
exhibit various positive relationships. High MID support rates are assumed to be an 
indicator of greater minority control over representation, as it means that fewer votes are 
from non-minority areas and urban centers.
 4
 The result is a greater level of accountability 
to minority populations and heightened motivation to bring minority identity to the 
pulpit. This is somewhat akin to the “mandate effect” noted by Franceschet and Piscopo 
(2008), which posits that quotas resulting from domestic activism (bottom-up) enhance 
legislator obligations to represent the interests of the minority group (pp. 402-404). The 
difference here is that the mandate is not a reflection of the passage of the quota. Instead, 
the “electoral mandate effect” identified here is—as the name might suggest—an 
extension of electoral outcomes. MID support indicates a stronger minority mandate that 
is from areas more closely associated with the grass roots politics of the Afro and 
indigenous movement. In theory, this should increase legislator obligations to the 
minority group. The invoking of minority identity in congressional debate—and linking it 
with issues and geography—is perceived here as the promotion of minority interests. 
                                                       
4
 For a review of the empirical logic undergirding the assumption that votes from MIDs are a sign of a 
strong minority support base, see Chapter 3, pp. 60-66. 
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Thus I expect that as rates of MID support increase, ethnic invocation scores and issue-
identity linkage scores will also increase. Conversely, lower MID support indicates that a 
reserved seat is occupied by a politician with less appeal—and weaker ties—to the target 
group. I expect that this positive relationship between MID support and identity 
invocations will be observed at both the district-year and individual (representative) 
levels. 
 
H1: Higher rates of MID support will produce higher EIS scores at the level of the 
district-year. 
H2: Higher rates of MID support will produce higher EIS scores at the level of the 
individual representative. 
H3: Higher rates of MID support will produce higher issue-identity linkage scores 
at the level of the district-year. 
H4: Higher rates of MID support will produce higher issue-identity linkage scores 
at the level of the individual representative. 
 
 
Due to their focus on vote concentration versus geographic origins of support, I 
expect HHI scores to impact geographic invocations and linkages between geography and 
identity. In essence, HHI gives us a spatial indicator of an elected representative’s 
support base. Higher concentration scores indicate close ties to a locality, department, or 
region. Lower scores suggest that their appeal is broader and less parochial. I reason that, 
as an indicator of local ties, higher HHI are produced by candidates who have high 
accountability to specific communities. It follows that higher HHI concentrations will be 
accompanied by a greater tendency of minority representatives to make substantive 
geography-identity connections, or what I have called here geography-identity linkages. 
Ergo, higher HHI will have a positive effect on geography-identity linkage scores. 
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H5: Higher HHI concentration scores will produce higher geography-identity 
linkage scores at the district-year level.  
H6: Higher HHI concentration scores will produce higher geography-identity 
linkage scores at the level of the individual representative. 
 
 
Finally, cross-group expectations are primarily driven by the electoral outcomes 
discussed in Chapter 3. Particularly important are the HHI and MID support statistics for 
representatives elected from 2002-2010, as those are the legislators included here. The 
average rate of MID support for elected BCD candidates from 2002-2006 is 70.95%, 
while the corresponding figure for ISD representatives is 51.69%. ISD officials had by 
far the lowest MID support at 24.99% (See Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). Per my theory, this 
leads us to believe that BCD representatives have the strongest electoral mandate effect, 
with high rates of minority district support that should heighten obligations to represent 
group interests, with the ISD and ICD coming in second and third, respectively. In regard 
to HHI scores, these trends continue. The BCD has the highest average for the pertinent 
cycles at 31.85. ISD winners delivered an HHI of 20.52, followed by their co-group 
representatives from the ISD who brought a mean concentration of 9.06. These figures 
leave us with the impression that BCD agents have more intimate local ties with the 
communities that elected them—or at least have depended on these communities to a 
greater degree for their mandate—than have indigenous delegates. In sum, higher MID 
support and HHI lead me to believe that BCD representatives will have higher EIS, issue-
identity linkage scores, and geography-identity linkage scores. The same comparative 
tendency within the indigenous representation hints that the same results should follow 
for ISD versus ICD delegates. 
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H7: BCD representatives will produce higher EIS, issue-identity linkage scores, 
and geography-identity linkage scores than ICD and ISD representation.  
H8: ISD representatives will produce higher EIS, issue-identity linkage scores, 
and geography-identity linkage scores than ICD representation. 
 
 
With this set of expectations in mind, I first proceed by detailing the qualitative 
data and procedures used to measure the use of minority identity in Congressional 
discourse. This includes an overview of the data mined for the purposes of the analysis, 
details regarding the measures created, and an explanation of the qualitative coding 
process. I also describe some of the limitations of the data and draw boundaries on the 
conclusions that can be reached through the analysis. From there, I deliver an analysis of 
the data, focusing first on EIS outcomes. This is followed by an assessment of the 
relationship between HHI and geography-identity linkage scores. The relationship 
between MID support and issue-identity linkages will conclude the analysis. Finally, I 
discuss some of the theoretical ramifications. 
 
DATA AND PROCEDURES 
The data used in this analysis was mined from the Gaceta del Congreso de Colombia and 
consists of plenary transcripts from the Colombian Chamber of Representatives and 
Senate. All plenary transcripts from July 2002 to June 2014 were obtained, spanning 
three legislative cycles (2002-2006, 2006-2010, and 2010-2014). Congressional 
legislative periods have two sessions; July to December (session 1) and March to June 
(session 2). Consequently, each four-year cycle included data from eight legislative 
sessions (two per year). Using this qualitative data, two separate analyses are conducted; 
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first, a comparative exploration of the frequency with which minority representatives 
invoke identity; second, an investigation of the nature of these invocations. The second 
analysis focuses in on the linkage of identity to issues and geographic locations and both 
analyses include cross-group and cross-chamber comparisons.  
The first analysis quantifies the use of identity in plenary speeches delivered by 
minority representatives. Each representative’s tendency to invoke minority identity 
becomes part of a rhetoric score called an “ethnic invocation score” (EIS). In essence, 
this statistic denotes a legislator’s tendency to invoke minority identity in a floor speech. 
Tabulating EIS required extracting each plenary speech delivered by a minority 
representative between July 2002 and June 2014 (three legislative cycles). Throughout 
the extraction process, I scanned each speech to ensure that it was “substantive” in nature. 
A “substantive” speech was defined as one in which the representative makes a clear 
argument concerning a bill, proposition, issue, or previous speaker’s statement. “Non-
substantive” speeches included those pertaining to procedural matters (motions to vote, 
motions to adjourn, etc.), personal explanations (absences, tardiness, etc.), and other 
personal comments (introducing a guest speaker, mentioning festivals/holidays, etc.).
5
  
Put simply, if a representative presented a position in regard to a policy matter that was 
under congressional deliberation, the utterance was considered substantive. This process 
resulted in a total of 828 substantive speeches from 15 elected officials—six each from 
the BCD and ISD, as well as three from the ICD. 
                                                       
55
 For the vast majority of BCD, ICD, and ISD representatives, non-substantive speeches were remarkably 
rare. The exception to this rule was Maria Isabel Urrutia, who displayed a high tendency to seek motions to 
re-open discussions, motions to vote, motions of order, and various personal remarks that were not related 
to congressional business. This was particularly the case in her first term (2002-2006). 
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After extracting each substantive speech, these were uploaded to NVivo to 
conduct lexical searches. All speeches were queried for ethnic invocations using the same 
terms that were used in the minority presence analysis described above. Each speech 
featuring an invocation of group identity—and that was part of the main body of a 
speech—was marked as an “identity-inclusive speech.” 6 This classification was made 
without regard to the frequency or volume of invocations present and only in instances in 
which the representatives minority group is the source of the invocation (non-group 
invocations were excluded).  A total of 254 identity-inclusive speeches were identified 
out of the total population of 828. The number of identity-inclusive speeches was 
compiled at the individual level and the EIS was tabulated for each representative by 
dividing the number of identity-inclusive speeches by the total number of substantive 
speeches extracted (EIS = identity-inclusive speeches ÷ total substantive speeches).
7
 EIS 
were also tabulated at the district (BCD, ICD, and ISD) and district-year levels for 
comparative purposes. I them assessed any linkages between EIS outcomes and MID 
support by placing the two statistics on an X-Y scatterplot in a hope of identifying 
patterns across districts. 
EIS gives an indication of a representative’s tendency to insert identity into 
congressional discourse when making substantive policy arguments. It is insufficient, 
however, when the goal is to describe the nature of the invocation. Acquiring this level of 
detail required coding a random sample of identity-inclusive speeches. Given the intent 
                                                       
6
 The “main body” of a speech excludes introductions or salutations that identify the speaker as the 
representatives of Black or Indigenous communities. This means that in the instances where a speaker 
introduced themselves as the “Afro-Colombian,” “Black communities,” or “Indigenous communities” 
representative the speech was not deemed “identity-inclusive.”  
7
 To see examples of this procedure in the gender literature, see Piscopo (2011) and Shogan (2011). 
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of the exercise—to determine the frequency with which identity was connected to issues 
and geography—speeches without identity invocations were excluded. Using a random 
number generator, I pulled a sample of approximately one-third of the 254 identity-
inclusive speeches. This led to a sample of 86 speeches, each coded by hand using a sheet 
that identified the number of identity invocations and the nature of these invocations 
(substantive versus non-substantive). I also noted geographic invocations and whether 
these were linked to the minority group (geography-identity linkages).  Next, issue 
coverage was recorded and also assessed for linkages to group identity (issue-identity 
linkages). Finally, I recorded total word counts, geographic locales invoked, and the 
nature of geographic invocations (substantive vs. non-substantive)
8
 Geography-identity 
linkage scores and issue-identity linkage scores were derived by dividing the number of 
speeches with substantive geography-identity or issue-identity linkages by the total 
number of coded speeches (linkage score = speeches with identity/geography-identity 
linkages ÷ total coded speeches).  
This dual qualitative comparison—across minority groups and chambers of 
congress— will provide strong indications of the frequency with which Indigenous and 
Afro representatives invoke identity and how often they make substantive connections. 
Furthermore, examining the effects of MID support and HHI scores will indicate whether 
elections and constituency factors are determinants of representative behavior. 
This analysis has a few caveats. For the added benefit of efficiency, speech 
coding was done for a random sample of speeches delivered by minority representatives. 
                                                       
8
 A copy of the code sheet used for this process is included in Appendix A. 
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A couple of limitations extend from this. First, an analysis of non-minority 
representatives (all others) is omitted. The cost associated with this omission is the 
inability to draw larger conclusions regarding the way that the full population of 
legislators invoke identity and make substantive linkages. This, of course, poses some 
limitations. The data presented here, however, satisfactorily addresses the chapter’s 
focus. By this, I mean that the data allowing for an Afro versus Indigenous and Chamber 
versus Senate comparison is appropriate for answering the central questions at hand: to 
what extent do minority representatives introduce minority identity to the deliberative 
process and how much is this conditioned by constituency dynamics? This is addressed in 
a systematic fashion, with data that is amenable to deriving conclusions about the 
comparative behavior of minority representatives. The second limitation is that the 
random sampling process—in conjunction with the small number of speeches from 
certain representatives—forced the exclusion of certain representatives from individual-
level analyses. Exclusions were made in cases where a legislator did not reach a 
minimum of three coded speeches. Individual-level attrition was sharpest in the BCD, 
with two (out of six total) representatives not reaching the threshold. This means that the 
individual-level relationships between the independent constituency variables (HHI and 
MID support) and dependent identity representation variables (issue-identity linkages and 
geography-identity linkages) are being drawn from a smaller number of cases than 
originally anticipated. Nonetheless, the combination of district and individual-level 
outcomes should still provide a strong indication of the strength of these correlations. 
The final limitation extends from the omission of a comprehensive overview of 
the agenda across each of the legislative periods under study. Thus I am unable to control 
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for the impact of the agenda on congressional discourse, which in certain years may have 
brought issues that were more amenable to the introduction of minority identity. This was 
also a necessary evil that aided the efficiency and parsimony of the analysis. A content 
analysis of all major bills submitted to both the Chamber and Senate posed a formidable 
task. Moreover, the added benefit of such a review may have been limited, as it would 
have required justifying assumptions surrounding the types of bills that are friendly to 
minority discourse. I note some statistical outcomes that soften this issue somewhat, 
showing that it is unlikely that agenda is a key factor driving the use of identity.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Ethnic Invocation Scores (EIS) 
It is difficult to discern a clear pattern in EIS outcomes across minority districts and 
legislative periods, as demonstrated in Figure 4.1. On average, ISD representatives 
invoked Indigenous identity in their speeches at a greater rate than BCD and ICD 
representatives. The scores for the ISD are marked by a large spike in 2006-2010, a 
period in which Indigenous identity was invoked in almost 45% of the floor speeches 
delivered by an ISD representative. The ICD also shows an increase during this period, 
although minimal in comparison (.381 to .415). EIS in both Indigenous districts then 
tumbles in 2010-2014. In comparison, BCD representatives have produced less EIS 
variation across cycles. After an initial dip in 2006-2010, there is a rebound in 2010-
2014. The latter is almost congruent with the 2002-2006 score (difference of -.007). The 
consistency in the BCD indicates that there has been little change in the mere mention of 
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Afro identity, although this tells us little of the nature of these invocations. Indigenous 
districts, on the other hand, stand out for the sharp variation produced across cycles.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the relationship between MID support and EIS outcomes at the 
district-year level, with MID support collected from all candidate lists (winners are not 
isolated). Aggregated levels of electoral support from minority-influenced departments 
(MIDs) do not have a clear relationship with EIS outcomes. I expected that a greater 
percentage of MID support would motivate minority representatives to bring identity to 
the podium with greater frequency, as they would be responding to a base that is heavily 
influenced by the minority vote. But the rate of support from MIDs appears to have 
exerted an uneven influence. The results from the ICD particularly defy expectations, 
with representatives invoking identity more frequently where the percent of MID support 
was lower. The plots indicating BCD outcomes show a great disparity in MID support,  
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Figure 4.1. Ethnic Invocation Scores by District and Legislative Cycle (2002-2014) 
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ranging from 55.6 to 80.7% (Range = 25.1). Yet this failed to produce any great variation 
in EIS, which saw a low of .257 and a high of .302. More importantly, the highest spike 
in MID support produced a very similar EIS outcome as did the lowest, indicating that 
the district rate of MID support had little, if any, impact on the invoking of Black 
identity.  The ISD observations come closest to lending support for the expected 
outcome, although this is tenuous given that lower MID support in 2006—relative to 
2010—is associated with the highest EIS for the following legislative cycle. Reasoning 
that broader district outcomes might matter less to district winners than their own list’s 
support, I also tested for the effect of MID support from winning lists only. Figure 4.3 
shows that a focus on MID support for winning lists brought only small changes. The  
Figure 4.2. MID Support and Ethnic Invocation Scores (District-year level, MID 
Support from all candidate lists) 
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trend for the ICD continued to be slightly downward. Furthermore, the slightly positive 
trends in the ISD and BCD from Figure 4.2 change direction. These district-
leveloutcomes indicate two main possibilities; first, that MID support is inconsequential 
to a representative’s willingness/capacity to invoke minority identity; second—and less 
obvious—that this effect may be obscured at the district level and requires zooming in to 
the level of the individual representative.  
Table 4.1 provides a first glimpse at EIS outcomes at the individual 
(representative) level. Individual scores ranged from a low of .192 (Hernando Hernandez, 
ICD) to a high of .451 (Jesus Piñacue, ISD). The data reveal sharp variations in 
Figure 4.3. MID Support and EIS (District-year Level, Winners Only) 
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individual activity, with some representatives stepping to the podium over 100 times 
while others appear to have a marked inclination for introversion, in some cases speaking 
just a handful of times over a four year mandate. There appears to be no particular order 
to the EIS variation in the BCD across cycles or representatives. This suggests that none 
of the congresses under study presented an agenda that brought greater opportunities to 
introduce Afro identity, somewhat lessening the damage of one of the mentioned 
weaknesses herein. Even so, this remains difficult to substantiate without having 
performed a content analysis of all laws deliberated across cycles. The ISD, contrarily, is 
marked by close scores between representatives sharing the same cycle. In other words, 
ISD representatives do not deviate greatly from colleagues with whom they sat in office. 
Figure 4.4. MID Support and Ethnic Invocation Scores for the BCD 
(Individual Level, 2002-2010) 
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It is therefore possible that representative EIS is a function of the agenda—particularly in 
2006-2010, where the observations are notably high in both the ISD and the ICD. Again, 
this cannot be confirmed with the present data, but I will revisit this when the focus turns 
to the nature of ethno-racial invocations.  
Figure 4.5. MID Support and Ethnic Invocation Scores for the ICD and ISD  
(Individual Level, 2002-2010) 
 
 
I expected to observe a positive relationship between the percent of MID support 
and EIS outcomes, reasoning that a more robust minority support base would lead to 
higher identity invocation rates.  Individual-level scatterplots of MID support and EIS are 
presented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, with neither lending great support to expectations. In 
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likely to be connected with frequent introductions of minority identity. The ICD 
observations (Figure 4.5) indicate likewise, although there is little variation in MID 
support upon which conclusions can be developed. The ISD is once again the minority 
district with the strongest support for the presented hypotheses, exhibiting a slight 
upward trend. This provides at least some support for these expectations in regard to the 
ISD, however weak the relationship.  
 
Table 4.3. Minority Identity Invocations in Coded Speeches (By District, 2002-2014) 
 
District 
BCD ICD ISD 
Total Speeches (N) 24 16 46 
Words Per Speech 623.9 609.9 776.3 
Total Invocations 130 108 452 
Words Per Invocation 115.2 90.3 79.0 
Group Invocations 104 103 431 
Words Per Group Invocation 143.9 94.7 82.6 
Non-Group Invocations 26 5 21 
Words Per NG Invocation 575.9 1951.4 1700.6 
Identity Substantively Linked 
(%) 
17 (70.8%) 11 (68.6%) 42 (91.3%) 
 
 
District-Level Identity Linkages 
Table 4.3 provides a broad overview of information from the sample of coded speeches. 
Measured as the rate of identity invocations per spoken word, ISD representatives 
mentioned identity most frequently, doing so at a rate of one invocation for every 79 
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words. Representatives of the ICD were next, mentioning ethnicity at a rate of one 
invocation for approximately every 90 words. Afro representatives brought identity to the 
lectern least often, invoking Afro or Indigenous identity once for every 115 spoken 
words. This cross-district trend continues when “group-specific invocations” are 
isolated,
9
 although the gap widens further from the indigenous districts to the BCD, 
which invokes Afro identity once for every 144 words. The “non-group invocations” 
statistic is noteworthy. Representatives of Black Communities were more likely to bring 
Indigenous identity into the conversation than vice versa, doing so at a rate of one 
indigenous invocation for every 576 words. This cross-group invocation rate was three to 
four times greater than those observed for Indigenous representatives. Thus, not only do 
Indigenous representatives invoke their own identity more often than their Afro-
Colombian colleagues, but BCD representatives are more helpful in bringing indigeneity 
to the discourse than indigenous representatives do for Afro identity. This is a curious 
statistic given that indigenous representatives have often framed themselves as 
champions of both indigenous and Afro communities, particularly during the 
constitutional reform period (Laurent 2005; Agudelo 2002). Interestingly, while BCD 
representation invokes identity less than ICD lawmakers, they make substantive linkages 
to issues slightly more (+2.2%), suggesting that ICD representatives are more commonly 
invoking identity without a clear connection to a policy argument. Finally, ISD 
representatives make substantive issue-identity linkages most often, doing so over 90% of 
the time (91.3%). These general results indicate that indigenous identity has been blended 
                                                       
9
 A “group-specific” invocation is a reference that is made to the representative’s respective minority group 
(that for which they serve as a “descriptive” representative). A “non-group” invocation is a mention of the 
other group’s identity, where Indigenous representatives invoke Afro identity and vice versa.  
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in to the deliberative process with greater facility than Afro identity. What is less clear is 
whether this is a function of the social perception of the former identity versus the latter. 
That is to say, I cannot determine if the trope of racial democracy—which connects the 
dual process of discrimination and ethno-racial mixture— is responsible for the 
acceptability of indigenous over black identity. It is plausible that contrasting historical 
treatments of the two groups, in which blacks are often not perceived as legitimate  
 
Table 4.4. HHI Scores and Geographic Invocations (By District, 2002-2014) 
 
District 
BCD ICD ISD 
HHI Scores (Winners Mean) 26.49 11.58 15.84 
Total Speeches 24 16 46 
Speeches w/ Geo. Invocations 14 (.583) 9 (.563) 31 (.674) 
Speeches w/ Muni. Invocation Only 3 (.125) 2 (.125) 4 (.087) 
Speeches w/ Dept. Invocation Only 2 (.083) 1 (.063) 11 (.239) 
Speeches w/ Region Invocation 
Only 
0 (.000) 1 (.063) 0 (.000) 
Speeches w/ Various Levels 9 (.375) 5 (.313) 16 (.348) 
Substantive Geography-Issue 
Linkage 
12 (.500) 9 (.563) 27 (.587) 
Geography-Identity Linkage (%) 7 (.292) 7 (.777) 29 (.935) 
 
 
objects of state or intellectual concern, has carried over into institutional politics (Wade 
1993, pp. 29-37). Without being dismissive of the importance of historical antecedents, I 
concede that I do not have sufficient information with which to confirm historical 
treatment as an explanatory factor. Generating an argument of this ilk is outside of the 
scope of this project, and thus never its intent. The important message to glean from the 
frequency of ethnic invocations is that, whatever the cause, indigenous representatives 
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will have greater opportunities to make substantive linkages with identity, if they are so 
motivated. This advantage is particularly observable in the Senate, where the insertion of 
indigeneity into the discourse has been most recurrent.  
I expected that higher HHI scores would give representatives greater motivation 
to link minority identity geographic locales.
10
 Table 4.4 shows the district-level 
relationship between HHI and geographic invocation scores. Based on the HHI 
observations, we would expect the BCD to have the highest tendency to invoke 
geography as this district showed the most concentrated support (HHI = 26.49). My logic 
would suggest that this would be followed by the ISD (HHI = 15.84) and then the ICD 
(HHI = 11.58). The displayed outcomes tell a slightly different story. Relative to ICD 
representatives, those from the BCD do invoke geographic locales with slightly more 
frequency, but the negligible difference (.020) is hardly commensurate with the wide HHI 
gap (+14.91 HHI points). Furthermore, ISD representatives also invoked locales less 
often than the BCD, despite the lower HHI figure (-10.65 points). Most importantly, 
BCD representatives linked Afro identity to geography far less than did Indigenous 
representation. They made these connections in 29.2% of speeches. Making linkages 
between Afro identity and geography almost a third of the time is not inconsequential. It 
demonstrates that BCD representatives were indeed making connections between 
constituent identity with localities and departments. Comparatively speaking, however, 
this rate is paltry. ISD representatives linked identity with geography in 93.5% of 
speeches, while their partners in the ICD did so 77.7% of the time. This district-level data 
                                                       
10
 Sub-national levels of government included here are the department and municipality. Where a 
representative mentions a neighborhood, collective territory, or Indigenous reservation, this information 
was added to the corresponding municipality and department in which they are located.  
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suggests that a more clearly defined geographic constituency—at least for Afro-
Colombians—does not motivate the defense of specific minority communities. The 
higher concentration in the ISD has delivered more geographic invocations, as well as 
linkages between Indigenous identity and communities. 
Figure 4.6 zooms in to the level of the district-year. As expected, the relationship 
between HHI and geography-identity linkages is positive for all districts. The ICD 
exhibits the weakest relationship, while the correlations for both the BCD and ISD are 
considerably strong. Also notable is the contrasting chronological tendencies between the 
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BCD and ICD, on one hand, and the ISD on the other. Representatives of the former two 
districts generated their lowest combined HHI and linkage scores in the most recent 
period (2010-2014) and their highest in the most distant (2002-2006), in essence seeing a 
decrease in the geography-identity linkages over time. Contrarily, the latter district makes 
these connections with increasing frequency as time moves forward.
11
  
 
 
 
                                                       
11
 To test spuriousness of this relationship, I also plotted the relationship between MID support and issue-
identity linkages. To a degree, the results clash. Both the BCD and ICD bring lower linkage scores when 
MID support was highest. The ISD again produced a markedly positive trend. My reasoning dictates that 
vote concentration should have a conspicuous impact on a lawmaker’s tendency to tie identity with sub-
national locales. The rate of support from minority departments, in contrast, does nothing to describe 
geographic support patterns. Thus the uneven results in for MID support and geography-identity linkages 
are consistent with my logic. 
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Rates of MID support are expected to have a positive effect on the coupling of 
identity and issues. Figure 4.7 shows that this expectation held true for both Indigenous 
districts. Each saw greater output from representatives in regard to making substantive 
connections between group identity and policy arguments when MID support was 
elevated. In fact, every single speech coded for the 2010-2014 legislative session made 
the issue-identity association, a period which came on the heels of the highest Indigenous 
MID vote share (55.6% in 2010). The BCD sits in stark contrast, displaying an 
unmistakably negative relationship. This is by no means a justification for vilifying black 
representation. Representatives of the BCD are still linking Afro identity with issues 
quite often, anywhere between 53.7 % (2010-2014) and 80.7% (2002-2006) of the time. 
This is almost on par with their Indigenous colleagues. Good performance aside, though, 
the apparent negative influence of MID support defies my expectations and prompts the 
need to consider the theoretical fallout. Two explanations come to mind—either 1) there 
is some other deliberative factor that is driving the linkage of identity with policy 
positions (the agenda perhaps), or 2) that the departmental origins of BCD support is of 
little consequence to black representatives. They may seek to link identity to issues 
wherever prudent and reasonable, simply because their mandate was granted through 
institutional affirmative action. Patterns of electoral support may be of secondary 
concern, if any at all. If this is the case, it jogs another curiosity: why might electoral 
results carry greater weight for Indigenous representatives? Answers may lie in 
individual-level data. It is possible that when MID support is highly concentrated in one 
or two departments, a more parochial approach to minority representation is incentivized, 
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perhaps resulting in a narrower understanding of minority issues and thus less 
opportunities to invoke and make connections with  minority identity.  
 
Representative-Level Identity and Geographic Representation 
Figure 4.8 shows the relationship between individual HHI outcomes and geography-
identity linkage scores.
12
 As the graphic demonstrates, the ISD relationship remains 
positive, as increases in HHI result in more associations between identity and sub-
                                                       
12
 Although the measured relationship is the same, these results will not mirror those observed in Figure 
4.6, as this data only includes representatives with a minimum of three coded speeches from the random 
sample. This standard prompted the exclusion of two BCD representatives (Heriberto Arrechea, 2010-
2014; Silfrido Morales, 2006-2010) and one ICD representative (Efrén Tarapues, 2002-2006). 
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national locales. The wide range of identity linkage scores across districts lessens the 
probability that the representational format of the Senate—national rather than 
departmental—makes it more difficult to link identity with geography. The ICD 
presentation is mainly for visual comparison, as consistency with previous outcomes is 
inevitable (there is only one representative per legislative period). That is to say, neither 
HHI nor linkage scores can be disaggregated from district-year to individual. The BCD 
plots are thought provoking. The disaggregation of statistics to the level of the 
representative—and the exclusion of two scantly coded individuals—produces a shift 
from a positive HHI-Geography linkage relationship to an unequivocally negative slant. 
Moreover, the plots reveal that this negative shift is largely responsible to a single outlier 
(Yahir Acuña) who exhibits the largest HHI on record (all years and districts) but does 
not link identity with geography on any occasion. Acuña’s mandate for the 2010-2014 
legislative period came primarily from the department of Sucre, an MID situated on the 
Caribbean side of the country. The sucreño vote amounted to 89.1% of Acuña’s national 
vote, hence the remarkably high HHI and rate of MID support. These figures were 
counterbalanced by his accompanying colleague, Heriberto Arrechea, in the previous 
figure. Acuña’s large support from his home department is not remarkably out of place. 
He has a strong political trajectory in the area, first elected to the concejo of Sincelejo, 
the department’s capitol, and shortly after to the departmental assembly. More troubling, 
though, is his alliance with the right and ongoing investigations into his alleged ties with 
paramilitary organizations. To be fair, allegations have yet to stick—although his 
distance from them can be sincerely questioned (“Se salvó de la carcel investigador del 
expresidente Uribe”, 2013; “Los casos pendientes de Yahir Acuña”, 2014). Darker 
Figure 4.8: HHI Concentration and Geography-Identity Linkage Scores (Representative Level) 
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accusations aside, Mr. Acuña can nary dodge the label of the clientelistic politician, 
purchasing local votes with favors in recent campaigns (Arrieta 2014). The Acuña case 
illustrates that high HHI scores might only lead to geography-identity linkages when 
traditional patronage networks are not overriding the salience of group identity. It is also 
worth pointing out that Acuña’s term in office (2010-2014) is the one with the weakest 
identity linkage scores for each observed relationship (see Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8). My 
interpretation is that Acuña has the tendency of dragging down district-year scores for 
that period. To be clear, he does invoke identity and link it to issues, as I demonstrate 
below. But the lack of geography-identity associations indicates that his local affiliations 
Figure 4.9. Representative-Level MID Support and Issue-Identity Linkages  
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are not of the ethno-racial ilk. Otherwise he would at some point make a connection 
between his home department (Sucre)—which he does invoke in 40% of speeches—with 
Afro issues.  
Figure 4.9 turns our attention back to the matter of MID support and issue-identity 
linkages. In this case, the directionality of each relationship mirrors the district-year 
observations. The ISD maintains a strong growth in issue-identity associations as MID 
support increases. Both German Carlosama and Marco Anibal Avirama made such 
linkages in every coded speech. Carlosama’s score is most striking, given the large 
sample of coded speeches (N=13). He was also shown to be the strongest in regard to 
connecting Indigenous identity with geographic locations (see Figure 9 above). It merits 
noting that Carlosama and Avirama’s issue-identity scores, the highest two produced, are 
from the same period (2010-2014). This hints again at the possibility that the agenda in 
the Senate during this latest season was particularly amenable to invoking Indigenous 
identity. This possibility is downplayed, however, by the thorough inability of Avirama 
to link identity with geography, where his score was nil. Carlosama was also productive 
in that regard (92.3% of coded speeches), an expected outcome given his higher vote 
concentration. In fairness to Avirama, geography-identity linkage scores were generally 
much lower than issue-identity scores. Nevertheless, the extreme variation between his 
two scores leaves some doubt that the agenda is mostly responsible for the observed 
output.  
The BCD again presents an unexpected downward trend, with less MID support 
resulting in more issue-identity associations. In addition, the plot thickens in the case of 
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Yahir Acuña. The absence of geography-identity linkages is followed by an issue-identity 
linkage rate of 60%. In other words, it is not that Acuña is failing to invoke identity and 
associate it with substantive arguments. On the contrary, he is doing this in over half of 
his speeches. He just does not seem inclined to do so with geographic locales. It would 
take a more nuanced look at Acuña’s invocations to better understand his tendencies. For 
now, it appears that his speeches mention either the demands of a geographic population 
or an Afro position on an issue, but not both. It is possible that his identity invocations 
are merely a move to satisfy the electoral mandate effect discussed above, and thus akin 
to a type-casted actor being forced to speak lines befitting their role. Whatever the reason, 
his case speaks against the theory constructed here, as his extremely high HHI and MID 
support should result in the linkage of identity with issues and geography. After all, if he 
is a champion of Afro issues and almost 90% of his support is from Sucre, then my 
reasoning dictates that he should ultimately seek to represent sucreño Afro-Colombians. 
This data does not clearly demonstrate such a connection.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The seats allocated to Colombian minority groups provide them with a mere fraction of 
congressional representation, a circumstance that hinders their ability to achieve the 
“outcome oriented” benefits commonly associated with substantive representation. This 
fact heightens the importance of the deliberative aspect of representation, the “talk 
function” that is most amenable to making claims about the group’s interests on any 
given issue. Further, if we move beyond cynical takes on parliamentary rhetoric—which 
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view plenaries as platforms for political showmanship—we can harness the critical aspect 
of representation that takes place when a legislator “stands for” minority constituents by 
invoking group identity. 
Viewing identity invocations as a form of substantive representation, this chapter 
assessed the impact of constituency formation in minority districts on representative 
behavior. Specifically, it measured the relationship between MID support and HHI 
concentration scores on ethnic invocations and the linkage of identity to issues and 
geography. I tested this relationship at the district-year and individual (representative) 
levels, theoretically expecting that higher MID support and HHI scores would induce 
more group identity invocations and the linkage of identity with issues and geography. 
The observations from reserved seats in Colombia deliver mixed findings. Most 
notably, scores at the individual (representative) level showed that higher rates of MID 
support were linked with higher EIS figures in the ISD only, where the relationship was 
slightly positive. Individual level HHI scores were more aligned with expectations: both 
indigenous districts produced higher geography-identity linkages as HHI increased. 
Largely due to the outlier of Yahir Acuña, the BCD produces a negative relationship 
between these two variables. Further, this pattern is followed in regard to the relationship 
between MID support and issue-identity linkages. Indigenous districts—particularly the 
ISD—show a positive relationship between these indicators, while the BCD presented a 
sharply negative relationship.  
Constituency outcomes do not exert an influence on the behavior of BCD 
representatives—at least not in the ways theorized here. This does not, however, suggest 
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a lack of capacity or desire to use identity as a deliberative tool. As was revealed by the 
sample of coded speeches, BCD representatives make substantive issue-identity linkages 
at a greater rate than ICD representatives. Notwithstanding this observation, BCD 
representatives collectively stand apart as the least conscious of constituency outcomes. 
This prompts a new question: Why are ISD and ICD representatives more sensitive to 
constituency and electoral outcomes?  
A potential answer lies in an interesting observation: indigenous representatives 
are less likely to mention Afro identity than the reverse. This suggests that indigeneity is 
more legitimate and salient than negritud in political circles, a circumstance that others 
have made note of when assessing the inchoate nature of the Afro-Colombian vote 
(Agudelo 2002). By mentioning this, I mean to point out that the BCD outcomes diverge 
from expectations due to increased difficulty in linking identity with issues and 
geography more broadly. Black representatives mention identity just as much, but 
making substantive connections is slightly more challenging. 
It cannot go unremarked that BCD representation, on average, produced the 
highest HHI concentration across all districts. But rather than facilitate more geography-
identity linkages, a more concentrated support base appears to be an indicator of 
patronage networks that can have little to do with black politics. The Yahir Acuña case 
clearly illustrates this dynamic. Geography is invoked often, as is identity. But the two 
are rarely connected. He seems more concerned with addressing the issues of people in 
Sucre rather than afro-sucreños specifically, while also being sure to pay lip service to 
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the quotas target group. This case hints at needed revisions or caveats in regard to the 
expected impact of vote concentration patterns.  
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CHAPTER 5: MINORITY DISTRICTS AND EMPOWERMENT: ASSESSING THE 
LINKAGES BETWEEN MINORITY CANDIDATE SUPPORT AND VOTER 
TURNOUT IN MINORITY-MAJORITY MUNICIPALITIES 
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Inclusive and broad participation is central to the quality of representation and democratic 
processes. Recognizing this, social scientists have dedicated vast resources to identifying 
the factors that influence an individual’s decision to engage in the political process, often 
citing factors such as income and education (e.g., Verba and Nye 1972; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Others have moved away 
from these individual-level factors to consider the role of the political context, in essence 
arguing that the decision to participate is not an exclusively internal matter (e.g., 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Tate 1991, 1994). On the heels of this empirical shift to 
systemic explanations, studies have assessed whether variations in minority political 
power affect minority engagement (Gilliam 1996; Gilliam and Kaufman 1998; Kaufman 
1999). These studies most commonly focus on U.S. minorities and systematically observe 
the historical paucity of minority turnout in comparison with that of white Americans 
(e.g. Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Verba and Nie 1972). The lagging rate of minority 
participation, it is posited, is largely a function of the lack of trust between minorities and 
government that is induced by their exclusion from the system, culminating in disinterest 
and disempowerment (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Howell and Fagan 1988). 
Scholars have since delivered empirical findings that support the “minority 
empowerment” thesis. Tate (1991) demonstrated that the Democratic presidential primary 
candidacy of Jesse Jackson produced increases in Black participation in 1984 and 1988, 
while Washington (2006) observed an increase in both Black and white (overall) turnout 
when Black congressional candidates appeared. In addition, similar outcomes were 
observed for Latino populations when a group member is featured on the ballot (Barreto 
2007; Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004). Zooming to the local level, Lublin and Tate 
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(1995) showed similar increases in turnout when a Black politician was among mayoral 
candidates, while Bobo and Gilliam (1990) concluded that Blacks were more likely to 
vote when they lived in “minority empowerment zones.”1 In connection with these 
empirical studies, Dawson (1995) theorizes that a minority utility heuristic is at work 
when minority citizens weigh participation. This utility heuristic, the argument suggests, 
motivates minority citizens because they make connections between their own interests 
and those of the group. In electoral settings, these interests are embodied by the minority 
candidate. Consequently, there is a perception of “linked fate” that leads minority citizens 
to relate the success of descriptive candidates with their own advancement. This speaks 
back to Mansbridge’s (1999) insistence on the salience of “mutual experiences”, as well 
as Young’s (1989) argument that shared histories matter. That is to say, it is the shared 
experience of historical marginalization that allows identity to signal common stakes and 
victories—and perhaps defeats, as well—to group members. In the language of Pitkin, 
common group experiences are the fuel that drives the symbolic attachment between 
constituents and representatives. Ergo, inclusive measures do not only intend to increase 
minority presence in institutions. They are also meant to foster minority advancement in 
all areas of society (Htun and Jones 2002; Kudva 2003), including heightened self-esteem 
and confidence (Nanivadekar 2006), increased contact between citizens and 
representatives (Kudva 2003), and, most importantly, observable increases in the political 
engagement of minorities (Krook 2006). In sum, it has been shown that the consequences 
of affirmative action measures extend beyond substantive representation in institutions.  
                                                       
1
 Bobo and Gilliam (1990) defined the concept of the “minority empowerment zone” as a locality in which 
a Black politician held the mayor’s office. 
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Latin American studies focusing on ethno-racial minorities and institutions have 
recently grown exponentially, assessing such dynamics as ethnic party formation and 
performance (Madrid 2012; Rice 2011; Rice and Van Cott 2006; Van Cott 2005), the 
linkages between indigenous people and ethnic electoral organizations (Laurent 2002), 
electoral behavior for indigenous populations (Madrid 2005b; Laurent 2010), and 
electoral behavior and outcomes for Afrolatinos (Agudelo 2002; Agudelo, Hoffmann and 
Rivas 1999). But even as this body of scholarship matures, key voids remain. First, 
despite the coexistence of both Indian and Afro-Latino politicization, scholars have not 
energetically pursued comparisons between indigenous and Black politics in the region.
2
 
Most importantly here, the minority empowerment thesis has yet to be tested for Latin 
American ethnic minorities. This chapter seeks to address this gap by conducting an 
analysis of the impact of reserved seat quotas on turnout in minority-majority 
municipalities in Colombia. I measure this connection by testing the linkage between 
votes cast for minority district candidates and rates of participation in minority-majority 
municipalities. Put otherwise, I measure whether ethnic minority communities that are 
strongly linked to the minority district vote also see greater turnout figures, the latter 
understood here as an indicator of minority empowerment. In essence, this chapter seeks 
to determine whether the Colombian reserved seat policies produce similar symbolic 
outcomes as those observed elsewhere, including. Further, we are entirely unaware of the 
comparative impacts that reserved seats have had for the two target groups. Do minority-
                                                       
2
 There are a few notable exceptions. Taking a regional approach, Hooker’s (2005) piece that highlights the 
disparity in a collective rights gained by indigenous groups versus Afro-Latinos in multi-cultural reforms. 
Chapter 3 of Van Cott’s (2000) earlier book also sheds light on some of the comparative development of 
Afro-Colombian social movements versus Indian Colombians while highlighting each group’s involvement 
in the National Constituent Assembly. Finally, Sanchez et al. (1993) perform another single-state 
comparison of the involvement and outcomes for each group following the constitutional reform process in 
Colombia. 
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majority municipalities with stronger electoral linkages to minority districts also exhibit 
higher rates of participation in elections? Has either target group experienced a greater 
sense of empowerment as a result of minority districts? To my knowledge, a systematic 
and cross-identity analysis of this ilk has yet to be conducted in the region. As such, the 
conclusions derived will make a key contribution to the minority empowerment and Latin 
American ethnic politics literatures. 
Following those who find support for the minority empowerment thesis, the main 
expectation of this study is that minority-majority municipalities exhibiting strong 
support for minority district candidates will also see higher voter turnout. There are also 
two subsequent expectations that are assessed comparatively. First, and due to a longer 
history of group recognition by mainstream society, I expect to observe a more 
pronounced positive relationship between minority district support and participation in 
indigenous versus Afro-Colombian minority-majority municipalities. This stems from the 
historical fact that “indigeneity” was preserved as part of the national Colombian identity 
far more than “negritude” (Wade 1993), a historical circumstance that makes it more 
likely that a strong sense of group consciousness has taken form in the indigenous case.
3
 
Additionally, Agudelo (2002) has noted that the fragmentation which typifies the Black 
vote is symptomatic of a lack of group solidarity. We can expect the delicate 
cohesiveness of Black communities to be accompanied by a lower probability to 
experience empowerment as a result of identity-driven quotas. Finally, and taking the 
                                                       
3
 A psychological theory called the “ethnic community approach” holds that membership in a 
disadvantaged minority community leads group members to develop strong feelings of group 
consciousness. A potential product of this awareness is the emergence of group calls for political action, 
particularly for the purpose of improving the status of the community (Miller et al 1981; Olsen 1970; Verba 
and Nie 1972). 
 124 
 
form of a cross-institutional comparison, I expect strong electoral linkages to the 
indigenous senate district (ISD) to produce a more formidable positive relationship with 
turnout in indigenous minority-majority municipalities than does support for the 
indigenous chamber district (ICD). I expect this to be the case due to the higher visibility 
of the ISD, which guarantees representation in a smaller and more prestigious institution. 
This is, in part, an extension of Zetterberg’s (2009) argument that “signal effects”—the 
“interpretive effects” that policies have on masses—are heightened when the policies are 
both salient and perceived to have real impacts for constituents. In other words, 
minorities must perceive inclusive measures to have a true impact in their lives in order 
for these mandates to affect their perceptions of government. It is more likely that this 
will be the case when minority district candidates are both more visible and will 
constitute a larger proportion of institutional actors once elected to office (2 out of 102 in 
the senate vs. 1 out of 166 in the house). Thus, the salience and potential efficacy of 
indigenous representatives in the upper chamber should enhance their impact on 
symbolic empowerment. 
This study capitalizes on a unique opportunity to compare the effects of reserved 
seat policies for both Afro and indigenous Latinos. This is due to advantageousness of the 
Colombian context, in which both minorities have seat reservations in the Congreso 
Nacional. The particularity of the case, however, does not confine the importance any 
potential conclusions. On the contrary, it allows for further development of a growing 
body of institutional literature by offering a means for comparing the impact of minority 
candidates across minority groups, while also holding constant the variables commonly 
used to explain cross-national variation (Gray and Caul 2000). This is a promising set of 
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conditions for making a substantial contribution to the literature on minority 
empowerment and the impact of representational quotas, as it isolates the effects that 
minority presence in elections has on ethnic voters. 
Capitalizing on the implementation of both indigenous and Afro-Colombian seat 
reservations, this paper conducts a comparative (cross-identity) analysis with the goal of 
identifying the contexts in which higher rates of support for minority candidates is linked 
to minority empowerment. I examine this question from a cross-municipal perspective, 
analyzing voter turnout for minority-majority municipalities across five election cycles. 
All of the electoral data utilized here was acquired from the Registraduria Nacional de 
Colombia, while the population data used to identify minority-majority municipalities 
were acquired from the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadisticas (DANE) 
of Colombia. The analysis reveals that indigenous candidates are more likely to have 
significant impact on overall turnout rates in indigenous-majority municipalities than 
Afro-Colombian candidates. The latter group of candidates do not exhibit a significant 
impact on turnout in Afro-majority municipalities, in most cases. Thus, indigenous 
candidates appear to have greater empowerment effects for group members than do Black 
candidates. Equally important, I find that the strength of the relationship between 
minority roll candidates and voters is strengthened when we make the analysis exclusive 
to the Pacific littoral. It therefore appears that the salience of ethnicity and race does not 
just vary across minority groups, but also across geographical contexts. 
Before proceeding, I would like to make a note regarding the use of the term 
“minority empowerment.” As will be illustrated in the following section, I restrict the use 
of this term to ideas specific to the concept of minority political engagement. I do not—
 126 
 
and with my data, I believe I cannot—make claims regarding changes in the agency for 
any set of minority actors. That is to say, the use of the word “empowerment” should not 
be understood to present arguments about the ability of minorities to enact change, alter 
their collective social standing, or become a more formidable vehicle of public policy. 
Rather, it is a reflection of minority political participation, which may or may not 
facilitate more substantive outcomes. It is clear that simple changes in voter turnout do 
little to explain changes in inter-group power dynamics. Such an assessment would 
require far more intricate and involved measures. But I also view the term to be apropos, 
primarily because it begins to describe the potential power of minority groups and 
captures the positive “feelings” that group members acquire due to greater inclusion. 
Black voters participate more, for example, because inclusion makes political processes 
potentially more valuable to them. 
 
DATA, MEASURES, AND PROCEDURES 
To examine the relationship between rates of minority district support on minority 
turnout, I relied on both electoral and census data from governmental sources. The 
electoral data used was mined during fieldwork from the Registraduria Nacional de 
Colombia, while the population data was acquired remotely via the Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadicas (DANE).  Both data types were compiled at the 
municipal level. The population data utilized came from the 2005 Colombian census 
conducted by the DANE, the earliest census cycle for which municipal-level ethnicity 
data was available.  Electoral data was mined for each election cycle between 1991 and 
2010 (6 cycles total). It should be noted that electoral data for the 1998 cycle was not 
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available at the municipal level for minority rolls, thus an analysis of minority turnout in 
connection with minority rolls was not possible for that cycle. The models for predicting 
turnout in MMMs also include various controls for district competitiveness and the 
availability of polling stations. The main independent variable (IV) of interest is the 
proportion of municipal votes cast for minority district candidates in the BCD, the ISD, 
or the ICD. This independent variable is calculated as the percentage of votes that were 
cast for the pertinent roll of minority candidates (proportion of minority votes cast = 
votes cast for minority district candidates ÷ total votes cast in the municipality). The 
dependent variable dependent variable is rate of voter turnout and is calculated as the 
percentage of registered voters who casted ballots at the municipal level.
4
 
Original implementation of Colombian seat reservations occurred in 1991 for 
indigenous communities, who received 2 (out of 102 total) seats in the Colombian senate 
immediately after the conclusion of constitutional reform. This seat reservation policy has 
remained uninterrupted, now spanning six election cycles (1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 
and 2010), five of which are included in the analysis due to the inaccessibility of the 1998 
data. In 2002, indigenous communities also gained one additional seat (out of 166), this 
time in the lower house. Black communities first gained 2 reserved seats (also out of 166) 
in the Colombian house during the second post-reform legislative period (1994-1998). 
Consequently, the first election including a Black minority roll occurred in 1994. This 
policy, however, saw a gap in implementation in the subsequent cycle (1998-2002) due to 
a legal struggle regarding the constitutionality of the measure. After being reinstituted for 
the 2002-2006 cycle, the policy has since remained in place. The Afro-Colombian 
                                                       
4
 Voter turnout among registered voters was the only statistic available from the Colombian National 
Registrar, which does not calculate abstention rates based on the total voting age population (VAP).  
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minority roll has therefore been present across 4 electoral cycles (1994, 2002, 2006, and 
2010), all of which are included here. 
Due to the fact that it is impossible to determine the identity of voters, the nature 
of seat reservation implementation in Colombia requires special procedures to maximize 
the probability that a vote for minority candidates came from a Black or indigenous voter. 
In order to more safely assume that minority roll participation was primarily a function of 
minority voters, data was compiled at the municipal level including only municipalities 
that are predominantly Black or indigenous (70% or more of either group, but not both 
combined). The 2005 census data acquired through the DANE was used to determine the 
ethno-racial makeup of each Colombian municipality. All municipalities not reaching the 
70% threshold for either group were excluded from the analysis. This threshold was 
utilized for three reasons. First, the threshold is consistent with the nature of the study, 
which seeks to link votes cast for minority candidates with changes in minority turnout. 
In order to perform this type of analysis, given the nature of the data and inability to 
determine voter identity, it is necessary to only include minority districts in the analysis. 
It would otherwise be impossible to determine the specific effect of reserved seat 
candidates on minority empowerment. Second, a 70% minority-majority municipality 
(MMM) according to 2005 census data can be more safely classified as such across all 
election cycles. A simple minority-majority (50% +1) on the other hand could possibly 
have seen demographic changes that might alter its classification across election cycles, 
which span almost twenty years (1991-2010) and includes years that are up to twelve 
years prior to the collection of population figures. Thus, if a simple majority was used the 
likelihood that excludable cases were wrongly included would be increased. The third 
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reason for this threshold is that it functions to lend more credibility to the results by 
further maximizing the assumption that minority roll votes came from minority voters. 
This procedure for identifying MMMs is a necessary step for approximating the impact 
that minority districts had on minority voters as it makes it increasingly likely that the 
voter turnout figures included in the analysis are a reflection of Black and indigenous 
voter behavior. Including data for non-MMMs would greatly jeopardize this required 
assumption. 
Because these data were compiled at the municipal level and are specific to the 
election year, the unit of analysis for this study is the municipality-year. The total number 
of minority-majority municipalities included in the analysis was 82, with some attrition 
of cases across cycles due to inconsistencies in data or the non-existence of certain 
municipalities in earlier years. Sixty of these municipalities were classified as Afro-
majority municipalities (AMMs), most of which were analyzed across four elections 
cycles (1994, 2002, 2006, 2010). The remaining 22 were classified as Indigenous-
majority municipalities (IMMs), with the majority of these analyzed across six election 
cycles (1991, 1994, 2002, 2006, 2010). After excluding cases with gaps in data and 
adding the pertinent electoral years to each municipality, the total number of cases 
include came to 382 (N = 382). Two hundred seventy-three of these municipality-year 
cases were AMMs, with IMMs making up the remainder (109). 
The final sample size is formidable and allows for a multivariate linear regression 
in order to measure the relationship between the IV (minority candidate support) and DV 
(overall voter turnout in MMMs). In order to control for other electoral dynamics, I also 
included four dichotomous district competitiveness measures. Representation for the 
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Chamber of Deputies is elected at the department level. Ergo, these measures are 
intended to denote the inter-partisan competition in the department’s lower house 
elections. This is captured for both the previous and current election. These measures 
include the following: 
1) Whether a single party won more than 70% of department seats in the 
previous election (PREVSEATCOMP; 1 = No, 0 = Yes). 
2) Whether a single party won more than 70% of department seats in the current 
election (SEATCOMP; 1 = No, 0 = Yes). 
3) Whether 3 or more parties gained seats in the district in the previous election 
(PREVPARTYCOMP; 1 = Yes, 0 = No). 
4) Whether 3 or more parties gained seats in the district in the previous election 
(PREVPARTYCOMP; 1 = Yes, 0 = No). 
 
These measures essentially took into account the tendency of a single party to 
dominate a district or the ability of tertiary political parties to win seats.5  As I have 
designed them, a dichotomous classification of “1” indicates that the district was/is 
competitive in nature. If more than two parties acquired seats in the previous house 
election, for example, this was understood as a competitive election. The party 
competitiveness measure was particularly useful for departments with district magnitudes 
higher than five, where there is greater chance for tertiary party success. The seat 
allocation aspect sought to capture instances of single party dominance. If a single party 
won more than 70% of available seats the district was considered non-competitive (e.g. 
winning three out of four available seats). This measure was more amenable to districts 
with smaller magnitudes in which it was unlikely or impossible—in the case of two-seat 
                                                       
5
 Two points must be added here. First, the nature of the Colombian party system is historically two party 
dominant, with the Liberal and Conservative parties operating under the quasi-oligarchical pact known as 
the National Front. Consequently, any election in which a tertiary party was capable of acquiring seats can 
legitimately be viewed as particularly competitive, whether that tertiary party was lasting or effervescent 
(temporary coalitions notwithstanding). Second, house races are conducted at the departmental level, one 
governmental level above the municipal. Thus, all party competitiveness measures are necessarily compiled 
at the departmental level rather than the municipal. 
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districts—for a third party to win a seat. The final intervening variable taken into account 
is the availability of polling stations, here operationalized as the number of polling 
stations per registered voter in a municipality, all multiplied by 1000 in order to deliver 
integers greater than 1 (polling stations/registered voters X 1000). The theory behind the 
polling stations variable is that a higher number of polling stations per registered voter 
may decrease the costs of participation by offering easier access to a nearby polling 
station and possibly a decrease in waiting time where more polling stations are present. 
Both of these factors may impact an individual’s decision to participate due to an 
alteration in the cost-benefit analysis attached to the voting process. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
I estimated the models using a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis. This entailed 
running series of OLS models that included dummy variables for each MMM to correct 
for municipality-specific effects. The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is used to test 
correlation among the residuals. The desired range for DW outcomes is between 1.50 and 
2.50. A score closes to 2.0 indicates non-autocorrelation, while a value closer to 0 
indicates positive autocorrelation and a score closer to 4 suggests negative 
autocorrelation. In an attempt to assess the impact of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable in a particular context, I also ran additional models that isolated 
MMMs in the Pacific Region. 
The model outcomes in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate the stipulated 
relationships for AMMs. We should first note that for each model the Pearson’s R 
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correlations are moderately positive and significant, though the correlation is higher when 
Pacific region AMMs are isolated. The DW statistic for all IMMs falls just below the 
desired range (1.382), suggesting that there is a slight positive autocorrelation tendency. 
The Pacific region DW falls just within the range (1.561). Interestingly, the single factor 
with statistical significance in both models is the party competitiveness dummy for the 
current election (-5.606 and -9.167). This is a curious indicator, as it suggests that 
competitive districts tend to produce lower turnout in MMMs. More importantly, 
however, is the fact that the rate of minority district support shows contrasting outcomes 
between the two models. When all cases are  
 
Table 5.1. Impact of BCD Support, District Competitiveness, and Polling Stations 
on Lower HouseParticipation in Afro-Majority Municipalities (All Cases) 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
B 
Standard Error 
Constant 50.450*** 3.635 
% of District Votes Cast in Minority Roll -.103 .060 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Previous Election 3.062 3.775 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Current Election 2.233 2.591 
Party Competitiveness in Previous Election -5.596 3.718 
Party Competitiveness in Current Election -5.606** 1.942 
No. of Polling Stations Per Registered Voter -.586 .857 
 
Number of Cases 223 
Durbin-Watson 1.382 
Pearson’s R .271* 
Adjusted R² .048 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
included (Table 5.1) the rate of minority district support actually has a negative impact on 
turnout (-.103). When MMMs of the Pacific are isolated, the direction flips (.210). 
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Neither of these correlations, however, are significant. It is therefore difficult to conclude 
with certainty that this relationship is not spurious. It is still worth noting that the 
relationship between BCD support and turnout is strongest when Pacific region AMMs 
are isolated. This variation in outcomes implies that the presence of minority district 
candidates is most likely to produce a symbolic outcome for Afro-Colombians in a 
particular geographic context; the Pacific littoral. Given that the area has been a key 
focus of Afro-driven policies such as mining reform, riverine/riparian rights, and  
 
Table 5.2. Impact of BCD Support, District Competitiveness, and Polling Stations 
on Lower House Participation in Afro-Majority Municipalities (Pacific Region) 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
B 
Standard Error 
Constant 46.021*** 3.621 
% of District Votes Cast in Minority Roll .210 .060 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Previous Election -.155 9.020 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Current Election 3.833 2.490 
Party Competitiveness in Previous Election -5.756 8.960 
Party Competitiveness in Current Election -9.167*** 1.962 
No. of Polling Stations Per Registered Voter .548 .813 
 
Number of Cases 143 
Durbin-Watson 1.561 
Pearson’s R .442** 
Adjusted R² .160 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
communal landholdings (Asher 2009), it is not surprising that it would mean more to 
practice Black politics in this region versus others. In other words, we would expect the 
greatest sense of group consciousness and perceptions of  
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connected fate to be strongest in the departments of the Pacific, such as the Chocó, Valle 
del Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño, where Afro-Colombian identity has been linked to 
structural outcomes like territory and natural resources.  
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the model outcomes for IMMs. The directionality of the 
models is also positive and mirrors the BCD outcomes in one regard; the positive impact 
of the model on turnout is higher in Pacific IMMs (.621) than when all IMMs are  
 
Table 5.3. Impact of ICD Support, District Competitiveness, and Polling Stations on 
Lower House Participation in Indigenous-Majority Municipalities (All Cases) 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
B 
Standard Error 
Constant 46.876** 12.998 
% of District Votes Cast in Minority Roll .352* .146 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Previous Election -10.356 7.374 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Current Election 13.683 8.548 
Party Competitiveness in Previous Election 15.463* 6.671 
Party Competitiveness in Current Election 2.353 3.481 
No. of Polling Stations Per Registered Voter -6.883* 3.381 
 
Number of Cases 66 
Durbin-Watson 1.445 
Pearson’s R .496** 
Adjusted R² .169 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
included (.496).  Both DW statistics fall just below the desired threshold at 1.445 and 
1.454, respectively. Notably different in IMM models are the relationships between rates 
of support for ICD candidates and the DV (turnout). Both correlations are positive and 
statistically significant, with all cases producing a slightly lower figure (.352) than Pacific 
region cases (.443), with the latter being most significant (p<.01). In addition, the party 
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competitiveness measures flip from Table 5.3 to Table 5.4. While party 
competitiveness—particularly in the previous election—had a strong positive effect when 
all cases were included, the model exclusive to Pacific MMMs shows that these variables 
have a slightly negative effect. The only significant figure among these correlations is  
 
Table 5.4. Impact of ICD Support, District Competitiveness, and Polling Stations on 
Lower House Participation in Indigenous-Majority Municipalities (Pacific Region) 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
B 
Standard Error 
Constant 78.678*** 10.325 
% of District Votes Cast in Minority Roll .443** .123 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Previous Election Excluded^ --- 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Current Election Excluded^ --- 
Party Competitiveness in Previous Election -2.671 3.467 
Party Competitiveness in Current Election -3.193 3.365 
No. of Polling Stations Per Registered Voter -10.376** 2.864 
 
Number of Cases 42 
Durbin-Watson 1.454 
Pearson’s R .621** 
Adjusted R² .320 
^The combination of excluded cases due to missing data and isolating Pacific region MMMs 
produced errors due to these predictors being constant in regard to the DV. 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
produced by party competitiveness in the previous election when all cases are included 
(15.463) and the large standard errors shown in Table 5.4 (3.467 and 3.365) make it 
imprudent to derive any conclusions from these numbers. It is possible that 
competitiveness between parties carries greater weight for turnout outside of the Pacific, 
as the smaller Pacific population figures that lead to lower district magnitudes in the 
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region might decrease competitiveness and access for tertiary parties.
6
  But given the 
large margin for error in the outcomes, this is pure speculation. The number of polling 
stations statistic is negative and significant in both models, a result which defies the 
expectation that more polling stations per registered voter would have a positive 
correlation with turnout as this would facilitate participation. 
 
Table 5.5. Impact of ISD Support, District Competitiveness, and Polling Stations on 
Senate Participation in Indigenous-Majority Municipalities (All Cases) 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
B 
Standard Error 
Constant 55.200*** 6.726 
% of District Votes Cast in Minority Roll .028 .063 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Previous Election -5.709 3.783 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Current Election -3.769 3.658 
Party Competitiveness in Previous Election 8.209* 3.431 
Party Competitiveness in Current Election 4.308 2.454 
No. of Polling Stations Per Registered Voter -2.870 1.558 
 
Number of Cases 108 
Durbin-Watson 1.398 
Pearson’s R .358** 
Adjusted R² .076 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 also show model outcomes for IMMs, but with the DV shifting 
to turnout in senate elections. Again, Pearson’s R statistics are both positive with the 
Pacific IMMs producing a more pronounced figure (.358 and .408), though in this 
                                                       
6
 The Valle del Cauca department is the sole exception, which has a district magnitude of 13. However, as I 
have classified MMMs (70% minority or higher), there are no IMMs in the Valle del Cauca department. 
The remaining Pacific departments have a district magnitude of 4 or lower. The Pacific departments 
particularly marked by a high number of IMMs are Cauca (DM = 4) and Nariño (DM = 4). This increases 
the likelihood that many IMMs are classified as non-competitive due to the lower number of seats 
available. 
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instance the latter outcome fails to reach statistical significance (p = .071). Also, the DW 
statistics both fall just short of the desired range (1.398 and 1.344), indicating a slight 
positive autocorrelation in the residuals. These tables somewhat follow the previous sets 
in regard to the impact of minority district support on turnout—the impact of this variable  
 
Table 5.6. Impact of ISD Support, District Competitiveness, and Polling Stations on 
Senate Participation in Indigenous-Majority Municipalities (Pacific Region) 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
B 
Standard Error 
Constant 45.556*** 7.630 
% of District Votes Cast in Minority Roll .124* .059 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Previous Election -6.120 8.164 
Seat Allocation Competitiveness in Current Election .279 3.837 
Party Competitiveness in Previous Election 9.408 8.558 
Party Competitiveness in Current Election 1.022 2.574 
No. of Polling Stations Per Registered Voter -1.668 1.484 
 
Number of Cases 69 
Durbin-Watson 1.344 
Pearson’s R .408 
Adjusted R² .086 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
 
on the dependent variable is stronger when Pacific region IMMs are isolated (.124, p < 
.05). The model including all IMMs delivered a very small and non-significant 
correlation (.028, p = .662). A look back at Tables 5.3 and 5.4 reveals that ICD support 
exhibited stronger positive impacts on house turnout than ISD support on senate turnout. 
Most notably, the Pacific region correlation for the ICD (.443) is markedly higher than 
that of the ISD (.124), both statistically significant figures. A similar observation can be 
made through the models including all IMMs, with the impact of ICD support (.352) 
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outweighing the effect of ISD support (.028) on IMM turnout, with the latter correlation 
being particularly unreliable. My hypothesis was that the enhanced visibility of senate 
candidates would heighten the “signal effects” of the ISD, thereby fostering greater 
empowerment for indigenous citizens. But this prediction has not materialized, indicating 
either that the ISD candidates are no more visible than ICD candidates or that 
Zetterberg’s signal effects do not play a role in this political context. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter examines the contexts under which minority district support inspires 
changes in participation rates in minority-majority municipalities. While including 
district competitiveness and polling station variables in the models, I sought to determine 
whether or not linkages to minority district candidates empower the minority citizens of 
the target groups. It is clear that strong linkages with ICD district candidates have a more 
pronounced positive impact on IMM participation than support for BCD candidates on 
AMM participation. The results for the impact of BCD support on AMM turnout also 
reveal a positive correlation, but the lack of statistical significance inhibits our ability to 
make firm conclusions regarding this relationship. These findings are congruent with one 
of the articulated expectations, which posited that ICD support would be more strongly 
connected with empowerment outcomes due to the longer history of inclusion by the 
central government (Wade 1993). I view this as a modest confirmation that group 
consciousness is more deeply intermingled with politics in indigenous communities. This 
is, per my account, primarily due to a longer past of linking identity with key political 
issues such as territory and self-determination (Van Cott 2000) and a longer track record 
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of engaging in institutional politics to achieve group goals (Laurent 2005). That is to say, 
it appears that the historical recognition of indigeneity (e.g. indigenous territories 
[resguardos] and governing bodies [cabildos]) versus the more hardline removal—or the 
attempt thereof—of the Afro-descendant identity from the national memory has a 
considerable impact. In short, indigenous citizens seem far more likely to view political 
engagement as a group weapon than Afro-Colombians. By saying this, I do not mean to 
imply that Afro-Colombians are less politically engaged overall, nor can this data be 
made amenable to such a claim. Still, the data does suggest that, whatever the nature of 
overall group engagement, Afro-Colombians appear to mobilize less around their 
identity—assuming, of course, that minority district support is a good proxy for group 
engagement. Otherwise, we would see a more conspicuous empowerment outcome as a 
function of linkages to the minority roll. Further research is needed to unearth this 
dynamic, particularly in the regional and localized contexts where candidates vying for 
seats reserved for Black communities had little to no effect on turnout in AMMs.  
It is possible Afro-Colombian politics has suffered more from the deleterious 
effects of increased levels of violence that has been observed in some Afro-majority areas 
This is an unfortunate process that the Observatorio Pacifico y Territorial (Territorial and 
Pacific Observatory; www.pacificocolombia.org) has continuously noted over the last 
several years. The explanatory power of this issue, however, is questionable. Many tribal 
communities are finding themselves increasingly mired in the violence of the Pacific 
(Mesa Permanente de Concertación Nacional con los pueblos y Organizaciones Indígenas 
2014). Yet this does not appear to have prevented the ICD from exhibiting a heightened 
impact on turnout in IMMs, particularly in the Pacific. Despite that disclaimer, the 
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importance of increased violence in the Afro-Pacific cannot be summarily dismissed as a 
potential factor. Displacement as a result of violent struggle in the conflict-laden region 
has been noted as a mostly Afro-Colombian problem—although it cannot be said to be 
exclusive. It is hardly doubtful that displacement and fear might be harmful to 
empowerment. Confirming or denying violence as a factor requires the operationalization 
of violence as a variable at the municipal level. I have yet to find a data source that 
covers such an expansive period of time and pinpoints violent acts at the municipal level, 
thus attempts to take this into account have yet to materialize. 
Leaning against my preliminary expectations were the cross-institutional 
outcomes across indigenous districts. Because of the greater visibility of senators relative 
to house representatives, I expected those candidates to augment the “signal effects”—the 
“interpretive effects” that policies have on masses—of seat reservation policies 
(Zetterberg 2009). Stated otherwise, I expected constituents to believe that senators 
would have a greater capacity to produce salient and impactful policy changes. It seemed 
likely that this would be the case for the more prestigious of the legislative chambers, 
who also constitute a larger proportion of institutional actors once elected to office (2 out 
of 102 in the senate vs. 1 out of 166 in the house). The salience and potential efficacy of 
ISD representation, however, has not delivered results that suggest a greater level of 
empowerment as a function of ISD support. It is possible that an explanation lies in the 
nature of high-profile politics, which might lead minority senators to seek support from a 
more mainstream, urbanized voter base. The result is a shift away from the grass roots 
demands of the Indigenous movement, which may in turn heighten skepticism toward 
minority senate representation and the district. A deeper analysis of support patterns may 
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lend credence to such an explanation. If indigenous senate candidates exhibit more urban 
or “Andean” support patterns than Indigenous house candidates, this may be a partial 
confirmation that the lower chamber aspirants have stronger linkages with the grass roots 
base of the Indigenous movement.  
Finally, my results also show that the impact of minority district support on voter 
turnout is subject to geographical variation. While district support—particularly on the 
indigenous side—seems to have influence on turnout across all MMMs, the impact is 
sharper when Pacific region MMMs are isolated. These results speak to the diversity that 
is present within Colombian minority groups, as different geographical contexts produced 
different sets of interests and locations within the national division of labor (Wade 1993).  
The Pacific, more so than any other region, is home to struggles over collective land 
claims and control over critical resources (Asher 2009). Thus, it seems as though identity 
is particularly salient when it is linked with structural demands, particularly those in 
which cultural or traditional group rights plays a considerable role (e.g. collective 
territory, traditional modes of resource extraction, etc.). This preliminary finding merits 
greater attention. Further study on these regionalized outcomes is particularly important 
as it serves to deliver a better understanding of the nature of race in a post-racially 
democratic society—or at least a society that is post-racially democratic in the rhetorical 
sense. That is to say, the conjunction of ethnicity/race, “mutual experiences” (Mansbridge 
1999), and historically-rooted systemic disadvantages (Young 1989) seems to have 
acquired more force in certain spatial (read localized) contexts. Thus, the “friendly 
liquidation of the past”—to borrow a phrase from the late Donna Lee Van Cott—might 
be viewed as a post-racially democratic process in which the role of ethnicity and race in 
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the ordering of Latin American society has undergone a partial but incomplete 
reformation. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
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Minority quotas have become a popular tool through which legislative institutions are 
made more inclusive. This phenomenon has raised questions about the costs and benefits 
of these measures, the latter assessed according to the extent to which they produce 
effective minority representation. Determining the contexts in which descriptive minority 
representation results in substantive and symbolic outcomes for Afro and indigenous 
Colombians has been the main goal of this dissertation. In this chapter I revisit the 
purpose of the study and summarize my findings. I continue by touching on a few of the 
shortcomings of this research and future plans for study. 
 
RECAP OF THE STUDY AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
I began this project seeking an answer to a specific question: what are the substantive and 
symbolic outcomes of reserved representation for Afro and indigenous Colombians? In 
addition, I sought to determine how constituency outcomes impacted the representation 
of minority identity. I made the theoretical argument that the impact of descriptive 
representation on substantive and symbolic outcomes is conditioned by the history of 
mestizaje and racial democracy that undergirds ethno-racial perceptions in the region. 
This, the argument suggested, leaves interpretation as to who is an ethno-racial subject 
and in what ways identity can be legitimately used in relation to politics. This factor, in 
combination with the non-exclusive, non-geographical construction of Colombian 
minority districts, makes it necessary to consider the formation of minority constituencies 
through electoral processes. By making a cross-group comparison of understudied 
populations, this dissertation has made a considerable contribution to the literature 
surrounding the linkages between descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation.  
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My findings in Chapter 3 indicate that institutional design and systemic reforms 
play a considerable role in the electoral outcomes of minority districts. The respective 
manner in which each district was implemented has had two main effects: 1) contrasting 
levels of group control over ballot access and candidate selection; 2) fragmentation in 
minority rolls. These factors are understood to be crucial to representation, where process 
leads to outcomes. The oversight granted to indigenous organizations and traditional 
governing structures—as well as the more involved process of creating an indigenous 
organization—has, in a sense, centralized the candidate selection process for indigenous 
districts.
1
 This has resulted in less district fragmentation, a more unified indigenous vote 
around a limited number of aspirants, and cohesive organizations with enough reach to 
have broad appeal. The grass roots sector of the Afro movement, on the other hand, has 
been overshadowed by weak group control over ballot access and a remarkably simplistic 
process for establishing a profile as an Afro organization. The resulting spikes in the 
number of registered lists has exacerbated the pre-existing fragmentation in the Black 
movement and resulted in weak ethnic mandates. Moreover, BCD electoral processes 
have not produced lasting parties. I will revisit the fallout of these issues momentarily.  
Chapter 4 revealed mixed results in regard to the impact of constituency outcomes 
on the representation of group identity. Only in the ISD was I able to observe consistent 
support for the expectation that higher MID support and HHI scores would lead to higher 
rates of identity invocations and substantive linkages with identity. In addition, 
representatives from both indigenous districts produced the expected relationship in 
                                                       
1
 While “centralized” candidate selection is normally perceived as the control of party leaders over who 
runs for their party, I believe that the term is also applicable here if we substitute “minority group” for 
“party.”  
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regard to HHI and geography-identity linkages. Finally, ISD representation produced 
higher rates of identity-issue linkages than the other two districts. These findings clearly 
show that indigenous representation has been more substantively productive.  
In comparatively assessing empowerment outcomes, Chapter 5 continued the 
theme of impactful indigenous representation. The various models demonstrate that 
linkages to BCD candidates do not have statistically significant and positive impacts on 
turnout in Afro-majority municipalities. Linkages to ICD candidates, in contrast, were 
both significant and moderately positive for turnout in indigenous-majority 
municipalities. The other key finding was that each positive relationship was stronger 
when Pacific region minority-majority municipalities were isolated. 
 
REVISITING CAUSALITY 
It is possible that the lack of strong representational outcomes for Afro-Colombians is a 
function of the ardent erasure of negritud (blackness) from the Colombian national 
memory. This is also referred to as the blanqueamiento (whitening) of Colombian society 
via the erasure of African presence from her history and culture. In essence, the omission 
of “blackness” from the national memory was the official solution to the so-called “race 
problem.” As a matter of consequence, it should not be surprising that an identity linked 
to cultural and ideological genocide lacks salience.  
What I have argued here is that, while history and perceptions matter, institutional 
design is also important. The fact that minority districts were designed in their respective 
fashions is partially a function of historical circumstances. Indigenous actors have a 
greater sense of organizational knowledge due to the local governance of cabildos, which 
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in large part has provided them the organizational capacity to push for greater 
concessions during constitutional reform and exercise control over ballot access. It should 
also be noted, however, that this does not mean that Afro-Colombians are a population 
devoid of historical agency or that there is no identifiable Afro-Colombian segment that 
requires representation. Recognizing this, what remain foggy are the reasons to which we 
can attribute the comparative lack of transferability of Afro-Colombian identity—
particularly in the contemporary representational context—from the cultural to the 
political. I insist that this current reality, corroborated by the analyses presented here, 
extends primarily from the dearth of Afro control over representation. 
Pointing out high fragmentation and the lack of group control, however, may not 
be sufficient. But it does raise a new question: What types of candidates have been 
successful as a result of this design? Early cycles saw the election of figures that were at 
least known for connections to minority communities, if not prominent champions of 
Afro causes. A prime example is Zulia Mena (1994-1998), who had strong connections to 
the Proceso de Comunidades Negras and was involved in the interlocution with the state 
when Ley 70 was drafted. She continues her political role in Black communities and is 
the current mayor of Quibdó, the capital city of Chocó. Agustin Valencia, her legislative 
contemporary, has a similar background. But as time moved forward, the profile of BCD 
representation began to change. This began with the success of candidates of athletic 
fame but scant political experience (e.g. María Isabel Urrutía and Wellington Ortíz). 
Perhaps less helpful to the Colombian cause was the eventual infiltration of 
representatives connected to nefarious sectors and corrupt practices. Three of the four 
representatives elected from 2006-2014 fit this description. Silfrido Morales (2006-2010) 
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was sentenced to a six year prison sentence due to political corruption charges during his 
mayoral stint in María La Baja, Bolívar. Heriberto Arrechea’s (2010-2014) ties to Juan 
Carlos Martínez, the latter currently serving his own sentence for involvement in 
parapolitics, are widely known. The case of Yahir Acuña, discussed briefly in Chapter 4, 
is yet another example of clientelistic tendencies and shady allegiances. Acuña has ties to 
Enilce Lopéz, also known by her street alias La Gata, who is currently serving a lengthy 
prison sentence for ordering paramilitary squads to murder a woman in Bolívar. During a 
personal interview, scholar and activist Claudia Mosquera Rosero-Labbé spoke 
emphatically to this point. She stated that 
Each Afro representative has been a bigger joke than the one before. I had María 
Isabel Urrutía in this office asking me what are the important Black issues. Her, 
the already elected representative, asking me to tell her what the Black 
community’s problems are!....You don’t know?!...She hardly seemed intelligent. 
And the latest representative, this Yahir Acuña, is the most absurd joke of 
all….The fact is that most of these representatives do not have strong connections 
with Afro-Colombians…Most don’t even consider themselves Black! 
 
I am not sure how Dr. Mosquera-Labbé knows the self-perceptions of Afro 
representatives, but her words speak to the issue of poor linkages between Black 
representation and Afro communities due to the hijacking of reserved representation. I 
have asserted here that this dynamic is largely the result of institutional design, not just 
cultural perceptions of negritud, which cannot easily explain the electoral outcomes of 
the BCD. 
The data from Chapter 3 revealed the tendency of the BCD to produce 
comparatively higher HHI concentration scores. My expectations were that higher HHI 
would lead to greater linkages between identity and geography. The outcomes for this 
relationship, however, defied expectations, with BCD representatives exhibiting a 
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decreased tendency to link issues with geography as HHI rose. This prompts the need to 
reassess the message that we interpret from highly concentrated support patterns, 
particularly where minority district elections are dominated by figures with questionable 
ties to the group. That is to say, concentrated support within minority-influenced 
departments, which is most commonly the product of a local/departmental politician from 
an urban hub, will produce substantive outcomes only if the elected representative 
possesses genuine ties with the target group. Any other representative profile—like those 
mentioned above—will produce advocacy for localized interests that override broader 
group demands, especially those traditionally viewed as important to grass roots 
organizations (e.g. communal land rights, riparian rights, mining and agriculture, etc.). 
The lower HHI scores observed from indigenous elections, in contrast, are a sign of the 
exposure of indigenous parties that have survived multiple elections and fielded 
presidential candidates. These organizational platforms have brought more votes from 
non-indigenous areas, a sign of the broader appeal that produced lower HHI. The most 
counterintuitive finding is that this influx of votes from Bogotanos, Antioqueños, and the 
like did not inhibit substantive representation, at least as it was measured here. Other 
measures may have produced distinct results, a potential weakness that I discuss in the 
following section. 
From a macro standpoint, there is a factor that has received little attention here: 
the role of the state itself. Traditional understandings of ethnicity perceive these identities 
as exogenous to the state (determined outside of state activities). This dissertation’s 
findings, however, suggest that the state had a heavy hand in creating identity in 
contemporary Colombia, particularly in regard to the inclusion of minorities in national 
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governance. That is to say, the state’s active role in molding minority identity as it 
pertains to institutional politics has been left unarticulated. In earlier epochs, the state 
interpreted indigenous identity through state sanctioned territorial policies that attached 
indigeneity to territory. Contemporarily, the state has helped craft identity, at least in part, 
by offering different modes of implementing group representation. I have noted that 
Afro-Colombian districts were mobilized in a way that wrestles control over reserved 
representation away from the target group, opening the door for organizations with little 
connection to minority politics to hijack reserved seats. This outcome may be 
unintentional, but the district design had little chance of producing strong advocacy 
mainly because it left considerable interpretation as to who could present themselves as 
an Afro-Colombian. This came to a crescendo in 2014, an election that featured the 
election of two Euro-descendants to the seats reserved for Black communities, whose 
candidacy was legitimized simply because they received the sanction of Funeco, an 
organization filed with the Interior Ministry as an Afro movement. After legal challenges 
from Afro candidates who lost the election, their authorization was confirmed. Identity is 
left far less to the imagination for the purposes of legitimate representation, adding to the 
pages the state has authored that help dictate how Colombian society perceives 
legitimacy in regard to ethno-racial identities.  
 
SHORTCOMINGS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This project has perceived substantive representational outcomes in a way that is friendly 
to minorities who have little chance of passing legislation, which both Afro and 
indigenous representation have struggled to accomplish. Outcome-oriented substantive 
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representation was thus viewed as an unrealistic measure and would have produced little 
variation. The response was to mobilize substantive as a process-oriented variable (the 
representation of identity in plenary speeches). I maintain that this is a viable measure, 
but it leaves us wanting due to its avoidance of analyzing the policy process and nuances 
of legislative politics. With whom do minority representatives coalesce and co-author 
bills? Or, do they remain isolated? What is the content of authored bills? All of these 
questions are yet unexplored. Speaking for minority constituents is a valid critical act, but 
it is also a simplistic one that requires little political acumen and explains only a sliver of 
congressional activity.  
The lack of behavioral comparisons with non-minority and non-quota minority 
legislators has limited the conclusions that these analyses can deliver. The data presented 
here does not tell us how minority representatives alter congressional discourse and 
debate issues in comparison with others, their congressional behavior essentially 
presented in a theoretical and empirical bubble. It also leaves open the issue of the 
mandate effect. It is unclear how much of reserved representative behavior—invoking 
identity, for example—is a function of being authorized through an affirmative action 
measure.  
In the absence of viable public opinion data, measuring empowerment effects as a 
function of reserved seats necessitated adopting assumptions about turnout in minority-
majority municipalities. Most prominently, increases in minority-majority municipal 
turnout were understood to be driven entirely by minority populations, despite the fact 
that non-minorities votes could be part of the observed increases, thus skewing the 
outcomes in the dependent variable (turnout/empowerment). To boot, the key 
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independent variable (rate of district votes cast in the minority roll) is tested for its effect 
on a dependent variable that is also linked to votes, leaving the distinct separation 
between the two questionable. My justification is that, rather than testing votes on votes, I 
am testing for the impact of minority candidate support on municipal turnout. However, 
this approach for assessing empowerment has clear methodological weaknesses. 
Together, the findings and weaknesses of this dissertation point to future research 
possibilities. Additional studies should include comparisons between reserved 
representatives, minorities elected through regular channels, and non-minorities. There 
are certainly some examples of Afro and indigenous representatives who were elected 
through mainstream processes and who can be identified. Branching out in this fashion is 
a requisite for more generalizable conclusions on four fronts: 1) the overall impact of 
minority presence on institutional processes; 2) the exclusive effect that the mandate 
effect has on reserved representatives; 3) the invoking and linkage of identity across all 
representatives; 4) the contrasts between minority and non-minority issue positions and 
voting behaviors. 
Alternatively, focus on Afro and indigenous populations can be maintained while 
reconsidering outcome variables. Specifically, substantive representation must be re-
mobilized and new data added so that bill authorship, bill sponsorship, and issue 
congruence with constituents can be included. Each of these key additions can be 
accomplished by directing attention to the congressional debate of particular laws. This 
would involve the use of three sets of introduced laws: 1) laws authored by minorities; 2) 
laws co-authored by minorities; and 3) laws that focus on issues of importance to 
minorities. This will grant us the ability to see further inside the legislative process and 
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identify substantive representation in a more nuanced fashion. In addition, it will be 
possible to measure minority solidarity in both plenary speeches and roll call votes. 
Finally, an expansion to cross-national public opinion studies may provide better 
indicators of the attitudinal impact of inclusive measures. A comparison of quota types 
(party quotas versus reserved seat policies) and magnitudes (number of seats 
awarded/gained) would be particularly useful for making contributions to the discussion 
surrounding critical mass. The greatest barrier to this advancement is the availability of 
public opinion data that is comparable, longitudinal, and reaches significant minority 
response rates, a true challenge given the levels of poverty in which many indigenous and 
Afro-Latinos exist.  
Whichever research path is chosen, I feel confident that ethno-racial 
representation through quotas—within and beyond Latin America—will prove to be a 
fruitful area of inquiry into the distant future. Gender scholars have drawn up a 
theoretical and empirical roadmap that acts as a great heuristic. The nuances of groups 
like Afro and indigenous Latinos, however, diverge significantly from women, a 
ubiquitous global minority that consistently comprises roughly half of the national 
population.  Thus modifying extant theories, as I have tried to do here, will revolve 
around adjusting to the types of constituencies that different ethnic groups produce, 
whether regional, urban/rural, separatist, working class, or otherwise. 
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Variable Description        Code  
 
Representative       
 _________________ 
 
Gaceta/File No.       
 _________________ 
 
Legislative Period       
 _________________ 
 
Gender of Speaker (1 = female, 0 = male)               ____ 
  
Representative Type (1 = BCD; 2 = ICD; 3 = ISD)    ____ 
 
Number of words in speech        ____ 
 
Number of ethnicity/race invocations      ____ 
 
Invocation type (1 = substantive; 2 = non-subst; 3 = unclear)  ____ 
 Substantive indicates that the invocation is clearly linked to a specific argument or policy proposal.  
 
 
Geography invoked (1 = Yes; 2 = No)     ____ 
 
Level of specificity (1 = Region; 2 = Dept; 3 = Muni; 4 = Various)  ____ 
 
Locations mentioned: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Identity/minorities linked to location (1 = Yes; 2 = No; 0 = Unclear) ____ 
 
Geography invocation type (1 = substantive; 2 = non-subst; 3 = unclear) ____ 
Substantive indicates that geographical location is clearly linked to a specific argument or policy proposal 
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 Issue Coverage in Speech 
 
Tone of Speech (T) (1 = positive; 2 = negative; 3 = mixed; 4 = neutral; 0 = no tone)  
Substantive Identity Linkage (S) (1 = substantive, 2 = non-subst, 3 = unclear) 
 Issue T S  Issue T S 
1 Defense Issues   19 Religion/Church   
2 Internal Conflict/Peace   20 Gay Rights    
3 Military Service/Appts.   21 Human Rights   
    22 Civil Rights   
4 Foreign Affairs   23 Women’s Issues/Rights   
5 Trade       
6 Treaties   24 Economy   
7 Terrorism   25 Budget   
8 War   26 Taxes   
9 International Orgs.   27 Employment/Jobs   
    28 Government Spending   
10 Education       
11 Healthcare   29 Business   
12 Immigration   30 Environmental Policies   
    31 Special Interests   
13 Culture   32 Energy/Oil   
14 Traditional Values       
15 Marriage Equality   33 Congress   
    34 Party Politics   
16 Crime/Corrections   35 Corruption   
17 Justice System        
    36 Territory/Land Issues   
18 Symbolic (e.g. holidays)    37 Agriculture   
    38 Mining   
    39 Riparian Issues/Rights    
    40 Athletics/Sports   
    41 Displacement   
    42 Minority Group Rights   
    43 Poverty/Inequality   
        
        
44 Other (describe below)       
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Afro-majority municipalities (AMMs): municipalities comprised of a 70% or greater 
Afro-Colombian population. 
Ethnic invocation score (EIS): statistic denoting the rate at which a legislator or group 
of legislators invokes minority identity in substantive (policy-relevant) plenary speeches. 
The statistic is tabulated by dividing the number of identity-inclusive speeches by the 
total number of speeches delivered by the legislator (EIS = identity-inclusive speeches ÷ 
total substantive speeches). 
Hirschman-Hirfandahl Index (HHI) score: index denoting the concentration or 
dispersion of a candidate or representative’s electoral support. Score is tabulated by 
squaring the proportion of a candidate’s vote total from each of the 32 departments and 
Bogotá(33 proportions total) and adding these figures together.  These figures are then 
added together to give the “sum of squared proportions” statistic. The sum of squared 
proportions is then multiplied by 100 in order to produce an integer. HHI scores can 
range anywhere between 3.03 (perfectly dispersed across all departments) to 100 (full 
concentration within a single department).  This measure is computed at the candidate, 
district-year, and district (all years) levels. 
Indigenous-majority municipalities (IMMs): municipalities comprised of a 70% or 
greater indigenous populations. 
Minority-influenced departments (MIDs): departments comprised of a 15% or greater 
minority population, taking into account one minority group or the other (Afro and 
indigenous shares of the population are not combined). 
Minority-majority municipalities (MMMs): municipalities comprised of a 70% or 
greater ethnic minority population. 
 
 
